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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of a business has been the matter of a long-standing scholarly 
deliberation in relation to a firm’s orientation towards its internal and external 
stakeholders. The rising social and environmental challenges require a firm to 
adopt a wider stakeholder approach in its behaviors and practices, yet most large 
firms often fall short of this expectation. While research on assessing corporate 
stakeholder orientation has received considerable academic scrutiny, the reason 
why firms adopt specific orientations has so far been approached in a rather 
fragmented fashion. Corporate stakeholder orientation construct in itself remains 
under-theorized and its assessment is often contaminated with green-washing and 
corporate posturing that makes it difficult to construe firms’ de facto stakeholder 
intent. This doctoral dissertation is dedicated to understand corporate stakeholder 
orientations across multiple contexts by inquiring into its antecedents, refining its 
assessment, and in turn providing theoretical clarity to the construct. Adopting a 
multi-theoretical perspective and a mixed methods approach, this thesis aspires to 
have implications for both theory and practice.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
What is the purpose of a business? That is the question! 
“The purpose of a business” has long been the subject of scholarly deliberation in 
relation to a firm’s orientation towards its multiple stakeholders. It raises some 
important questions – First, what determines firms’ orientations and who are 
firms’ oriented towards? Second, do firms exist to boost shareholder value and 
must espouse a shareholder orientation or are they conceived to satisfy broader 
socio-economic goals and should embrace a wider stakeholder orientation (Berle, 
1931; Stout, 2012; Wood & Jones, 1995)? Despite the proliferation of research 
aimed at understanding corporate orientations, these questions continue to 
remain intriguing, particularly in view of the differences that exist in managerial 
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mindsets across contexts (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Jamali, 
Sidani, & El-Asmar, 2009; Waldman, de Luque, Washburn, & House et al., 2006). 
My work is an attempt to open this black box and provide answers to these 
questions. 
1.1 Relevance and gap 
A corporation’s orientation is the executive view of a firm’s relevant stakeholders 
and can be perceived from two different perspectives. According to the 
shareholder view, popularized by Friedman (1962; 1970), firms are only directly 
responsible to shareholders; maximizing shareholder wealth implicitly creates 
value for society, thus benefiting other stakeholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen, 2002; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In line with this perspective, the wording 
of corporate statutes found in the most prominent countries in the world 
interprets shareholder value maximization as a corporation’s fiduciary duty (Stout, 
2012), thus encouraging shareholder primacy in corporate decision-making. 
Accordingly, corporate governance rules are designed to shape the shareholder-
manager relationship structure for the objective of minimizing managerial self-
interest and maximizing shareholder value (Berle & Means, 1932).  
On the other hand, the stakeholder model, propagated by Freeman (1984), 
contends that firms’ purposes and actions affect and are affected not only by 
shareholders, but also by other non-shareholding entities. It follows that no 
particular stakeholder group (shareholders constituting just one of them) has an 
obvious priority over the others (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, Harrison, 
& Wicks, 2007). Over the years, this concept has taken a firm footing in both 
research and practice, resulting in changes in corporate laws (such as constituency 
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statutes and business judgment rules in the US) that allow corporate insiders to 
consider the interest of non-shareholding stakeholders in decision making in the 
overall best interest of both the firm and society at large (Flammer & Kacperczyk, 
2015; Stout, 2012). Often firms build, maintain and manage their stakeholder 
relationships through socially responsible investments in favor of such entities 
(Wood, 1991). This has in part led to redefining corporate governance both as 
structure of rights and responsibilities among those “with a stake in the firm” 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aoki, 2001:11) and as a constitution of organizational 
processes through which different corporate governance indicators and variables 
interact and affect each other with the aim of influencing both financial and social 
value creation (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008).  
Furthermore, the stakeholder orientation assumes more prominence in the face of 
mounting evidence of different classes of stakeholders having the ability to impact 
corporate financial performance, and consequently to affect shareholder value 
(Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). It is found that 
firms with high levels of social engagement are likely to build up loyal customers 
(Brown & Dacin, 1997; Maignan, 2001) and employees (Rupp, Ganapathi, Aguilera, 
& Williams, 2006), have better community access (Frynas, 2005; Marquis, Glynn, & 
Davis, 2007) and a greater regulatory support (Vogel, 1997). Together, these 
advantages translate into both tangible and intangible benefits for firms such as 
gaining preferential access to critical resources and assets (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978), improved trust, social legitimacy and reputation (e.g., Luo & Bhattacharya, 
2006; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001; Turban & Greening, 1996), and sustained 
competitive advantages (Hillman & Keim 2001).  
Yet, akin to the idea of a good society (Rawls, 2000), which could take on diverse 
meanings for various communities around the world, the stakeholder orientation 
could also be considered to be pluralistic (Godfrey, 2005). Different stakeholder 
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entities have distinct value systems and moral preferences (Donaldson & Dunfee, 
1999), which shape the expectations they have of the firms in which they hold a 
stake in ways that do not necessarily coincide (Stout, 2012). Industry, regional and 
national specificities exert a particularly relevant influence on the heterogeneity of 
stakeholder expectations (Campbell, 2007; Matten & Moon, 2008; Welford, 2005). 
Given the value of stakeholder engagement through corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) activities, the selection of stakeholders, with their potentially conflicting 
expectations, becomes a key management issue (Mitchell et al., 1997; Godfrey, 
2005).  
Furthermore, the very nature of stakeholder relationships is determined by 
multiple dimensions of corporate governance, their indicators and constituent 
variables. For instance, at the macro level, formal and informal institutions 
(Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014) can determine both the 
form (explicit or implicit) and the intensity of CSR practices towards managing 
stakeholders (Matten & Moon, 2008). Yet, at the micro level, the individual 
demographical and socio-psychological experiences of managers and directors 
shape their world-views and manifest themselves in symbolic or substantive 
efforts toward stakeholder value creation (Walls & Hoffman, 2013; Chin, 
Hambrick, & Treviño, 2013). Similarly, the interplay of corporate governance 
indicators at the firm and board levels determines the relative salience they wield 
as they interactively and collectively influence the formation of a firm’s 
stakeholder orientation (Aguilera, Desender, & Kabbach-Castro, 2012). So far, 
research on this aspect has developed in a somewhat fragmented fashion across 
various disciplines such as law and finance, governance and public policy, 
economics, sociology, and management (Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & Lee, 
2015). Consequently, it has fallen short of providing a holistic frame for the 
intricate web of relationships that drive companies toward the adoption of a 
particular configuration of stakeholder orientation.  
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In parallel, although research on corporate social orientation has proliferated (e.g., 
Aupperle, Burton & Goldsby, 2009; Carroll, & Hatfield, 1985; Fukukawa & 
Teramoto, 2009; Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1991; 1995; Sotorrío & Sánchez, 2008), 
there are theoretical and methodological concerns that persist. Theoretically, the 
corporate social orientation construct is based on an all-inclusive definition of CSR 
given by Carroll (1991) who defines CSR as including firms’ economic, legal, ethical, 
and philanthropic responsibilities.  Yet as originally proposed (see Aupperle, 1984), 
corporate social orientation differentiates firms’ responsibility into economic and 
non-economic spheres and is known to corroborate better with the non-economic 
component of a firms’ responsibilities. Foundationally, it is almost exclusively 
embedded in a western society setting, particularly that of the US; this restricts its 
transferability to wider international contexts (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). 
From a methodological standpoint, the literature presents a resounding consensus 
on the fact that the techniques used to assess firms’ orientations are not effective 
in precluding green-washing practices aimed at fabricating a socially favorable 
image of a firm (Wood, 2010). Therefore, the resonant question concerns not just 
a clarification on the meaning of corporate orientation but also how these 
orientations can be properly assessed when a large proportion of corporate 
communication is green-washed and social performance data are presented 
selectively or belatedly, if at all?  
In order to shed new light on these persisting questions, I look at two aspects – 
First, what multilevel dimensions of corporate governance could influence the 
construction of corporate stakeholder orientation (CSO)? Second, how can 
green-washing and puffery be filtered out of the assessment of corporate 
stakeholder orientations across comparative contexts? 
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1.2 Theoretical perspectives leveraged 
To assess which dimensions of corporate governance can be instrumental in 
determining a firm’s stakeholder orientation and, subsequently, its performance, 
and to address the first aspect, I draw on a multi-theoretical perspective of 
corporate governance. Traditionally, good corporate governance is entrenched in 
agency theory. Agency theory presumes that, despite being shareholder agents, 
managers are guided by economic self-interest and are thus motivated toward 
opportunism in decision-making, even at the detriment of shareholder value 
(Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The theory proposes that these 
agency costs can be minimized or avoided through contractual relations between 
shareholders and managers that are geared towards the overarching goal of 
maximizing shareholder wealth (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Therefore, agency 
theory inherently emphasizes shareholder primacy in which non-shareholder 
relationships are instrumentally leveraged to increase shareholder value 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001).  
Agency theory has been the seminal notion behind corporate governance research 
across disciplines such as law, accounting, finance and economics, and strategic 
management (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002). Yet it is controversial; sociologists are 
presenting growing evidence that agency theory lacks predictive validity (Judge, 
2008). Specifically, it is criticized for overly simplifying the view of organizational 
relationships by over-emphasizing the relevance of financial incentives for 
managers and financial outcomes for firms. In addition, it fails to recognize the 
importance of the contexts within which manager-shareholder relations are 
embedded (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988).  
Institutional theory offers an alternative perspective of corporate governance 
within management. It is an approach that explains those management practices 
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and behaviors that defy the economic rationality presumed by agency theory. 
Specifically, neo-institutional theory argues that organizations operate within 
social contexts and can survive and succeed by conforming to socially legitimate 
behaviors prescribed by institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). From the institutional theory perspective, comparative institutionalism and 
organizational institutionalism are particularly relevant for the study of corporate 
governance. Comparative institutionalism adopts a multi-disciplinary approach 
and draws from economics, political economy and sociology. Focusing on the 
country level, it suggests that the various institutions found in the economic, 
political and sociological strata of societies co-evolve over time to emerge as 
interconnected structures in the form of national business systems (Whitley, 
1992), varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001), and national governance 
systems (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). This characterization is particularly suited for 
understanding cross-country differences between national institutions, including 
those related to corporate governance, and their effects on firms’ stakeholder 
orientations (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001; Matten & 
Moon, 2008). Organizational institutionalism focuses on the firm level and 
suggests that firms are affected by not only formal institutions, but also by 
informal ones, such that they exert coercive, normative and mimetic pressures 
toward the adoption of structures and practices aimed at gaining social legitimacy 
(Scott, 2008). I use both comparative institutionalism and organizational 
institutionalism to understand how corporate governance dimensions influence 
the formation of a firm’s stakeholder orientations in different social contexts.  
While the institutional perspective has gained much prominence and influence in 
the field of management and governance, its critics contend that not all firms 
within a particular social context are the same; some are capable of resisting the 
pressures of institutional conformation and instead exhibit agency aimed at 
managing or manipulating the institutions themselves (Oliver, 1991). I recognize 
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and employ this interplay between agency and institutional theories to 
understand the extent to which companies conform to or deflect societal norms 
and expectations as they frame their stakeholder orientations.  
Another theoretical perspective leveraged by emerging research in the field of 
corporate governance is resource dependence theory. This theory is based on the 
logic that, being open systems, firms do not just interact with institutional forces, 
but also transact with each other at the organizational level to secure the 
resources they need to survive. In other words, to reduce their dependency on the 
environment, firms coopt among themselves for tangible and intangible resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). By virtue of the advantages they acquire by networking 
with other companies (Granovetter, 1985), corporate insiders gain resource 
provision abilities and knowledge linkages (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). This gives 
them the power to influence relationship structures and decision-making 
processes, thereby shaping firms’ stakeholder orientations (Bansal & Clelland, 
2004).  
Finally, stakeholder theory has recently made headway in corporate governance 
literature. It is a theory of organizational management that draws on business 
ethics to advance the notion that firms do not only entertain relationships with 
shareholders, but with a broader spectrum of stakeholders that includes 
employees, consumers, governments, environmental advocates and others 
(Freeman, 1984). Firms that take the well-being of all their stakeholders into 
consideration will function more effectively and create more value, both financial 
and non-financial (Spitzeck 2009; Windsor, 2006). In terms of corporate 
governance, the application of stakeholder theory implies the adoption of a 
broader stakeholder focus and the creation of value that extends beyond that 
relevant to shareholders, as propagated by the agency view. What is particularly 
noteworthy is how the interests of a variety of stakeholders, including those of 
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corporate insiders, work in combination to increase value for both the company 
and society at large. In this manner, managerial agency and managerial 
stakeholder responsibilities are expected to interact with reference to the 
institutional environment within which a firm is embedded.  
In Chapter 2, I draw on these four theoretical perspectives to assess how multi-
level dimensions of corporate governance function at different levels and 
influence the determination of corporate stakeholder orientations. Through a 
systematic review of the field, I will show that corporate governance systems do 
not reflect the prominence of any one theoretical paradigm – as had been 
traditionally assumed – but is the product of an amalgam of the various 
perspectives; this result can have far reaching consequences for the spectrum of 
managerial responsibilities (Waldman & Galvin, 2008) – particularly the social 
ones.  
To assess firms’ stakeholder orientations by filtering out the impact of green-
washing, and to answer the second question, I begin by adding multi-
dimensionality to Aupperle’s (1984) construct of corporate social orientation. The 
corporate social orientation construct was intended to reflect the managerial view 
of a firm’s economic and non-economic responsibilities towards its internal and 
external stakeholders (Aupperle, 1984). To establish its multi-dimensional nature 
necessary to extract green-washed orientations and capture de-facto orientations, 
I draw on the signaling and neo-institutional theories. Signaling theory was 
originally conceptualized in evolutionary biology and was later applied to the field 
of management in the context of the asymmetry of information in the 
employment market (See Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Erhart & 
Ziegert, 2005; Rynes & Barber 1990; Spence 1973; Turban, 2001). In the corporate 
governance and strategy literature, signaling theory was predominantly employed 
to communicate earnings quality and CEO certifications to investors (Zhang & 
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Wiersema, 2009), while firm ownerships were utilized to signal incentive 
alignment with shareholders (Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes, & Dharwadkar, 
2007). To some extent, signaling theory has also been used in the context of 
stakeholder engagement and CSR. This strand of literature discusses that 
managers utilize voluntary information disclosure for image management 
(Salancik & Meindl 1984) and to impress their world-view upon stakeholders; 
managers may also signal CSR performance for attracting employees to the labor 
pool  (Turban & Greening, 2000). In this thesis, I apply signaling theory to the study 
of corporate social orientation. The argument that I make rests on the logic that 
corporate orientations are managerial intent signals constructed by managers, 
carrying both economic and non-economic information, and targeted towards 
stakeholders and society with the purpose of communicating a specific image of 
the firm.  
To identify and subsequently eliminate the effects of green-washing from 
corporate orientations, I build on the neo-institutional theory literature, 
particularly, on the concept of ceremonial conformation. Ceremonial 
conformation is useful to understand discrepancies within organizational structure 
and processes, and explains how firms adopt formal structures and procedures to 
conform to external expectations, while keeping their internal processes 
decoupled from them to avoid any exposure of discrepancies and consequential 
loss of legitimacy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Referred to as 
the gap between policy and practice, the reason behind this decoupling is typically 
attributed to differences that exist between intentions and actions (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012).  
Combining this with signaling theory, I extend the application of the decoupling 
concept – i.e. the gap between intent and action – to the study of the evolution of 
corporate intent over time. To this end, I progress two arguments. The first is that, 
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if an organization has the genuine (de facto) intention of maintaining specific 
stakeholder relationships, its orientation signals will be less sensitive to any 
turbulence presented by economic cycles (Surroca & Tribo, 2008). Extending this 
argument, I contend that a substantial decoupling in stakeholder signaling that 
may transpire during economically turbulent circumstances could be indicative of 
corporate green-washing. Accordingly and with the objective of capturing de facto 
corporate social orientations, Chapter 3 entails an assessment of the degree of 
decoupling occurring in corporate social orientations in the context of an 
economic crisis. Through this analysis, I uncover that although the construct of 
corporate social orientations is based on Carroll’s (1991) all-inclusive view of CSR 
that encompasses both economic and non-economic responsibilities of managers 
towards stakeholders, in its present conceptualization proposed by Aupperle 
(1984), it tends to emphasize and corroborate better with social dimensions of 
responsibility, while falling short of identifying the associated beneficiary 
stakeholders (see Aupperle et al., 1985). Consequently, I re-frame the corporate 
social orientation construct presented by Aupperle (1984) as corporate 
stakeholder orientation (CSO) that includes the wide spectrum of managerial 
responsibilities towards multiple stakeholders (as was originally intended) and 
offers a better approach to identify corporate purpose––both economic and 
social. Progressing the second argument, I assert that de facto CSO signals should 
encompass long-term managerial commitment and thus remain stable over time. 
Building on this, a temporal assessment of CSO can illuminate a company’s long-
term stakeholder commitment. Reframing corporate social orientations as 
corporate stakeholder orientations, Chapter 4 develops the argument towards 
assessing the trend of stakeholder signals, as effectually indicative of de facto CSO. 
In parallel, by leveraging comparative institutionalism, I shed light on de facto CSO 
across different countries and industries. Institutional theorists are increasingly 
arguing that the institutional pressures borne from the juxtaposition of coercive, 
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mimetic and normative forces are contingent upon the country and the industry 
within which a firm is embedded (Campbell, 2007; Jamali & Neville, 2011; Williams 
& Aguilera, 2008; Witt & Redding, 2013). Heeding these calls, through my 
research, I attempt to shed light on the processes through which companies 
identify their legitimate stakeholders and construct their CSO across multiple 
contexts. 
1.3 Research methods adopted 
Choosing a research methodology invokes a philosophical debate on ontology and 
epistemology. Ontology concerns “philosophical assumptions about the nature of 
reality”, whereas epistemology deals with “the best ways of inquiring into the 
nature of the world” (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2012: 17). Many authors 
suggest that any research method carries with it ontological and epistemological 
assumptions about the nature of knowledge and about the methods employed to 
obtain that knowledge. Thus, the choice of a research method reflects an 
allegiance to either an objectivist or an interpretivist view of the world (Morgan & 
Smircich, 1980). In the realm of social science research, this implies that 
quantitative (positivist) and qualitative (constructivist) research methods are 
inherently inconsistent with each other and exist in parallel (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979). Therefore, any mixed approach combining qualitative and quantitative 
methods could elicit a critique stemming from the paradigm argument that, from 
an epistemological perspective, quantitative and qualitative methods cannot be 
interconnected (Kuhn, 1970). 
This critique notwithstanding, the use of mixed methods has been on the rise over 
the last two decades. The number of business related articles employing mixed 
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methods that are published in peer-reviewed academic research journals has 
increased several-fold (Bryman, 2009; Gardner, Lowe, Moss, & Mahoney et al., 
2010). Additionally, the launch of the Journal of Mixed Methods Research, a 
specialist journal catering to this genre, signals the general acceptability and 
credibility of mixed methods among the academic community (Bazeley, 2008). In 
this section, in view of the ontological and epistemological objections that may be 
raised against it, I will justify the use of mixed methods to answer the research 
questions raised in this study.  
The acceptability of mixed methods draws from the scholarly observation that, 
although contrasting qualitative and quantitative methods is useful, straitjacketing 
them may not be. From a pragmatic perspective, scholars argue that it is more 
important to understand and resolve any questions and dilemmas pertaining to 
social issues rather than be constrained by ideological disputes in doing so 
(Caracelli & Greene, 1997). A more informed response highlights several examples 
in which the two methods clearly overlap. Qualitative research has been 
successfully used to test theories, rather than generate them. In parallel, 
quantitative research has been used to establish the foundations for qualitative 
case based research (e.g., Storey, Phillips, Maczewski, & Wang, 2002). This 
demonstrates that the two methods are not clearly separated and that, in some 
situations, mixed methods can be usefully leveraged in research.  
The case for the adoption of a mixed method is reinforced in those cases in which 
the research inquiry cannot be adequately answered by the individual use of 
either qualitative or quantitative methods (Bazeley, 2008; Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
This is particularly true of complex phenomena that cannot be fully transformed 
and represented by means of variables of cause and effect. Mixed methods are 
also credited with improving the validity and generalizability of results (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2012). Finally, there is no data analysis that is purely quantitative in 
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nature. Fielding and Fielding (1986:12) argued that: “…ultimately, all methods of 
data collection are analyzed ‘qualitatively’ insofar as the act of analysis is an 
interpretation and therefore, of necessity, a selective rendering of the ‘sense’ of 
the available data.” 
While mixed methods could be employed in various research designs, one 
prominent use is for the purpose of data analysis. A well-received technique 
involves the analysis of qualitative data using quantitative techniques (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2012). I follow this method for assessing CSO in Chapter 3 and 4. In 
line with the research question that aims at assessing de facto CSO, I use thematic 
analysis, a technique commonly employed in psychological studies (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). This is a qualitative method that involves quantifying texts by using 
recurring patterns of explicit themes (Boyatzis, 1998). I argue that CSO can be 
imputed from voluntary corporate communications by examining what is being 
communicated and then identifying the relevant stakeholders towards whom 
specific communications are directed. Using this technique, I develop a CSO code 
by iteratively moving between theory and data in a process carried out manually 
by two independent coders. The final code thus developed is pre-tested and 
validated to ensure that any interpretations drawn from the thematic code are 
free from researcher bias and reliably reflect a company’s CSO. Finally, I apply this 
code to voluntary CEO communications and carry out quantitative data analysis in 
order to extract meaningful results about de facto CSOs across countries and 
industries.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is prepared as a monograph, following a three-essay format. The first 
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essay is titled, “Looking inside the black box: The effect of corporate governance 
on corporate social responsibility” and is under second review at Corporate 
Governance: An International Review. The second essay, “Decoupling Corporate 
Social Orientations: A Cross-National Analysis”, is accepted for publication in 
Business & Society. The third essay, “Corporate Stakeholder Orientation in an 
Emerging Country Context: A Longitudinal Cross-industry Analysis”, is under 
second review at the Journal of Business Ethics. In the first essay, I address the 
question: what multilevel dimensions of corporate governance could influence the 
construction of corporate stakeholder orientations? In the second and third 
essays, I focus on the second question of the thesis: how can green-washing and 
puffery be filtered out of the assessment of corporate stakeholder orientations 
across comparative contexts?   
In the next section, I provide a brief overview of the three essays that make up my 
thesis. All the references and the additional tables and figures that support each 
essay are provided at the end of each respective chapter.  
1.4.1 Essay I 
“Looking inside the black box: The effect of corporate governance on 
corporate social responsibility” 
In this essay, I focus on the antecedents of CSO by studying the effects of multi-
level dimensions of corporate governance. I adopt a multi-theoretical perspective 
of corporate governance that goes beyond the ‘usual suspects’ (i.e., the agency 
theory approach to governance) and assimilate arguments drawn from 
institutional, resource dependence and stakeholder theories over and above the 
agency theory approach, to explain why corporate governance dimensions 
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functioning at multiple levels of analysis tend to have a positive, negative or 
neutral effect on a firm’s non-financial outcomes (Judge, 2008). I frame this article 
in the form of a systematic literature review that focuses on peer-reviewed articles 
in the field of management and finance that were published during the last decade 
and a half. Adopting a holistic approach, I examine the effect of various corporate 
governance dimensions, their indicators and constituent variables, independently 
and interactively, on a firm’s social performance (Aguilera et al., 2015; Aguilera et 
al., 2008; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; Walls, Berrone, & Phan, 2012). I conclude that 
greater scholarly attention needs to be placed upon breaking down aggregates 
into sub-parts and yet understanding how multiple configurations of corporate 
governance variables bundle up––substitute, complement and override each 
other––to impact firms’ social investments. I also note the importance of using a 
multi-theoretical lens besides sophisticated empirical methodologies to provide a 
deeper and fine-grained analysis of corporate governance systems and processes 
and of how they relate to the demands and expectations of multiple stakeholders 
across societies.  
1.4.2 Essay II  
“Decoupling corporate social orientations: A cross-national analysis” 
In Essay II, I focus my attention on the assessment of corporate social orientations. 
I draw on signaling theory and the decoupling concept and extend their 
application to the study of gaps in corporate intent (orientations). I build on the 
corporate social orientation construct (as originally proposed by Aupperle, 1984) 
and conceptualize it as a legitimizing signal carefully thought up and constructed 
by corporate insiders to showcase a specific company image aimed at maintaining 
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its social license to operate. I argue that executives are incentivized to share 
information designed to shroud their private intentions with public pretentions 
that conform to stakeholder expectations. I contend that genuine or de facto 
orientations should be long-term and relatively less sensitive to economic cycles 
(Surocca & Tribo, 2008). I demonstrate that the decoupling between corporate 
private intentions and corporate public pretentions can be captured by comparing 
corporate orientations publicized before and during legitimacy threats, such as 
those posed by the economic crisis, thereby bringing to light de facto corporate 
orientations (O’Donovan, 2002). Using thematic analysis, I develop and validate a 
CSO index that identifies executive orientations towards stakeholder groups and 
issues. When applied to a sample of banking firms selected across different 
institutional contexts – namely, the US, Germany and India – this CSO index 
reveals the dominance of shareholder orientation across countries. It appears 
that, during good times, companies project a multi-stakeholder image geared 
towards employees, communities and the environment to enhance their social 
license to operate; yet, such signals are not carried through in times of crisis. I 
argue that this disconnect in signaling in the wake of a legitimacy threat is 
indicative of the decoupling between corporate public pretentions and corporate 
private intentions. In summary, my findings indicate that, in comparison to their 
German counterparts, US and Indian companies are more prone to green-wash 
their images. It also appears that in the context of a crisis, the strict typologies of 
developed countries, and particularly those regarding CSOs, may be diluted, and 
that developing countries may present a unique set of CSOs. I conclude that, 
amidst the increasing use of corporate disclosures as green-washing and 
impression building tools, systematic mechanisms to uncover de facto CSOs must 
be discovered. In order to do this, it is imperative to untangle the multi-
dimensional facets of CSO. Through this study, I provide a new perspective to do 
so from both theoretical and methodological standpoints.  
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1.4.3 Essay III  
“Corporate stakeholder orientation in an emerging country context: 
A longitudinal cross-industry analysis” 
In Essay III, I delve deeper into assessing corporate social orientations. I re-frame 
corporate social orientations as corporate stakeholder orientations (CSO). I argue 
that corporate stakeholder orientation better represents a firm’s orientations 
towards multiple stakeholders (including shareholders). Extending the argument 
that genuine stakeholder orientations should not be very sensitive to changes in 
economic cycles (Surocca & Tribo, 2008), I argue that de facto stakeholder 
orientations should encompass long-term managerial commitment and remain 
relatively stable over time. Thus, assessing stakeholder signal trends can bring to 
light a firm’s long-term stakeholder commitments and, consequently, their de 
facto orientations. Building on essay II’s assertion of CSO being a legitimizing 
signal, I employ institutional logic at the industry level and contend that when 
framing their stakeholder orientations, firms face coercive, mimetic and normative 
pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). The impact of these 
institutional pressures on CSO will be tempered by the industry in which firms are 
embedded (Campbell, 2007). The interplay of industry-specific complexities and 
cross-industry similarities may lead to the emergence of different CSO groupings 
(O’Connor & Shumate, 2010). Applying the CSO index developed in essay 2 to an 
emerging country context, I uncover significant industry-related CSO differences 
that are potentially driven by four key factors: the degree of competitive 
dynamics, the nature of products and services, the extent of negative externalities 
and social activism, and the exposure to international markets. Yet, I also highlight 
a widening gap between corporate shareholder and non-shareholder orientations. 
I make suggestions for future research and conclude that industry level 
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institutional characteristics are highly relevant in understanding the formulation of 
corporate intent and, consequently, corporate responsibilities. Concomitantly, by 
assessing CSOs prior to the introduction of mandatory CSR regulations, I capture 
the disparities between firms’ existing orientations and those that such regulatory 
practices seek to establish. In this manner, I inform the debate on the purpose of a 
business viewed through a corporate lens relative to how it is perceived by the 
regulatory state.  
1.4.4 Presentation and scholarly contribution  
This thesis is a compendium of the above-mentioned three essays that are in 
various stages of publication as presented in Table 1.1. The first essay is a sole-
authored paper that has been accepted for publication in Business & Society in 
December 2014. The second essay is co-written with Ruth V. Aguilera and Dima 
Jamali and has been revised and resubmitted at Journal of Business Ethics in May 
2015. The third essay is written with Dima Jamali and is under second revision at 
Corporate Governance: An International Review as of September, 2015.  
The three essays are elaborated upon in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Each chapter 
provides a comprehensive account of the research gap, questions addressed, 
research methods employed, and a discussion of the findings and conclusions. 
Chapter 5 presents a synthesized discussion of the conclusions of the thesis and of 
avenues for future research. Collectively, my essays aspire to add greater clarity to 
the debate on the purpose of a business in two ways. Firstly, they provide a 
holistic view of the antecedents of CSO.  
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Table 1.1: Contributions to scientific knowledge 
Title Authorship Journal Status Publisher Conference Presentations 
 
Looking Inside the  
Black Box: The  
Effect of  
Corporate  
Governance on  
Corporate Social 
Responsibility  
 
 
Decoupling  
Corporate Social 
Orientations:  
A Cross-National 
Analysis 
 
 
Corporate  
Stakeholder  
Orientation in  
an Emerging  
Country Context:  
A Longitudinal  
Cross-Industry  
Analysis 
 
 
Tanusree  
Jain, Dima  
Jamali  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tanusree  
Jain 
 
 
 
 
 
Tanusree  
Jain, Ruth V. 
Aguilera,  
Dima Jamali 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate  
Governance: An 
International Review 
Impact Factor 2013: 
1.766  
Ranking: Business  
41/ 111 
 
 
Business & Society 
Impact Factor 2014: 
1.804  
Ranking: Business  
38/ 111 
 
 
Journal of Business  
Ethics 
Impact Factor 2013: 
1.552  
Ranking: Business  
52/ 111 
 
 
 
Revise & 
Resubmit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accepted: 
In Press 
 
 
 
 
 
Revise & 
Resubmit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wiley  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sage  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Springer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IABS Conference 2015  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SBE Conference 2013,  
IABS Conference 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Working paper presented  
at AOM 2014, CLADEA  
Conference 2014, IABS  
Conference 2015,  
latest version presented  
at 5th Strategy Symposium 
on Emerging Markets  
2015 
 
Secondly, by uncovering the multi-dimensionality of the CSO construct through 
the development and validation of a thematic CSO code, they attempt to advance 
both the theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches hitherto 
adopted to assess CSO. The conclusions of my thesis have been construed to 
provide guidance to scholars, business organizations, rating agencies, and policy 
makers on the interplay of the contextual factors and on the intricacies of the 
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contextual conditions that influence firms’ stakeholder responsibilities, on the 
critical role that can be played by managers in framing CSOs, and on the 
significance of the purpose of a business towards the development and 
sustainment of a responsible society.  
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Chapter 2: Looking inside the black box: The effect of 
corporate governance on corporate social 
responsibility 
2.1 Abstract  
Manuscript Type: Review 
Research Question/Issue: This study provides a systematic review of recent 
literature to evaluate the impact of the multi-level dimensions of corporate 
governance (CG) at the institutional, firm, group, and individual levels on firm level 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) outcomes. We offer critical reflections on the 
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current state of this literature and provide concrete suggestions to guide future 
research. 
Research Findings/Insights: Focusing on peer-reviewed articles published in impact 
factor management and finance journals from 2000 to 2015, our review compiles 
the evidence on offer, pertaining to the most relevant dimensions of CG, their 
indicators and constituent variables and their influence on CSR outcomes. At the 
institutional level, we focus on formal and informal institutional indicators and at 
the firm level we analyze firm ownership indicators. At the group level, we 
segregate our analysis into board structures, director social capital and resource 
networks and directors’ demographic diversity.  At the individual level, our review 
covers CEOs’ demography and socio-psychological characteristics. Beyond 
outlining existing documented effects of specific CG variables on CSR, our review 
identifies important gaps and provides directions for future research. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: We recommend that greater scholarly 
attention needs to be accorded to disaggregating CG and CSR variables and yet 
comprehending how their multiple configurations interact and combine to impact 
firms’ CSR behavior and practices. We suggest that CG-CSR research should 
employ multiple-theoretical lens and apply sophisticated qualitative and 
quantitative methods to enable a deeper and fine-grained analysis of the CG 
systems and processes. Finally, we call for research in different countries to 
capture the context sensitivities typical of both CG and CSR constructs.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: We offer critical insight to policy makers seeking 
to improve both CG and CSR outcomes. Our review suggests that for structural 
changes and reforms within firms to be successful, they need to be complemented 
by the institutional makeup of the context in which firms function to encourage 
substantive changes in corporates’ responsible behaviors.  
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2.2 Introduction  
In a provocative claim, the first decade of the new millennium has been described 
as the “Decade from Hell” characterized by the worst economic catastrophe since 
the Great Depression (Serwer, 2009). A recent Rockefeller study (2010) predicts 
that the next decade (2010-2020) will be the “Doom Decade” typified by 
authoritarian leaderships, domination by elites, and social and environmental 
disasters. In a world marked by grave corporate breaches and systemic 
governance failures on one hand, and gross societal and environmental excesses 
on the other, the interface between corporate governance (CG) and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) has acquired global resonance and is more intriguing 
than ever before (Ryan, Buchholtz, & Kolb, 2010; Walls, Berrone, & Phan, 2012). In 
our attempt to look inside the black box of this very vital interface (Filatotchev & 
Nakajima, 2014; Judge, 2008), we provide a timely review of the fast developing 
yet largely fragmented literature on the effect of multi-level dimensions of CG, 
their indicators and constituent variables on firms’ CSR outcomes.   
Beginning with the conceptualization of CG, the traditional economic perspective 
emphasizes the shareholder value approach to CG for maximizing firms’ financial 
performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Towards this objective, the purpose of CG 
is to specify the rules that shape the relations among boards of directors, 
shareholders, and managers to resolve assumed agency conflicts (Berle & Means, 
1932). However, recent literature, including the OECD revised principles (2004:11), 
considers the traditional outlook of CG as narrow and shortsighted with rising calls 
to include governance consequences for non-financial stakeholders (Gill, 2008; 
Windsor, 2006). This shift has occurred primarily because of three reasons. First, 
there is some evidence that stakeholder engagement can enhance the value of the 
firm (Brown, Helland, & Smith, 2006; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013b). This intertwines firms’ financial and non-financial 
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responsibilities (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Second, neither corporate statutes 
nor corporate case laws expressly require shareholder value maximization (Stout, 
2012). Therefore, the idea that the purpose of the firm is by default shareholder 
value maximization and CG systems should aim at protecting only shareholder 
interests is questionable (Gill, 2008; Stout, 2012). Finally, rising incidents of 
corporate frauds and scandals have expanded the idea of CG beyond merely 
dealing with agency conflicts towards adopting an ethical, accountable and socially 
responsible agenda (Elkington, 2006). This has led to redefining CG both as a 
“structure of rights and responsibilities among the parties with a stake in the firm” 
(Aoki, 2000:11; Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2015) as well as a configuration of 
organizational processes through which different CG indicators and variables 
interact and affect corporate financial and social outcomes (Aguilera, Desender, 
Bednar, & Lee, 2015; Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Aguilera, 
Goyer, & Kabbach-Castro, 2012). We follow this wider perspective on CG in this 
paper.  
Several individual studies have analyzed different dimensions, indicators and 
variables of CG that can affect firms’ social performance. At the institutional level, 
formal institutions such as legal and political systems (i.e., 
shareholder/stakeholder protection laws) are important drivers of the nature of 
firms’ stakeholder relationships (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014; Judge, 2008). 
Informal institutions, on the other hand, particularly cultural beliefs and norms, 
can impact both the form (explicit or implicit) and the extent of CSR practices 
(Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Matten & Moon, 2008). At the firm level, ownership 
structures (Cox, Brammer, & Millington, 2008; Graves & Waddock, 1994), board 
structural characteristics (Capezio, Shields, & O’Donnell, 2011), and executive 
compensation contracts (Cordeiro & Sarkis, 2008) capture the effect of owner and 
managerial incentives (Deckop, Merriman, & Gupta, 2006) as well as board’s 
monitoring and resource provision capabilities for engaging in pro-social activities 
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(de Villiers, Naiker, & van Staden, 2011). Furthermore, the continuous rise of 
financial and social activist pressures pushes managers to either precipitate or at 
least deliberate broader corporate issues such as CSR (Goranova & Ryan, 2014). At 
the individual level, managers’ and directors’ demography and socio-psychological 
experiences (Borghesi, Houston, & Naranjo, 2014; Chin, Hambrick, & Treviño, 
2013; Walls & Hoffman, 2013) tend to inform their roles and also affects their 
firms’ CSR performance. Interestingly, these different CG indicators and variables, 
functioning at multiple levels, are often interdependent (Aguilera et al., 2015) and 
work in tandem creating a complex web of relationships that have not been 
systematically examined before, particularly in relation to how they affect specific 
CSR outcomes, whether independently or in combination (Aguilera et al., 2012).  
Given the burgeoning field of research in CG and CSR, some excellent reviews have 
been published to date. While most review studies have focused either on CG 
(e.g.; Aguilera et al., 2015; Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & 
Johnson, 1998; Sjöström, 2008; Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009) or on CSR (e.g.; 
Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Carroll, 1999; Egri & Ralston, 2008; Peloza, 2009; 
Waddock, 2004; Wood, 2010), few are positioned at the CG and CSR interface such 
as Ryan (2005) and Ryan et al. (2010) who focus on the inter-linkage of CG and 
business ethics, Welford (2007) who reviews issues related to CG and CSR in Asia; 
and Sparkes and Cowton (2004) who discuss the growth of socially responsible 
investment and its linkage with CSR.  
Our endeavor is to contribute to this existing body of research in three ways. First, 
we undertake a systematic review of the literature (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006) 
that specifically examines the effect of CG on CSR outcomes in the last decade and 
a half. Second, drawing on multiple theoretical lenses, we summarize the 
literature by identifying the dimensions of CG and the various levels at which they 
operate (i.e., institutional, firm, group, and individual), identify their indicators and 
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constituent variables, and assess their effect on CSR outcomes. Whenever 
possible, we also recognize the potential interactions between them. Third, we 
offer critical reflections on the current state of this literature and suggest avenues 
for advancing knowledge and research in this direction, both theoretical and 
methodological. We think this is a timely exercise given the rising call for adopting 
a “holistic approach” to CG research that examines both the effect of individual CG 
dimensions, their indicators and variables, as well as identifies the 
interdependencies between CG indicators and variables and their implications for 
CSR (Aguilera et al., 2008; Walls et al., 2012). 
2.3 Scope of the review 
We carry out a systematic review of literature (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006) based 
on the content analysis of 93 peer reviewed journal articles (80 empirical and 13 
conceptual) published between 2000 and 2015 that explore the effect of CG on 
firm level CSR outcomes (see Table 2.1). We selected these articles using Business 
Source Complete and Web of Science databases and excluded book chapters, 
conference papers and book reviews. Although, our review encompassed the 
entire range of 93 articles, the empirical articles were hand-coded in two stages: 
first, by three graduate research assistants and second, by the first author of this 
paper, independently, to identify the dimensions, indicators and variables 
associated with CG predictors of CSR at the institutional, firm, group, and 
individual levels of analysis and outcome variables of CSR at the firm level.  
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Table 2.1: List of journals included in the review 
Journal Name IF (2014) Empirical Theoretical Total 
Academy of Management Perspectives 3.354  
1 1 
Administrative Science Quarterly 3.333 1  
1 
Applied Economics Letters 0.303 1  
1 
Business & Society 1.468 3 2 5 
Business Strategy and the Environment 2.542 6 1 7 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 1.734 8 2 10 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 2.321 5 2 7 
International Journal of Hospitality Management 1.939 1  
1 
Journal of Business Ethics 1.326 34 3 37 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 0.914 1  
1 
Journal of Business Research 1.480 1  
1 
Journal of Comparative Economics 1.170 1  
1 
Journal of Corporate Finance 1.193 2  
2 
Journal of International Business Studies 3.563 1  
1 
Journal of Management 6.071 3  
3 
Journal of Management & Organization 0.594 2  
2 
Journal of Management Studies 3.763 1 1 2 
Journal of Organizational Behavior 3.038 1  
1 
Management Decision 1.429 1  
1 
Management International Review 1.118 1  
1 
Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology 0.720 1  
1 
Strategic Management Journal 3.341 4  
4 
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice 0.328 1 1 2 
Total  80 (86%) 13 (14%) 93 
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2.4 Conceptual definitions and theoretical lenses  
At the outset, we categorize the different aspects of CG using three concepts: 
dimensions, indicators and variables. The dimensions of CG embody behaviors 
related to CG at different levels of analysis i.e., institutional level, firm level, group 
level, and individual level. For each dimension of CG, a specific set of indicators is 
defined that shed more light on that dimension. To add concreteness and enable 
measurability of each CG indicator, specific CG variables are investigated that 
enhance our understanding of the nature of the indicators and their impact on CSR 
outcomes. We begin by shedding light on the core concepts that will be used 
throughout the paper, namely Corporate Governance (CG) and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). As highlighted below, both CG and CSR have evolved into 
core managerial concepts, although there are widely differing interpretations as to 
what they precisely entail, particularly when viewed from different theoretical 
perspectives. 
2.4.1 Corporate governance 
Through our content analysis, we find that there are four main theoretical 
frameworks that guide empirical research at the intersection of CG and CSR. The 
most influential theoretical framing of CG is rooted in agency theory (Dalton, Hitt, 
Certo, & Dalton, 2007). Research from this perspective contends that generally 
principals (shareholders) and agents (managers and other corporate insiders) have 
divergent interests, risk tolerance, capacities and information. Opportunistic 
managers, motivated by self-interest and guile, will act at the expense of outside 
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investors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), wherever there is an opportunity to do so. To 
counter this aversion, shareholders may resort to various CG arrangements such 
as contractual relations, board monitoring structures and incentives (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). The adoption of the agency view on CG leads to acceptance of 
shareholder primacy with an emphasis on economic (financial) efficiency (Gill, 
2008). In terms of its effect on CSR, i.e. firms’ non-financial performance, agency 
theorists argue that CG systems should be designed to ensure adoption of CSR 
activities only when the latter entail efficiency benefits (McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001).  When this is not the case, CSR activities risk being viewed as anti-
shareholder practices or as stakeholder appeasement strategies adopted for 
managerial entrenchment (Mallin, Michelon, & Raggi, 2013).  
Challenging the contention of agency theory, institutional theorists provide an 
explanation for managerial behavior that defies economic rationality. Neo-
institutional theory suggests that social and economic behaviors are guided by 
country specific informal institutions (such as norms, customs and traditions), 
which in turn manifest themselves in formal institutions (such as legal, political 
and financial systems) (Hofstede, 1984; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Lubatkin, Lane, 
Collin, & Very, 2005; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Williamson, 2000). These institutions 
develop overtime and prescribe behaviors that are legitimized in specific societies 
(Suchman, 1995). With regard to CSR, institutional theory contends that firms 
embedded in shareholder centric CG contexts (e.g., the US) will tend to emphasize 
shareholder primacy over other stakeholder interests. Therefore, in such contexts, 
proactive CSR actions will be explicitly undertaken primarily for instrumental and 
strategic purposes (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001; Matten & Moon, 2008). On the 
other hand, firms entrenched in pro-stakeholder CG settings (e.g., Continental 
Europe and Japan) adopt society-oriented strategies that align with norms and 
laws intended to protect the interests of multiple stakeholder entities (Matten & 
Moon, 2008). Accordingly, they tend to espouse broader stakeholder 
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responsibilities implicitly as a matter of principle (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). 
Another theoretical perspective that has recently been applied to the CG and CSR 
domain is provided by the resource dependence theory (RDT) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). According to RDT, firms are open systems and do not just interact with 
institutional forces, but also transact with each other at the firm level to gain 
resources needed for survival (Granovetter, 1985). It emphasizes the complex 
resource provision functions and abilities of the board towards improving firm 
performance (de Villiers et al., 2011). For example, company directors, being 
experts in their field, have long-term board experience and hold influential 
positions in other firms as well. Consequently, they are a rich source of knowledge 
and guidance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and can provide critical linkages to 
resources and leverage social capital though their social networks (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). Thus, directors enable managers to make informed decisions 
towards adopting specific pro-social practices that could be value enhancing for 
the firm (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009). In this manner, 
RDT lends support to the view that board level dimension of CG could have a 
profound influence on firms’ pro-social performance.  
Lastly, a theoretical paradigm that prominently departs from agency theory in 
relation to its conceptions of CG and CSR relationship is the stakeholder theory. In 
contrast to the agency perspective that emphasizes structural aspects of CG while 
being focused on shareholders, stakeholder theory asserts that a firm has 
relationships with a broader set of stakeholders, including employees, consumers, 
governments, environmental advocates, and others, beyond shareholders 
(Freeman, 1984). Therefore, CG systems must enable firms to be managed for the 
benefit of all their stakeholders, financial as well as non-financial (de Graaf & 
Stoelhorst, 2009; Mason & Simmons, 2014; Windsor, 2006). In terms of CSR, this 
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view has far reaching consequences in relation to the spectrum of managerial 
responsibilities (Weber, 2014).  
2.4.2 Corporate social responsibility 
In the realm of CSR, the absence of a universally accepted definition and 
theoretical grounding leads to divergent interpretations of the concept (Dahlsrud, 
2008). One of the theoretical perspectives on CSR is grounded in agency theory 
that supports shareholder primacy. Per this view, it is argued that managers use 
CSR to further their personal goals at the expense of shareholders. Therefore, 
firms should invest in CSR only if it furthers economic efficiency, otherwise such 
investments could be considered as contrarian to shareholders’ interests 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001).  
Similar to CG, CSR is also commonly grounded within the neo-institutional theory. 
From this perspective, CSR is defined “by the expectations of ‘society’ that are 
entrenched and embodied in institutions” (Brammer, Jackson, & Matten, 
2012:21). That is, different conceptions of CSR are bound to emerge across 
different institutional settings, mirroring the peculiarities of the business-society 
relations, political rules, and norms, beliefs, and culture of the context in question. 
Therefore, the prevalence of high level corporate discretion, market based 
contracting and stewardship in the Anglo-Saxon context (Matten & Moon, 2008), 
may drive explicit forms of CSR in the form of voluntarism. In other contexts such 
as Continental Europe and Japan (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003), societal institutions 
may create mandatory and customary social responsibilities for businesses, which 
may be implicit in nature.  
Stakeholder theory represents another prominent theoretical grounding for CSR 
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and has been increasingly used to promote a stakeholder-oriented perspective for 
understanding how companies can manage their strategic relationships (Freeman, 
1984). Subsequently, a stream of research has emerged that explores the 
interfaces of stakeholder theory and CSR, and how organizations manage multiple, 
diverse, and often competing stakeholder interests in this respect (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Jamali, 2008; Yang & Rivers, 2009). 
Beyond the application of institutional and stakeholder theories, we have 
witnessed a soaring interest in CSR from other disciplines such as law and public 
policy, economics, and finance (Brammer et al., 2012). This has in turn added to 
the complexity of measuring CSR performance and outcomes. The latter are often 
gauged in terms of stakeholder engagement, philanthropic contributions, self-
regulations, adoption of ethical codes, compliance with laws and mandates, 
impact assessment on stakeholders and the environment, frequency and extent of 
disclosures, rankings and ratings by third parties, and stock market indicators 
among others. To capture these varied social outcomes, we categorize social 
performance in our review into CR (corporate responsibility targeted at multiple 
stakeholders), CEP (corporate environmental performance), and CR disclosures 
and CEP disclosures, irrespective of whether these behaviors are driven 
mandatorily or voluntarily. Furthermore, although the majority of the research is 
heavily focused on developed nations, we adopt an inclusive approach and rope in 
research based in other contexts as well. Applying comparative institutionalism 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977) helps us in turn to tease out how and why the effect of CG 
on CSR may differ across countries, adding to the depth and nuances of the 
findings we compile and present.  
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2.5 Results of the multi-level review  
This section is dedicated to reviewing the literature on the multi-level corporate 
governance dimensions and their impact on firm level CSR outcomes. Figure 2.1 
provides an overview of the dimensions of CG at different levels of analysis: 
institutional level, firm level, group level, and individual level; their indicators and 
constituent variables. We discuss the literature related to each of these aspects 
and its implication for firm level CSR performance and disclosures, highlighting 
wherever appropriate the salient underlying theoretical lenses.  
2.5.1 Institutional level dimension 
There is significant research suggesting that firm structures and strategies as well 
as managerial choices of CSR practices and engagement cannot be fully 
comprehended without an understanding of the institutional environment within 
which firms are embedded (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Luoma & Goodstein, 1999; 
Whitley, 1992). The institutional environment comprises of formal institutions in 
the form of political, legal and financial systems as well as informal institutions 
such as socially valued beliefs and norms (Lubatkin et al., 2005).  
Formal institutions 
Within the gamut of formal institutional indicators of CG, we focus on two 
important aspects namely, the nature of the political and legal system and the 
regulations influencing managerial discretion (see Table 2.2). It is argued that the 
nature of the legal and political system at a country level predicts that regulations 
in place could promote a narrow pattern of shareholder protection versus a 
broader pattern of stakeholder orientation (Matten & Moon, 2008).  
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Figure 2.1: Multi-level corporate governance dimensions 
Institutional Level CG Dimensions Firm Level CG Dimensions Group Level CG Dimensions Individual Level CG Dimensions 
 
Indicator: Formal Institutions: 
Legal and Political Factors 
- Regulatory Stringency 
- Rule Based Versus Relation Based  
System 
- Common Law versus Civil Law  
System 
- Anti-Self Dealing Index 
- Exposure to Market for Corporate  
Control 
 
Indicator: Informal Institutions: 
Norms, Values and Culture 
- Individualism 
- Power Distance 
- Gender Gap 
 
Indicator: Ownership Structure: 
Concentrated Ownership 
- Institutional Shareholding 
 (i) Pension Funds 
(ii) Banking and Mutual Funds 
(iii) Institutional Shareholder  
Activism 
 
- Block Owners 
(i) Family Owners 
(ii) State  
  
- Managerial/TMT Ownership 
 (i) Inside-Owners 
(ii) Outside-Director Owners 
 
 
Indicator: Board Structures: 
- Board Size 
- Board Independence 
- CEO Duality 
- Executive (CEO) Compensation 
   (i) Base Pay/Salary 
  (ii) Bonus 
 (iii) Equity-Based Pay 
 
Indicator: Board Social Capital &  
Resource Network: 
- Board Interlocking 
- Director Experience 
 
Indicator: Board Demographics: 
- Gender Diversity 
 
Indicator: CEO Demographics: 
- Age 
- Gender 
- Qualification 
 
Indicator: CEO Socio-Psychological  
Characteristics: 
- Experience 
- Political Ideology 
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Supporting this, our review finds that non-US countries, typically falling within the 
umbrella of civil law, exhibit better compliance and ratings on CSR in comparison 
to US or other common law countries (Gainet, 2010; Galbreath, 2010; Mackenzie, 
Rees, & Rodionova, 2013; see Table 2.2).  
CG regulations influencing managerial discretion (e.g., the market for corporate 
control and anti-self-dealing laws) work on the assumption that the market has 
the capacity to discipline managers in order to avoid agency conflicts. This market 
for corporate control can also discipline them with respect to other stakeholder 
responsibilities. Specifically, poor environmental performance could lead to heavy 
penalties for erring firms that could prompt a fall in share prices leading to 
possible hostile takeovers, endangering managers’ positions and reputation (King 
& Lenox, 2002). 
Broadly, in our review we uncover that pro-shareholder laws that reduce 
managerial discretion (as discussed above) tend to diminish CSR performance 
(Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Kock, Santaló, & Diestre, 2012), while laws that 
increase managerial discretion (Jo & Harjoto, 2011) improve pro-social 
performance (see Table 2.2). However, an important caveat here lies in the 
observation that although formal institutions may drive managers’ CSR behaviors, 
they may prove self-defeating (Lubatkin et al., 2005). Supporting this observation , 
some studies in our review reveal that adopting stakeholder centric regulations 
may actually improve CSR performance symbolically while making opportunistic 
behaviors more difficult to detect (See Brown et al., 2006; Jain, in Press; Kassinis & 
Vafeas, 2002; Lubatkin et al., 2005). In other words, even under the best 
circumstances, where the political and legal conditions in a particular country 
context favor the adoption of stakeholder centric orientations and provide room 
for managerial discretion, CSR outcomes may not necessarily be more positive or 
favorable.
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Table 2.2: Effect of institutional dimension on CSR  
CG Indicators Variables  Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
Negative  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
No Effect  
on  
CR/CEP 
Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
Negative/  
No Effect  
on CR/CEP 
Disclosures 
 
 
Formal Institutions: 
Legal & Political  
Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory  
stringency;  
Rule based versus 
relation based  
system; Anti-self  
dealing index;  
Exposure to  
market for  
corporate control 
 
 
 
CEP 
Gainet,  
2010;  
Galbreath, 
2010; Jo & 
Harjoto,  
2011;  
Mackenzie 
et al., 2013  
 
 
 
CR 
Ioannou & 
Serafeim,  
2012;  
Kock et al., 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CR 
Brown et  
al., 2006 
 
CEP  
Kassinis & 
Vafeas,  
2002 
 
 
 
 
CR 
Li et al.,  
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Informal  
Institutions: 
Norms, Values  
& Culture at  
Country Level 
 
 
Power distance;  
Individualism; 
Gender gap 
 
CR 
Ioannou &  
Serafeim,  
2012  
 
   
CR 
Fernandez- 
Feijoo et  
al., 2014 
 
Thus, although formal institutional indicators are important to understand the 
configuration of CSR practices among firms, it is necessary to explore them in 
conjunction with prevalent informal institutions that could have a profound 
influence on managerial behaviors (Campbell, 2007), as discussed below. 
Informal institutions 
Neo-institutional theory, specifically organizational institutionalism, predicts that 
the different nature of informal institutions, such as cultures and norms, at the 
country level should facilitate a better understanding of desirable firm behaviors 
in different contexts (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
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While formal institutions rely on the coercive adoption of rules, informal 
institutions are more finely ingrained and have a ubiquitous influence on the 
“character of economies” through mimetic or normative adoption of practices 
(Scott, 2008; Whitley, 1992:596). A case in point are lingering differences between 
the US and Continental Europe pertaining to the role of business in society. While 
the US exhibits an individualistic culture with a higher degree of corporate 
discretion, where managers give back to society through stewardship and 
philanthropic responsibilities; Europe has evolved as a collectivist culture that 
employs consensus and collaboration on CSR invoking the participation of political 
parties, labor unions, the church, and the state (Matten & Moon, 2008; Wieland, 
2005). 
As presented in Table 2.2, we find that only a few studies focus on these 
differences and how they affect CG systems and related CSR practices. For 
example, firms located in more gender equal countries were found to employ 
more women on boards and subsequently disclose more on CSR than firms in 
gender unequal countries. Furthermore, firms in countries that are more 
individualistic or demonstrate greater power distance adopt explicit CSR activities 
that are often employed as a voluntary strategic response to stakeholder 
expectations, whereas firms in societies that are more collectivist or have less 
power distance tend to assume implicit forms of CSR (Jackson & Apostolakou, 
2010). We recommend that future research should focus more on the interaction 
effects of formal and informal institutions that will enhance our understanding of 
firms’ CSR behaviors across different contexts.  
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2.5.2 Firm level dimension 
In this section, we present our discussion pertaining to firm level dimension of CG 
and its effect on CSR. Specifically, we focus on concentrated ownerships of 
different entities such as institutions, block holders such as families and the state, 
and ownership of corporate insiders and outsider-directors (see Tables 2.3: Panels 
A to F). Theoretically, we find that there are two arguments that predict the effect 
of concentrated ownerships on CSR (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998).  Following the 
stakeholder logic, concentrated investors will support CSR investment because the 
latter increases the long-term value of the firm (Barnett, 2007; Harjoto & Jo, 
2011). Alternatively, from an agency perspective, concentrated owners will stall 
CSR investments employed by managers for entrenchment purposes. Accordingly, 
the shareholder or stakeholder orientation of CG will be contingent upon the 
shareholders’ motivations and the extent of their ownership concentration. 
Institutional ownership 
Institutional shareholders can have different investment horizons and possess 
both the incentives and the power to monitor corporate decision-making (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1986). From our review, we find (see Table 2.3: Panel A) some evidence 
that pension funds, with a longer-term investment horizon, support CSR 
investments, while banking and mutual funds, with short-term investment 
interests, may not find the cost of engaging in CSR justified (Hoskisson, Hitt, 
Johnson, & Grossman, 2002; Graves & Waddock, 1994). However, we also find the 
existence of some neutral results that we believe could emanate from two 
possible reasons:  
(I) One reason for conflicting results could stem from looking at an incomplete 
picture of governance (Aguilera et al., 2015). Beyond internal CG aspects, external 
governance forces such as stakeholder activism can also influence CSR (Lee & 
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Lounsbury, 2011). The impact of activism may vary depending upon whether the 
activists are financially motivated and consequently anti-CSR, or whether they are 
socially motivated and in favor of CSR. 
Table 2.3: Firm level: Panel A: Effect of institutional ownership on CSR 
CG Indicators Variables  Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
Negative  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
No Effect  
on CR/CEP 
Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
 
Types of 
Institutional  
Ownership: 
Pension Funds 
 
 
Proportion of  
shares held by  
pension funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CR 
Aguilera  
et al., 2006;  
Mallin et al.,  
2013; 
Neubaum &  
Zahra, 2006;  
Oh et al.,  
2011 
 
  
CEP 
Dam &  
Scholtens,  
2012;  
Mackenzie et  
al., 2013 
 
CR 
Barnea &  
Rubin, 2010 
 
 
 
Types of  
Institutional  
Ownership: 
Banking and  
Mutual Funds 
 
Proportion of  
shares held by  
banking and  
mutual funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CR 
Neubaum &  
Zahra, 2006; 
Aguilera et  
al., 2006 
 
CEP 
Mackenzie  
et al., 2013 
 
CR 
Dam &  
Scholtens,  
2012 
 
CEP 
Earnhart &  
Lizal, 2006;  
Walls et al.,  
2012  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, legitimacy and power differences among activists exhibited through 
the coordinated level of activism (Neubaum & Zahra, 2006) may propel firms 
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either to challenge, oppose, avoid or settle with them. Second, we find that firms 
facing stakeholder activism may divert resources for symbolically creating a 
favorable CSR image to manage public perceptions, without adopting substantive 
changes in CSR behaviors (David et al., 2007; Lewis, Walls, & Dowell, 2014; Walls 
et al., 2012).  Clearly, these are aspects that need to be further researched. 
(II) A second possible reason behind conflicting results on the effect of institutional 
investors on CSR could be explained by the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & 
March, 1963). The availability of organizational slack as well as the unavailability of 
alternative investment opportunities may provide greater latitude to managers to 
respond favorably to institutional activism for improving CSR (Wahba, 2010). 
Therefore, one needs to look at the wider picture and adopt a multi-theoretical 
perspective to understand investors’ interest in CSR and managerial willingness 
and capacity to respond to CSR expectations within a particular institutional 
context. 
Block ownership 
Blocks, typically but not necessarily held by institutions, refer to a bundle of at 
least 5% or more shares in a firm. Supporting the agency logic, the majority of the 
studies in our review find (see Table 2.3: Panel B, Part I &II) that while block 
owners tend to comply with minimum required CSR standards to avoid potential 
legitimacy risks (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011), overall discouraging pro-active CSR. 
However, some mixed results are also observed and more research is needed on 
the identity of block-owners and their corresponding CSR outlook and aspirations. 
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Table 2.3: Firm level: Panel B: Effect of block ownership on CSR: Part I 
CG Indicators Variables  Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
Negative  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
 
No Effect  
on CR/CEP 
 
Ownership  
Structure: 
Block Ownership 
 
Proportion of  
shares held by  
an entity  
(at least 5%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CR 
Jo & Harjoto,  
2011; Mallin  
et al., 2013  
 
 
CR 
Arora & Dharwadkar,  
2011; Dam &  
Scholtens, 2013;  
Rees & Rodionova,  
2015; Sánchez et  
al., 2011 
 
CEP 
Walls et al., 2012 
 
CEP 
Chin et al.,  
2013; Walls  
et al., 2012 
 
CR 
Surroca &  
Tribo, 2008; 
Brown et al.,  
2006 
Table 2.3: Firm level: Panel B: Effect of block ownership on CSR Disclosures: 
 Part II 
CG Indicators Variables  Positive  
Effect on CR/CEP 
Disclosures 
Negative  
Effect on CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
No Effect  
on CR/CEP 
 Disclosures 
 
 
Ownership  
Structure: 
Block Ownership 
 
Proportion of  
shares held by  
an entity  
(at least 5%) 
 
CR 
Prado-Lorenzo et  
al., 2009  
 
CR 
Brown et al.,  
2006; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen,  
2013a; 2013b 
 
CR 
Prado-Lorenzo  
et al., 2009 
 
Family ownership 
Family owned firms are different from other forms of concentrated ownership 
because families invest their own money in their business ventures, which 
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translates into a reasonably long-term business outlook and a concern for 
stakeholder relationships (Yoshikawa, Zhu, & Wang, 2014). A unique characteristic 
of such firms lies in family dominance in board decision-making (McGuire, Dow, & 
Ibrahim, 2012).  
There are two key theoretical explanations linking the effect of family ownership 
on CSR outcomes. From a RD perspective, stakeholder support (both internal and 
external) is an important source of social capital that can sustain family control 
over management and deter potential legal problems associated with future 
succession plans (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). In contrast, the dominance of family-
centered motives may create agency conflicts and discourage CSR to advance 
family financial interests over other stakeholder interests.  
Through our review (see Table 2.3: Panel C), we find that the response of most 
family dominated firms to CSR is generally negative supporting agency arguments 
(Mackenzie et al., 2013; Rees & Rodionova, 2015), particularly for firms in liberal 
market economies (LMEs). Across coordinated market economies (CMEs), the 
negative impact is less evident although the results are mixed (Rees & Rodionova, 
2015). Theoretically and empirically, we assert that it is important to accord closer 
attention to family firms across multiple contexts because in certain countries 
(such as South Korea and China) family ownership tends to be institutionalized 
(Choi, Lee, & Park, 2013). Thus, future research in this area should particularly 
focus on the interactions between institutional and agency theories. 
State ownership 
Our review unveils that firms with a higher proportion of state ownership are 
generally associated with a higher CR/CEP performance (see Table 2.3: Panel D). 
We conjecture that this supports the neo-institutional perspective, which suggests 
that the state has coercive powers to scrutinize and regulate firm CSR activities.  
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Table 2.3: Firm level: Panel C: Effect of family ownership on CSR 
CG Indicators Variables  Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
Negative  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
No Effect  
on CR/CEP 
Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
 
Ownership 
Structure: 
Family Ownership 
 
Proportion of  
shares held by  
family 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CR 
McGuire  
et al., 2012 
 
 
 
CR  
McGuire et 
al., 2012; 
Rees & 
Rodionova, 
2015 
 
CEP 
Mackenzie 
et al., 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, states may push for CSR as part of an overall welfare agenda 
(Surroca & Tribo, 2008). However, some studies report a negative effect of state 
ownership on CSR. We believe that while welfare goals of the state can normally 
be aligned with CSR activities, it is likely that to further specific political and 
bureaucratic goals, states may support specific CSR activities, while avoiding 
others that may result in an overall decline or neutral effect on CSR performance 
(Zhang, Rezaee, & Zhu, 2010). Alternatively, states may separate their strategic 
investments in private firms from their social agendas (Dam & Scholtens, 2012). 
We conjecture that the institutional and economic context may be relevant in 
framing states’ roles and must be put in perspective to shed more light on the 
motivations of the state towards CSR.  
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Table 2.3: Firm level: Panel D: Effect of state ownership on CSR 
Variables  Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
Negative  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
No Effect  
on CR/CEP 
Positve Effect  
on CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
Negative/no  
Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
Proportion  
of shares  
held by  
the state 
 
 
CR 
Chang et al., 
2015; Li & Zhang, 
2010;  
Surroca & Tribo, 
2008 
 
CEP 
Earnhart & Lizal, 
2006; Huang, 
2010 
 
 
CR 
Dam & 
Scholtens,  
2012; Zhang  
et al., 2010 
 
CR 
Huang, 2010 
 
CEP 
Mackenzie  
et al., 2013 
 
CR 
Meng et al.,  
2013; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 
2013a; 2013b; 
Weber, 2014 
 
 
Managerial/insider ownership 
The impact of managerial ownership on CSR can be understood from two 
theoretical perspectives. Following the agency logic, increased ownership activates 
managers’ economic self-interest that reduces CSR investments (McKendall, 
Sánchez, & Sicilian, 1999). Alternatively, ownership may inspire insiders to forgo 
short-term profits in favor of long-term value creating CSR strategies (Hansen & 
Hill, 1991; Johnson & Greening, 1999). Drawing upon managerial entrenchment 
and hubris arguments, managerial ownership will increase managerial discretion in 
decision-making (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Although, normatively, managers 
ought to fulfill their moral duties (Quinn & Jones, 1995), entrenchment is generally 
found to promote socially irresponsible behaviors.  
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Table 2.3: Firm level: Panel E: Effect of managerial/insider ownership on CSR 
CG Indicators Negative  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
No 
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
Positive 
 Effect  
on CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
Negative  
Effect  
on CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
No Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
Ownership 
Structure: 
CEO  
Ownership 
 
CR 
Arora & 
Dharwadkar, 
2011; Deutsch & 
Valente, 2013 
 
 
CR 
McGuire  
et al., 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CR 
Ntim &  
Soobaroyen,  
2013a 
 
Ownership 
Structure: 
Inside-director  
Ownership 
 
 
CR 
McGuire et al., 
2012 
 
CEP 
Kassinis & 
Vafeas, 2002 
 
 
CR 
Borghesi et 
al., 2014; 
Rodriguez-
Dominguez 
et al., 2009 
 
CEP 
Kock et al., 
2012; Walls 
et al., 2012; 
de Villiers et 
al., 2011 
 
 
CR 
Deutsch & 
Valente, 
2013 
 
 
 
CR 
Khan et al., 
2013 
 
Our review finds no support for insider ownership encouraging CSR investments, 
over and above minimum compliance (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011). We also find 
several studies capturing a neutral effect (see Table 2.3: Panel E). Our observations 
raise important questions for future research. First, perhaps, corporate insiders do 
not believe that CSR investments will raise firm value substantially. However, 
social legitimacy requirements may prompt them to adopt a neutral attitude 
towards some CSR investments. Second, top management teams (TMT) comprise 
of individuals having different demographic, psychological and ideological profiles 
(Chin et al., 2013). Therefore, it is important to disentangle TMTs to understand 
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the interplay between individuals and their potential impact on CSR. Third, 
insiders do not function alone. The dynamics of CEO-board relationships could be 
critical to understand the effect of TMTs on CSR (Westphal & Zajac, 1997). We 
suggest that it is important to adopt alternative methodologies such as grounded 
theory to make sense of the complex dynamics of board processes and CEO-board 
interactions in the context of CSR. 
Outside-director ownership 
Outside-directors (with ownership) have an added incentive to articulate, 
represent and help enforce shareholder interests inside the board (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Walsh & Seward, 1990). Only a few papers in our review explore the 
effects of outside-director ownership (independently of TMT) on firm’s non-
financial outcomes, (see Table 2.3: Panel F). With the exception of one study (i.e., 
Kock et al., 2012), all others demonstrate that outside-director owners adopt a 
neutral stand vis-à-vis CSR. It is worth noting that generally, outside-directors have 
low ownership stakes (de Villiers et al., 2011; Oh et al., 2011), even among large 
S&P firms (Hafsi & Turgut, 2013). It is likely that the voice of inside owners may 
override that of outside-director owners on CSR decisions. 
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Table 2.3: Firm level: Panel F: Effect of top management team and outside 
director ownership on CSR 
CG Indicators Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
Negative  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
No Effect  
on CR/CEP 
Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
 
Ownership 
Structure: 
TMT  
Ownership 
 
 
 
 
CR 
Barnea & Rubin,  
2010; Harjoto & Jo,  
2011; Oh et al., 2011;  
Paek et al., 2013 
 
 
CR 
Paek et al., 2013 
 
 
 
Ownership 
Structure: 
Outside-Director  
Ownership 
 
CEP 
Kock et al.,  
2012 
  
CR 
Deutsch & Valente, 
2013; Hafsi & Turgut, 
2013;  
Oh et al., 2011 
 
CEP 
de Villiers et al., 2011 
 
 
2.5.3 Group level dimension 
As per the agency theory, boards monitor managers for avoiding agency conflicts. 
At the same time, boards represent multiple stakeholder interests in the process 
of managerial decision-making. Recent research goes beyond these two aspects 
and proposes that boards of directors have their own social networks and can 
coopt external linkages to manage resource dependencies of firms (Granovetter, 
1985; Pfeffer & Salanchik, 1978). In this section, we discuss the effect of structural 
elements of boards and the roles played by their directors in framing firms’ CSR 
decisions.  
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Board structures 
The strength of the monitoring capability of the board is contingent on board size 
and board independence from managers. At the same time, CEO duality and 
executive compensation determine managerial power that can weaken the 
monitoring effect of boards. In the following section, we review our findings on 
board structures and their impact on CSR (see Table 2.4: Panel A to D). 
Board size and board independence 
Agency theory contends that large-sized boards often face free-rider problems 
(Dalton et al., 1998) as well as coordination and communication issues (Jensen, 
1993). In this scenario, there is a likelihood of boards being dominated by short-
term profit oriented managers who can steer firms to reduce CSR investments 
(Walls & Hoffman, 2013). Alternatively, the neo-institutional logic and stakeholder 
theory predict that large boards are representative of diverse interests (Hillman & 
Keim, 2001; Kock et al., 2012) and can help garner CSR investments. As per the RD 
perspective, larger boards imply better social capital (Pfeffer & Salanchik, 1978) 
and balanced decision-making that can result in improved CSR performance. 
Theoretically, independent boards help reduce agency conflicts (Dalton et al., 
1998) and can ensure managerial compliance with a wider spectrum of 
stakeholder responsibilities (Luoma & Goodstein, 1999). Alternatively, 
independent directors are known to be appointed for their financial acumen and 
may be agents of shareholders, not stakeholders (Fligstein, 1991).  
Although, in general, we find a positive association between board size, board 
independence and CSR outcomes, there is also some evidence of mixed results 
(see Table 2.4: Panel A & B).  
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Table 2.4: Group level: Panel A: Effect of board size on CSR 
Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP   
Negative  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
No Effect  
on CR/CEP 
Positive Effect  
on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
Negative  
Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
No Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
CR 
Hillman et al., 
2001; Huse et al., 
2009; Jo & Harjoto, 
2011; Brown et al., 
2006 
 
CEP 
Ben Barka & 
Dardour, 2015;  
de Villiers et al., 
2011; Galbreath, 
2010; Mackenzie et 
al. 2013  
 
 
CR 
Bai, 2014; 
Deutsch & 
Valente, 
2013 
 
CEP 
Kassinis &  
Vafeas, 2002;  
Walls et al.,  
2012; Walls  
& Hoffman,  
2013 
 
CR 
Hafsi & 
Turgut, 2013 
 
CEP 
Galbreath,  
2011; Walls  
et al., 2012 
 
CR 
Brown et al.,  
2006;  
Frias-Aceituno 
et al., 2013;  
Jizi et al.,  
2014; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen,  
2013a 
  
CR 
Amran et al.,  
2014; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen,  
2013b 
Our supposition is that structurally, board size and board independence could be 
endogenously determined by powerful CEOs in which case their effectiveness as 
resource enablers and monitors could be compromised (Johnson, Schnatterly, & 
Hill, 2012). Other board characteristics such as board diversity and experience 
could also determine board orientations towards CSR, beyond independence and 
size considerations (Walls et al., 2012). More importantly, it is time to move 
beyond structural aspects of boards, towards understanding board processes and 
dynamics, specifically the nature of CEO-board interactions that are more accurate 
proxies for both board involvement and effectiveness, and can critically influence 
CSR decision-making (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). 
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Table 2.4: Group level: Panel B: Effect of board independence on CSR 
Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP   
Negative  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
No Effect  
on CR/CEP 
Positve Effect  
on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
Negative  
Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
No Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
CR 
Choi et al., 2013; 
Deutsch & Valente, 
2013; Fabrizi et al., 
2014; Harjoto & Jo, 
2011; Huang, 2010; 
Jo & Harjoto, 2011; 
Jo & Harjoto, 2012;  
Mallin et al., 2013;  
Rodriguez-
Dominguez et al., 
2009; Sánchez et al., 
2011; Zhang et al., 
2013 
 
CEP 
de Villiers et al., 
2011; Galbreath, 
2011; Kock et al., 
2012; Mackenzie et 
al., 2013 
 
 
CR 
Arora & 
Dharwadkar, 
2011; Deckop 
et al., 2006; 
Surroca & 
Tribo, 2008 
 
CEP 
Walls et al.,  
2012 
 
CR 
Ben Barka  
& Dardour, 2015; 
Boulouta, 2013; 
Brown et al., 2006; 
David et al., 2007; 
Deutsch & Valente, 
2013; Hafsi & 
Turgut, 2013 
 
CEP 
  Walls et al.,  
  2012;  
Walls &  
Hoffman,  
2013 
 
CR 
Jizi et al., 2014; 
Khan et al.,  
2013; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen,  
2013b; Sharif &  
Rashid, 2014 
 
CR 
Brown et al., 
2006 
 
CEP 
Prado-Lorenzo 
& Garcia- 
Sánchez,  
2010 
 
 CEO duality 
In this section, we focus our discussion on CEO duality and dual board leadership 
structures (DBLS) that we conjecture could have strong implications for managerial 
entrenchment and CSR (see Table 2.4: Panel C).  CEO duality occurs when the 
functional role of the CEO (management) and that of the chairman (control) are 
vested in the same individual elevating him/her to an entrenched position within 
the firm (Rechner & Dalton, 1991).  
From an agency perspective, CEO duality leads to concentration of managerial 
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power (Surroca & Tribo, 2008) enabling managers to suspend CSR investments, if 
considered wasteful or increase such investments, if considered beneficial. In 
contrast, DBLS separates management and control, consequently enhancing 
boards’ monitoring power (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Following RD and stakeholder 
theories, DBLS can improve social capital and stakeholder representation within 
boards to positively influence CSR (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990).  
Table 2.4: Group level: Panel C: Effect of CEO duality on CSR 
Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP   
Negative  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
No Effect 
on CR/CEP 
Positive Effect  
on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
No Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
CR 
Bear et al.,  
2010; Fabrizi  
et al., 2014;  
Mallin et al.,  
2013 
 
CEP 
Galbreath,  
2010  
 
 
CR 
Bear et al., 2010;  
Hafsi  & Turgut, 2013; 
Jo & Harjoto, 2011;  
Surroca & Tribo, 2008 
 
CEP 
de Villiers et al., 2011; 
Kock et al., 2012; 
Mackenzie et al.,  
2013; Post et al.,  
2011; Walls et al., 
2012; Walls & 
Hoffman, 2013 
 
 
CR 
Jizi et al., 2014 
 
CEP 
Prado-Lorenzo &  
Garcia- Sánchez,  
2010 
 
CR 
Khan et al,. 2013;  
Ntim &  
Soobaroyen, 2013b  
 
CEP 
Prado-Lorenzo &    
Garcia- Sánchez,  
2010 
In our review, we find that while the majority of the research suggests that 
entrenched CEOs are indifferent to CSR, but when exposed to market discipline 
they tend to discourage CSR providing support to agency arguments. At the 
outset, we deem that regulations that mandate DBLS (e.g., King II 
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recommendations and Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002) might make it difficult to 
capture the real effect of powerful CEOs on CSR. Future research should involve 
studying country contexts where DBLS is a voluntary practice to reveal the inside 
dynamics. Second, temporal studies should be conducted to uncover underlying 
path dependencies in relation to CSR being a CEO entrenchment strategy (Surroca 
& Tribo, 2008) i.e., do CSR investments lead to CEO entrenchment or are 
entrenched CEOs supportive of CSR. Third, conditions under which powerful 
managers encourage or discourage CSR and the effect of stakeholder salience on 
CEO preferences for CSR could be an important area for future research.  
Executive compensation  
Executive compensation is a bundle of fixed compensation in the form of salary, 
short-term financial incentives in the form of bonuses, and long-term incentives 
such as equity based pay (Frye, Nelling, & Webb, 2006). The proportion of these 
constituents in the total compensation package of a CEO can determine the extent 
of agency conflicts (Mackenzie, 2007; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). 
Traditionally, a high proportion of base salary leads to managerial entrenchment 
(Hambrick & Finklestein, 1995). One view suggests that to maintain their positions, 
entrenched managers may adopt a risk-averse strategy (Zajac & Westphal, 1994) 
and comply with minimum CSR standards (Mahoney & Thorn, 2006). At the same 
time, fixed pay structures are based on retrospective short-term financial goals 
(ibid) that discourage pro-active CSR (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999). 
Similar to fixed compensation, agency theory predicts that a higher proportion of 
bonus payments may drive executives to focus on short-term bottom line 
considerations (Stata & Maidique, 1980), leading to diminished CSR investments. 
In contrast, equity based incentives are likely to encourage CSR by aligning 
managerial and shareholder interests towards long-term share value maximization 
(Lambert, Larcker, & Weigelt, 1993).   
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Table 2.4: Group level: Panel D: Effect of executive compensation on CSR 
Variables  Positive Effect on  
CR/CEP 
    Negative Effect on  
    CR/CEP 
 
No Effect on  
CR/CEP 
 
Proportion of base  
pay (fixed salary) to  
total compensation 
  
CR 
Mahoney & Thorn,  
2006; Manner, 2010; 
McGuire et al., 2003 
 
CEP 
Kock et al., 2012 
 
 
CR 
Mahoney & 
Thorn, 2006; 
McGuire et al., 
2003 
 
CEP 
Walls et al., 2012 
 
 
Proportion of bonus  
payments to total  
compensation 
 
 
CR 
Callan & Thomas, 
2014; Mahoney & 
Thorn, 2006 
 
 
CR 
Deckop et al., 2006;  
Fabrizi et al., 2014; 
Manner, 2010 
 
CR 
Mahoney & 
Thorn, 2006; 
McGuire et al., 
2003 
 
CEP 
Walls et al., 
2012 
 
 
Proportion of equity  
based pay to total  
compensation 
 
CR 
Deckop et al., 2006; 
Deutsch & Valente, 
2013; Callan & 
Thomas, 2014; 
Mahoney & Thorn, 
2005; Mahoney & 
Thorn, 2006; 
McGuire et al., 2003 
 
CEP 
Kock et al., 2012 
 
 
CR 
Fabrizi et al., 2014; 
Jiraporn & Chintrakarn, 
2013; Mahoney & Thorn, 
2005 
 
CR 
Fabrizi et al., 
2014; Mahoney 
& Thorn, 2005; 
Mahoney & 
Thorn, 2006; 
Manner, 2010; 
McGuire et al., 
2003 
An alternative perspective suggests that pro-social performance requires intense 
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managerial effort (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009) that could reduce the perceived 
instrumentality of pro-social performance (McGuire, Dow, & Argheyd, 2003), 
making the link between good social performance, reputation and firm value both 
indirect and weak.  
From our review (see Table 2.4: Panel D), we find that a higher proportion of CEO 
salary is not positively associated with CSR; at the same time there are no clear 
effects of bonus and equity based compensation on CSR performance.  
Interestingly, we find no studies that test these effects in relation to CSR 
disclosures.  
Our understanding of this literature leads us to the following key observations. 
First and foremost, agency theory may not be able to fully explain the effect of 
CEO compensation on CSR. Board determination of CEO pay could be related to 
the need for maintaining the status quo among CEOs, or simply dealing with 
information asymmetries between the board and managers (Capezio et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, when boards and managers collectively decide on corporate 
matters, a certain degree of reciprocity develops between them as a result of 
social influence (O’Reilly & Main, 2007). This may in turn affect decision-making on 
CEO compensation. Thus, a more psychologically nuanced view of how CEO pay is 
determined in light of CEO-board reciprocal dynamics should be explored. Future 
studies may also consider the level of CEO compensation relative to inside-
directors’ pay overtime and proportion of directors appointed by incumbent CEO 
as a proxy for entrenchment and reciprocity.  
Directors’ social capital and resource network 
Aside from the monitoring role of the board propagated by agency theory, RD 
theory asserts that human and social capital of well-connected directors 
influences the nature and quality of managerial-board interactions (Westphal, 
1999), thereby stimulating potential deliberation and adoption of CSR (Shropshire, 
78 | Page 
 
2010).  In our review, we focus on two indicators, i.e., board interlocks and 
director experience through which interconnections between firms and their 
effect on CSR can be assessed at the group level (See Table 2.5). 
Table 2.5: Group level: Effect of directors’ social capital and resource network on 
CSR 
CG Indicators Variables Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
No Effect  
on CR/CEP 
Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
 
BOD  
Interlocking 
 
Number of 
directorship 
posts held by  
a corporate  
director 
 
 
 
CEP 
Glass et al., 2015; 
Kassinis & Vafeas, 
2002; 
Walls & Hoffman,  
2013 
 
 
 
CR 
Ben Barka & 
Dardour, 2015 
 
CEP 
de Villiers et al., 
2011 
 
 
 
Board Experience 
 
Seniority in  
board,  
functional 
experience, 
occupational 
experience 
 
 
CEP 
Walls & Hoffman,  
2013 
 
CSR 
Ben Barka & Dardour,  
2015 
 
  
We mostly encounter positive effects between board level social network ties and 
CSR, with some neutral effects. Although social networks of directors have been 
extensively explored in the CG literature in relation to financial performance, this 
research is just emerging in the context of firms’ non-financial outcomes and 
needs more attention. Since motivations are difficult to evaluate, future research 
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could explore shareholding and compensation of inter-locked directors as a proxy 
of their motivations. Furthermore, for boards to function well, it is important for 
them to be engaged in decision making without being overly unreceptive or 
involved (Nadler, 2004). Consequently, a U-shaped relationship between director 
engagement and CSR outcomes could be explored. In addition, board engagement 
could be dependent on board demographics (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014), 
which we discuss in the following section. 
Directors’ demographic diversity 
Directors’ demographic diversity comprises three main variables––directors’ age, 
gender and nationality/ethnicity. We focus our attention on the gender diversity in 
boards (see Table 2.6). As per the literature on moral reasoning, early gender 
socialization leads to gender differences (Gilligan, 1982) such that women are 
more sensitive about the scenarios requiring ethical judgments (Post, Rahman, & 
Rubow, 2011). Therefore, gender diverse boards should enable the representation 
of different stakeholder voices, leading to enhanced CSR performance and 
disclosures (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a).  
Our review supports the contention that gender diverse boards do not discourage 
CSR. We also observe that directors respond differently to CSR strengths and 
weaknesses and to the different components of CSR. Therefore, future research 
must study the prevalence of stakeholder salience in gender diverse boards 
(Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Moreover, neutral results could be explained by 
invoking the critical mass theory (Kramer, Konrad, Erkut, & Hooper, 2006), which 
argues that women directors are typically minority directors and tend to become 
mere tokens for their group (Brewer & Kramer, 1985). It is important for minority 
directors to reach a minimum threshold or a critical mass for evoking a strong 
impact on CSR.  
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Table 2.6: Group level: Effect of directors’ demographics on CSR 
CG Indicators Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
No Effect  
on CR/CEP 
Positive Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
No Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
 
Director 
Demography: 
Director’s 
Gender Diversity 
 
 
CR 
Bear et al., 2010; 
Boulouta, 2013;  
Hafsi & Turgut, 
2013; Mallin et 
al., 2013; 
Williams, 2003; 
Zhang et al., 2013 
 
CEP 
Glass et al., 2015; 
Post et al., 2011; 
Walls et al., 2012 
 
 
CR 
Bear et al., 2010; 
Boulouta, 2013 
 
CEP 
Galbreath, 2011; 
Post et al., 2011; 
Walls et al., 2012 
 
CR 
Fernandez-Feijoo 
et al., 2014; 
Frias-Aceituno et 
al., 2013; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 
2013a 
 
CEP 
Prado-Lorenzo &  
Garcia-Sánchez,  
2010 
 
 
 
CR 
Amran et al., 
2014; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 
2013b  
 
CEP 
Prado-Lorenzo  
& Garcia- 
Sánchez,   
2010 
2.5.4 Individual level dimension 
An essential foundation of CG lies in the “personal integrity and business acumen” 
of executives (Cadbury, 2006). CEOs lead organizations towards value creation, but 
at the same time they are also individuals who vary in demographics, values and 
preferences (Chin et al., 2013). Agency and stewardship theories make different 
assumptions about managerial motivations, particularly in relation to selecting 
shareholder versus stakeholder interests (Godos-Díez, Fernández-Gago, & 
Martínez-Campillo, 2011). While agency theory assumes managerial guile (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976), stewardship theory negates this assumption and proposes that 
managers can be honest individuals who can adopt pro-organizational and pro-
stakeholder activities (Ghoshal, 2005). Tables 2.7 (Panel A & B) present our review 
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of this literature addressing the effect of CEOs’ individual characteristics, as a 
product of demographic and socio-psychological indicators, on CSR outcomes of 
the firms they lead. 
CEO demographics 
We review the effect of three demographic variables on CSR, typically found in CG-
CSR literature —CEO age, gender and educational specialization. From a moral 
reasoning perspective, older CEOs have a greater moral capacity to support pro-
social behaviors (Kets de Vries & Miller, 1984). In addition, career paths invigorate 
critical implications for pro-social decisions. Newer and younger CEOs are judged 
by the market in relation to their capacity to deliver financial results (Fabrizi, 
Mallin, & Michelon, 2014). As CEOs get older, they may be less pressured by 
career goals, and more willing to give back to society (McCuddy & Cavin, 2009). In 
our review, we find inconclusive results in this domain. 
We surmise that CSR construed as an innovative business strategy may garner 
greater support from younger yet experienced CEOs, as opposed to conservative 
older CEOs. We suggest that instead of linear relationships between CEO age and 
CSR, future research should look at interactive relationships between age and 
experience and their impact on CSR. This is particularly relevant given the rise of 
younger but widely experienced CEOs in certain industries (Forbes, 2013).  
As discussed earlier, gender socialization theory predicts that women CEOs should 
be better able to pursue CSR than men CEOs (Brammer, Millington, & Pavelin, 
2007). Scholarship on gender and leadership contends that women leaders tend to 
be more innovative and egalitarian in their view of firm strategy and consequently 
more long-term and stakeholder focused (Adams & Funk, 2009; Glass, Cook, & 
Ingersoll, 2015). Although in our review, women CEOs do not discourage CSR, 
recent research suggests that men CEOs are just as likely to strengthen CSR as 
women CEOs (Glass et al., 2015). Clearly, the relationship between the CEO’s 
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gender and pro-social decision-making is more complex than previously assumed. 
We conjecture it is likely that there is not much difference between men and 
women’s decision-making behaviors at the highest levels of authority. Diversity, 
rather than homophily, among and between TMT, may be more effective in 
promoting pro-social behaviors (Cox, Lobel, & McLeod, 1991). Finally, social and 
environmental decisions should be broken down into pro-active decisions and risk-
averse compliance decisions. It is likely that diversity and homophily may have 
different effects on these parameters (Glass et al., 2015; Johansen & Pettersson, 
2013).  
CEOs educational background potentially contains complex yet important cues for 
decision-making behaviors (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Borrowing from this strand 
of literature, executive educational background could also influence their pro-
social orientations (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella, 2009). For example, 
psychology and sociology involve the study of human behavior where cooperative 
problem-solving models are more recognized (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 
1997). Consequently, CEOs with a background in sociology or psychology may be 
better at appreciating the benefits of stakeholder management. In contrast, 
economics as a discipline does not emphasize the ethics of decision-making and it 
is expected that CEOs with an economics background may not relate to CSR unless 
it is viewed as a risk-averse strategy (Manner, 2010). In a similar vein, CEOs with 
MBAs are said to have greater human capital, and are more adept at strategic 
decision-making (Finkelstein et al., 2009).  On the other hand, CEOs with a legal 
background are likely to be cautious, conservative and risk averse (Delmas & 
Toffel, 2008; Lewis et al., 2014). Accordingly, CEOs with MBA degrees may look at 
voluntary CSR more pro-actively than those with a legal background, who will be 
more inclined towards compliance-based CSR.  
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Table 2.7: Individual level: Panel A: Effect of CEO demographics on CSR 
CG Indicators Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
Negative 
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
No 
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
Positive 
Effect  
on CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
Negative  
Effect  
on CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
 
CEO 
Demographics: 
CEO Age 
 
CR 
Slater & 
Dixon-Fowler, 
2009 
 
 
CR 
Borghesi 
et al.,  
2014 
 
 
CR 
Fabrizi et al., 2014; 
Huang, 2013; Slater 
& Dixon-Fowler, 
2009 
 
  
 
CEO Gender  
 
CR 
Borghesi et 
al., 2014; 
Huang, 2013; 
Manner, 2010 
 
  
CR 
Rodriguez-
Dominguez et al., 
2009 
 
CEP 
Glass et al., 2015 
 
  
 
CEO 
Qualification 
 
CR 
Huang, 2013; 
Manner, 2010 
 
CR 
Manner,  
2010 
 
CR 
Manner, 2010 
 
CEP 
Lewis et 
al., 2014 
 
CEP 
Lewis et al.,  
2014 
 
Our review concurs that educational differences in CEO backgrounds could lead to 
differences in firms’ CSR outcomes as predicted above (Table 2.7: Panel A). This 
has important implications for universities and curriculum design decisions. 
Specifically, the question of why business ethics continues to be conspicuously 
absent within a conventional business or economics curriculum needs to be 
revisited given the extensive social, environmental and reputational harm that 
accrues from irresponsible business activities. Another promising research area 
that emerges at the individual level is the effect of racial, ethnic and/or national 
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diversity in leadership positions on CSR. Research in this direction is largely lacking 
(except Huang, 2013) and assumes relevance given the rise of non-white, 
immigrant and women CEOs, at least in the Silicon Valley (Forbes, 2015). 
CEO socio-psychological characteristics  
In this section, we review two variables to assess CEOs’ socio-psychological 
characteristics: CEO political ideologies and CEO past-experience (See Table 2.7: 
Panel B). Political psychologists suggest that executives vary in their political 
ideologies (Francia, Green, Herrnson, & Powell et al., 2005) and that could impact 
their CSR decision-making.  Through our review of research in this field, we find 
that specifically in the US, liberalist CEOs tend to believe in economic equality and 
social justice and are more likely to be sensitive to social issues such as diversity, 
human rights, and the environment (Schwartz, 1996). On the other hand, 
conservative CEOs tend to value individualism and free markets and therefore are 
more inclined to focus on business goals over social needs (ibid).  
Upper echelons research suggests that executives' experiences can also affect 
their world-view and consequently their strategic CSR choices (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; Walsh, 1988). We find that past work experience that involves processing 
complex and dynamic information and deriving innovative solutions to complex 
problems may enable executives to better understand the relevance of CSR from a 
long-term value generation perspective (e.g., Manner, 2010; Slater & Dixon-
Fowler, 2009).  
This domain of work is still new and intriguing. Whereas for some CEOs, personal 
values reflect on their political donations (Chin et al., 2013), for others such 
donations are a means to enhance political connections often overriding personal 
ideologies (see Borghesi et al., 2014). Given the increasing involvement of business 
in politics and recent regulations that have abolished limits on political donations 
(such as in the US) (Liptak, 2014), more research in this direction is called for to 
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understand the extent to which individual values matter for CSR and the degree to 
which CEOs are willing to circumvent other processes to uphold those values. In 
addition, existing research is limited to the US context, providing scope for 
furthering research in other political systems given the increasing involvement of 
businesses in political CSR (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).  
Table 2.7: Individual level: Panel B: Effect of CEO socio-psychological 
characteristics on CSR 
CG Indicators Variables Positive  
Effect on  
CR/CEP 
No Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
Effect on  
CR/CEP  
Disclosures 
 
 
CEO Socio-
Psychological 
Characteristics: 
CEO Experience  
 
 
Functional  
Experience; occupational 
experience; international 
experience 
 
 
CR 
Manner, 
2010; Slater & 
Dixon-Fowler, 
2009 
 
 
 
CR 
Manner, 2010; 
Slater & Dixon-
Fowler, 2009 
 
 
 
CEO Political 
Inclination 
 
Liberal versus  
conservative value;  
CEOs political  
contributions 
 
CR 
Borghesi et 
al., 2014; 
Chin et al., 
2013 
 
  
2.6 Discussions and directions for future research 
In this paper, we attempt to look inside the black box of CG-CSR research and 
critically assess the impact of multiple CG dimensions, their indicators and 
constituent variables, on firms’ CSR outcomes. Our study highlights that 
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theoretically there is a strong case for CG to influence CSR, yet the persistence of 
inconclusive results is often visible providing exciting opportunities to advance 
research in this important field.  
We observe that CG indicators and variables are often interdependent and 
interactively shape or create specific CSR outcomes for the firm (Aguilera & 
Williams, 2009). We propose that in addition to furthering research at the 
different levels of analysis (i.e., institutional, firm, group, and individual), scholars 
must espouse a holistic approach where variables associated with different 
dimensions of CG are seen as interacting, i.e., substituting, complementing, or 
over-riding others, to form bundles and configurations of governance practices 
that in turn influence CSR. There is indeed some recent and nuanced research 
(e.g., Aguilera et al., 2015; Arora & Dharwadkar, 2010; Glass et al., 2015; Jo & 
Harjoto, 2011; Kock et al., 2012; Lubatkin et al., 2005; Walls & Hoffman, 2013; 
Walls et al., 2012) that could lead the way towards this endeavor. In this section 
we tease out three examples that exemplify interactions between different CG 
variables and articulate a concrete agenda for future research.  
2.6.1 Beyond direct effects 
(I) Extant literature at the firm level focuses on the different investment horizons 
and motives of concentrated owners and their impact on CSR. Group level 
research focuses on diversity (specifically gender diversity) in boards being 
supportive of CSR. While existing research on these phenomena is commendable–
–there are some questions that remain unanswered. For example, if block-owners 
are driven solely by their investment horizons and motives, will they adopt the 
same behaviors across multiple investment destinations? Why are diverse boards 
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not as perverse as one would imagine given the general outcry for socially 
responsible behaviors and why do some firms embrace board gender diversity 
more readily than others? We conjecture that the institutional environment in 
which firms are embedded should hold the key to some of these questions.  
Prevalent research demonstrates that firms embedded in shareholder-oriented 
LME countries perceive CSR activities as provision of public goods by appropriating 
private capital as opposed to firms embedded in stakeholder-oriented CG systems 
in CME countries. We contemplate that agency or stakeholder orientations of 
shareholder-entities could at least partially be the result of the country context in 
which owners are embedded and/or functional (e.g., Mackenzie et al., 2013; Rees 
& Rodionova, 2015). Similarly, countries that are more gender equal, as a result of 
informal institutions, tend to reflect greater gender diversity on boards 
(Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, & Ruiz-Blanco, 2014). It follows that structural 
changes promoting pro-CSR reforms within firms are likely to be more successful 
when complemented by the institutional makeup of the context in which firms 
function, failing which there is a likelihood of a greater tendency to engage in 
symbolic rather than substantive pro-social behaviors (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002; 
Brown et al., 2006). Therefore, for enabling substantive changes in CSR behaviors, 
policy makers must facilitate both the development of formal CG structures as 
well as informal institutions necessary to encourage a culture of ethics and 
responsibility. In view of these observations, we recommend that future research 
needs to focus on nested CG structures at different levels such that concentrated 
owners and board structures are viewed as nested within an institutional 
environment that influence managerial CSR aspirations. 
(II) Prevalent CG structures at the institutional and board levels are typically 
designed to curtail managerial entrenchment for restricting managerial discretion 
to safeguard shareholder interests (Hambrick & Finklestein, 1995; Surroca & Tribo, 
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2008). Yet managerial discretion is pertinent for conceiving and implementing CSR 
decisions that involve balancing the interests of investing and non-investing 
stakeholders. Therefore, present CG structures to restrict managerial 
entrenchment position shareholder interests as diametrically opposed to other 
stakeholder interests, while painting all managers as inherently opportunistic 
(Ghoshal, 2005). This is akin to falling within the agency trap that, as substantial 
literature corroborates, takes a rather simplistic view of the business world (Judge, 
2008).  
Research in this domain could draw from the literature at the individual level, 
which suggests that CEOs’ demography and socio-psychological experiences may 
shape their world-view informing their ideological stances towards ethics and 
responsibility (Manner, 2010). Therefore, whether CEOs consider CSR as a threat, 
an opportunity or a responsibility should be explored as a function of not just the 
structural limitations placed on them but also of CEOs own personal 
characteristics that are often discounted by economists and management 
theorists in CG research.  
(III) At the group and individual level, considerable research highlights that the 
presence of few women on boards does not pro-actively encourage CSR 
investments because of the absence of a critical mass that can result in crowding 
out of their voices (Brewer & Kramer, 1985).  Another plausible perspective, often 
overlooked, is that women who are appointed on board positions may have 
ultimately acquired and bring the same qualities as men (e.g., Glass et al., 2015), 
resulting in the absence of diversity of skills and experiences on the board. 
Evidently, women CEOs are no different from men CEOs when it comes to CSR 
decision-making (see Glass et al., 2015). In fact, men CEOs tend to perform better 
on CSR than female CEOs when accompanied by gender diversified boards, 
contradicting the predictions of gender socialization and critical mass theories. 
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Perhaps over and above demographic diversity (gender), knowledge and 
experiential diversity of men and women on boards (interlocking) introduces an 
element of creative and meaningful discussions within boards that could improve 
CSR outcomes (Glass et al., 2015; Huse, Nielsen, & Hagen, 2009; Westphal & 
Milton, 2000). Despite obvious interdependencies between demographic and 
experiential diversity, these relationships are rarely considered in the literature 
and must be explored in tandem in the future. 
2.6.2 Future research agenda 
Beyond direct effects, in light of the extensive review presented above, we identify 
three vital areas for future research in relation to CG-CSR interfaces.  
Disaggregating corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility variables 
There are different ways in which aggregation has been introduced in CG and CSR 
research. In CG, institutional investors are often lumped into a singular category, 
despite variations in their motives and investment horizons for CSR. With newer 
categories of institutional investors becoming more prominent (e.g., hedge funds, 
private equity firms, and sovereign wealth funds) (Aguilera, Capapé, & Santiso, in 
press), the literature on CG-CSR needs to advance beyond the traditional gamut of 
institutional investors (Çelik & Isaksson, 2014). At the group level, TMTs are 
operationalized as one homogeneous entity despite significant demographic, 
psychological and ideological differences among their sub-groups (Chin et al., 
2013). The problem of aggregates is also visible in our dependent variable, CSR. 
The impact of CG drastically differs when CSR is considered as a composite 
construct as compared to when CSR is broken down into people and product 
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dimensions, environmental performance, and CSR weaknesses and strengths. Firm 
responses to CEP may be different from other CSR investments since the former is 
more technical and strategic (Bansal, Gao, & Qureshi, 2014). Negative CSR or CSR 
concerns are conceptually different and interpreted as “bad” events that receive a 
different response from firms than positive CSR or CSR strengths (Chatterji, Levine, 
& Toffel, 2009; Mattingly & Berman, 2006). Thus, individual CSR elements can 
capture differences in firms’ social orientations (Jain, in press) emphasizing the 
need to use precise and disaggregate measures of CG and CSR in future research.   
Beyond existing theories 
As research progresses to analyze the underlying complexities between the 
various aspects of CG and their effect on CSR, there is a growing appreciation that 
such a more nuanced understanding of CG and CSR complexity may not be fully 
comprehensible through a single theoretical lens (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). 
As the newer conception of CG gains traction by emphasizing both financial and 
non-financial performance of firms (Gill, 2008), recent research draws on multiple 
theoretical lens to explain CSR behaviors such as combination of agency and 
institutional arguments to explain the effect of stock compensation of outside-
directors on CSR (e.g., Deutsch & Valente, 2013) and an amalgam of agency and 
RD theories to analyze the impact of ownership and board characteristics on CSR 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a). We believe this is a step in the right direction.  
In addition, newer theories could also offer insights guiding future research 
directions. At the group level, the RD perspective emphasizes the importance of 
board network ties and the diffusion of knowledge and practices through board 
networks. This is likely to expand the roles of the boards beyond monitors of 
managerial decision-making, to counselors and advisors (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). 
Therefore, future research could draw from the theories of sociology and socio-
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psychology such as role theory for better understanding the expanding roles of 
boards towards positively influencing firm CSR behaviors.  
Addressing methodological issues 
Despite the proliferation of research in the field of CG-CSR, causality still remains 
elusive. The majority of the studies test association, but not causality. To shed 
more light on the precise nature of the relationship between CG and CSR, it is 
imperative for researchers to use extensive data sets, longer time series analysis, 
lagged models for testing CSR antecedents, and remove or alleviate the 
endogeneity bias. Most of the problems in CG-CSR research stem from the fact 
that several firm level CG variables are not exogenously determined but rather are 
affected by unobserved firm characteristics (Johnson et al., 2012). Therefore, 
future research should strive to model the determinants of CG above and beyond 
testing their effects on CSR.  
Part of this problem could also be addressed by experimenting with more 
sophisticated research methods. Conventional empirical methods, such as linear 
regression models, that assume independence amongst explanatory factors, do 
not appropriately capture the complex interactive relationships that we have 
identified in this paper. In addition, the focus in such models is more on how much 
variation in CSR is explained by different CG variables, and not on how the 
different CG variables combine to explain specific CSR outcomes (Aguilera & 
Williams, 2009). Future research could benefit from the use of innovative methods 
such as fuzzy sets (Ragin, 2008) that focus on the idea of equifinality suggesting 
that there is no one best pareto optimal practice of CG that could improve firms’ 
CSR performance (Aguilera & Williams, 2009).  
Finally, to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of board functioning and 
processes, particularly interpretation of external CG systems by corporate insiders, 
CEO-board interactions, and the influence of board interlocking, qualitative 
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methods such as grounded theory and alternative theoretical lens such as 
sensemaking and sensegiving (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Walls & Hoffman, 2013) 
should be adopted. These are likely to offer deeper insights that can in turn 
enhance our understanding of the linkages between CG and CSR. 
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Through our review, we set out to identify CG dimensions at four levels of analysis, 
namely, the institutional, firm, group, and individual levels, that independently 
and interactively impact firm level CSR outcomes.  Although both CG and CSR are 
growing independently into professional and mature disciplines, our review 
uncovers that research at the intersection of CG-CSR is still nascent and more is 
needed to understand how intricate CG indicators and variables affect CSR 
decision-making and outcomes. This sort of investigation is both timely and 
needed given the complex affinities of CG and CSR and increasing calls to better 
understand and leverage them (Jamali, Safieddine, & Rabbath, 2008; Kang & 
Moon, 2011).  
Beyond outlining existing documented effects of specific CG variables on CSR, we 
identify definitive gaps for future research. We recommend that greater scholarly 
attention needs to be accorded to disaggregating CG and CSR indicators into more 
refined variables and comprehending how multiple configurations of CG variables 
interact – substitute, complement or over-ride – to impact the different facets of 
firms’ CSR practices. Towards this end, we suggest employing multi-theoretical 
lenses to enable a deeper and finer-grained analysis of CG indicators and 
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processes and how they relate to the demands and expectations of different 
stakeholders. In addition, we suggest that cross-country research should acquire 
resonance given the contextual sensitivity and peculiarities of CG and CSR 
constructs. This calls for employing sophisticated methodologies that include both 
qualitative methods such as grounded theory and quantitative statistical modeling 
for resolving potential endogeniety. 
The wide scope of our review possibly leaves the reader with more questions than 
answers. However, we have taken an important first step in terms of teasing out 
the relationships that lie at the intersection of CG and CSR, consolidating existing 
knowledge in this domain and outlining a concrete agenda for guiding future 
research. We assert that, in the light of the growing importance of CSR, these are 
important areas for both organizational and non-organizational stakeholders and 
we invite more research to refine our understanding of the CG-CSR interface.   
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Chapter 3: Decoupling corporate social orientations: A 
cross-national analysis  
“When the sea was calm all ships alike show’d mastership in floating.” 
- William Shakespeare 
   (Coriolanus, Act IV, Scene 3) 
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3.1 Abstract 
This study examines the variations in corporate social orientations (CSOs) across 
developed and developing countries in the context of a legitimacy threat. 
Conceptualizing CSO as signals, the author develops and validates a seven-code 
index of CSO that identifies executive orientations towards multiple stakeholders. 
Using this index on CEO shareholder letters from the US, Germany, and India, the 
author finds that firms signal a multi-stakeholder image towards employees, 
communities, and environment during good times to enhance their social license 
to operate and yet such signals are not carried through during the threat period. 
This disconnect in signaling in the wake of a legitimacy threat is indicative of 
decoupling in corporate orientations and exposes the multi-dimensionality of the 
CSO concept. By adding a cross-national and temporal dimension, this research 
contributes towards better understanding the complexity behind CSOs and opens 
new areas for future research. 
3.2 Introduction 
In the lead up to the 2013 Global Leadership Summit, a survey conducted by the 
London Business School across 3800 respondents reports that creating a 
responsible culture, contributing to long-term sustainability, and demonstrating 
integrity and moral leadership are becoming as important as maximizing financial 
returns to shareholders. In achieving this, much of the skepticism is about leaders’ 
intentions to recognize and act responsibly towards various stakeholders (Gratton, 
2013) in a manner that goes beyond mere appropriate public posturing. Corporate 
social orientation (CSO) is the managerial view of a firm’s responsibility towards 
internal and external stakeholders (Aupperle, 1984). Therefore, examining a firm’s 
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social orientation helps in understanding executives’ intentions towards 
stakeholders and society and in this vein becomes an important area of research 
in the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social 
performance (Gray & Milne, 2002; Laufer, 2003; Wood, 2010). 
Since the emergence of the CSO concept in the mid-1980s, there have been 
expansions in the multi-dimensional understanding of corporate responsibility 
(Waldman et al., 2006). For instance, the shareholder approach that once included 
only the interest of the owner-shareholders has now widened to integrate the 
interests of customers, suppliers, and employees to facilitate maximization of 
shareholder value (Freeman, 1984; Schiebel & Pöchtrager, 2003). At the same 
time, an effective CSR approach requires an identification of and an engagement 
with multiple stakeholders (Hahn, 2012). Methodologically, there is a general 
agreement in the literature that the techniques assessing CSO do not effectively 
counter the practice of green-washing, which firms often employ to paint an 
opportunistically favorable image of themselves (Wood, 2010). Therefore, for a 
realistic understanding of firms’ genuine CSOs, what the author labels de facto 
CSOs, two aspects are key: First, a more advanced theorizing of CSO as a multi-
dimensional construct that analyzes both what drives or motivates firm behavior 
as well as assesses the top managements’ standpoint on who and what really 
counts for them and for the firms they represent (Albinger & Freeman, 2000; 
Jamali, 2008; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; Wood, 2010), and second, the need to 
adopt a methodology that systematically distinguishes a firm’s de facto CSO from 
green-washing and puffery (Gray & Milne, 2002; Laufer, 2003).  
It is also important to introduce some further contextuality to this research. On 
the one hand, most of the existing research in the field of CSO is concentrated on 
developed economies. However, developed economies exhibit different CSR 
typologies as exemplified by the cases of Germany and the US (Matten & Moon, 
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2008). It is necessary to explore how these cross-national differences apply to 
CSO. On the other hand, nearly half of the world’s GDP is being contributed by the 
developing economies (OECD, 2010) and scholars are increasingly calling for 
comparative research in developed and developing country contexts (Jamali & 
Neville, 2011; Williams & Aguilera, 2008; Witt & Redding, 2013). 
Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to unravel and understand firms’ de facto 
CSOs and to compare them across the US, Germany, and India that represent 
three different developed and developing country contexts. Specifically, using the 
signaling lens in the presence of a legitimacy threat, the author proposes a more 
advanced theoretical and methodological approach that effectively distinguishes 
corporate public pretentions from corporate private intentions through the process 
of decoupling to uncover firms’ de facto CSOs. Applying the signaling theory 
(Spence, 1973), the author suggests that in situations characterized by information 
asymmetry such as in the field of CSO (Hill & Jones, 1992), there is a strong 
incentive for executives to signal information that conforms to stakeholders’ 
expectations in order to enhance their social license to operate (SLO). Therefore, 
the signals sent might be different from executives’ real intent for the firms they 
represent. Such a process creates loose couplings between corporate public 
pretentions and corporate private intentions (Weick, 1976). However, when firms 
face a legitimacy threat, a change in legitimacy conferring publics takes place 
(Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; O’Donovan, 2002). As a result, 
executives reprioritize their signals around those stakeholders who matter the 
most, creating a disconnect between signals sent prior to and during the threat. 
An inter-temporal examination of stakeholder signaling in the presence of a 
legitimacy threat (such as the recent global financial crisis) can capture the 
decoupling between corporate public pretentions and corporate private 
intentions, thereby uncovering the de facto CSOs.  
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To do so, the author uses thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006) 
on a sample of financial firms’ annual letters to the shareholders across the US, 
Germany, and India. The author carefully interprets these letters by first 
examining what is being communicated and then identifying the relevant 
stakeholders towards whom specific communications are directed. This process of 
stakeholder identification is pre-tested to ensure that interpretations drawn are 
systematized through a thematic code and coding mechanism and are free from 
researcher bias to reflect a firm’s CSO reliably. The findings of this study, although 
drawn from a small sample, are indicative of country differences both in 
stakeholder prioritization and intensity of CSOs. The author also finds a potential 
convergence between the US and Germany (Heyes, Lewis, & Clark, 2012) and an 
emergence of a unique variety of CSO in India (Witt & Redding, 2013) during 
challenging times. 
This exploratory article makes a number of contributions to further research in the 
field of CSO. First, it provides a novel theoretical grounding to the research on CSO 
by integrating the signaling theory (Spence, 1973) and the process of decoupling 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Second, through the use of thematic analysis on top 
management communication, the author develops a seven-code index of CSO that 
identifies specific stakeholders and issues towards whom firms are generally found 
to be oriented. In this process, the author clarifies the CSO construct by revealing 
the stakeholder salience for firms (Mitchell et al., 1997). Third, by contextualizing 
this research in the recent global financial crisis, the study captures significant 
changes in CSOs over a short period of time. These changes are strongly indicative 
of a decoupling between corporate public pretentions and corporate private 
intentions and the presence of green-washing in CSOs across countries. In this 
manner, the author provides a useful methodology to uncover the multi-
dimensionality of the CSO construct. Finally, through this cross-national study, the 
author extends the research on comparative CSR by examining CSOs across 
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developed and developing countries (Jamali & Neville, 2011; Williams & Aguilera, 
2008).  
3.3 From corporate social responsibility to corporate social 
orientations 
CSR is defined in different ways in the literature (Dahlsrud, 2008) and accordingly 
different models of CSR explain for what and to whom organizations are 
responsible. Resonating Friedman’s (2009) view of shareholder supremacy, the 
classical model holds that firms must work for the long-term value creation for its 
owners; and CSR should only be used strategically towards this end (Porter & 
Kramer, 2002). Based on Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder theory, the modern view 
maintains that executives and firms are responsible to a wider set of stakeholders 
including the community and society (Clarkson, 1995). Reconciling the classical 
and modern models of CSR, Carroll (1979; 1991) proposed a four-part 
conceptualization of business responsibilities into economic, legal, ethical, and 
discretionary in order of priority, that according to him “address the entire 
spectrum of obligations business has to society” (1991, pp. 40). Economic 
responsibility primarily targets shareholders and includes the obligation of 
businesses to be profitable while meeting society’s consumer needs; legal 
responsibility concerns satisfying legal obligations and regulations while 
conducting business and earning profits; ethical responsibility revolves around 
following certain codes and norms expected from society although not formally 
codified as laws; and discretionary responsibility includes voluntary and 
philanthropic activities undertaken by the firm to acquire a good corporate 
citizenship (Carroll, 1979; 1991).  
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Using this construct, Aupperle (1984) introduced the term corporate social 
orientation (CSO) to assess the executive view of a firm’s social responsibility. 
Aupperle’s method comprises of a forced choice survey instrument, wherein 
respondents are asked to rate several set of statements––each signifying a specific 
dimension of Carroll’s construct of CSR––and the mean value of a respondent’s 
score on each of the four dimensions is used to arrive at their CSO. The underlying 
idea behind a forced-choice instrument is to minimize the social appropriateness 
of responses in measuring CSOs (Aupperle, 1984). 
Over the years, several studies have emerged that use versions of Aupperle’s 
instrument for investigating social orientations such as those of CEOs, board 
members (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1991; 1995), students (Angelidis & Ibrahim, 2004), 
and small businesses (Burton & Goldsby, 2009). While substantive, Carroll’s model 
(on which Aupperle’s instrument is constructed) is almost exclusively embedded in 
the US context. Research suggests that cultural differences across countries 
significantly influence perceived CSR priorities (Burton, Farh, & Hegarty, 2000). For 
example, while philanthropy in the US is discretionary, in several European 
countries philanthropy is compulsory under law and falls within the realm of legal 
responsibility (Crane & Matten, 2007). In contrast, in developing countries strong 
religious traditions make philanthropic donations the right thing to do, making 
them an ethical issue rather than a discretionary one (Visser, 2008). Therefore, the 
application of Carroll’s framework and consequently of Aupperle’s instrument may 
not be entirely appropriate for a cross-national understanding of CSO across 
developed and developing contexts. In addition, Carroll’s framework only lists the 
entire set of managerial functions in a hierarchy. Accordingly, Aupperle’s 
instrument of CSO assesses the varying levels of orientation as economic or 
beyond that spillover into the non-economic sphere, without identifying the 
specific stakeholders towards whom the firms may be oriented (Mitchell et al., 
1997; Wood, 2010).  
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Apart from Aupperle’s method, two other streams of research examining CSO 
have emerged. One stream uses reputational ratings, primarily KLD ratings, for 
assessing firms’ orientations (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Tang & Tang, 
2012; Waddock & Graves, 1997). While KLD ratings are based on an expert panel 
evaluation, they consider only certain specific orientations such as employee 
relations, community relations, environment, product, treatment of women and 
minorities, and corporate governance; do not capture social requirements of 
specific industries; and are not validated outside the US (Hillman & Keim, 2001; 
Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). Moreover, variables used in the KLD database are 
more a measure of outcome (Tang & Tang, 2012) and of management (Berman et 
al., 1999), rather than of orientation (Wood, 2010). The second stream of research 
is based on the analysis of corporate social disclosures (CSDs) such as sustainability 
reports, environmental reports (Kolk, 1999; 2003), and codes of conduct (Kolk, van 
Tulder, & Welters, 1999). Standalone CSDs, being voluntary in nature, are more 
likely to be issued by firms with a superior commitment towards CSR than 
otherwise (Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil, & LaGore, 2012). This may portray a biased 
and incomplete overall picture of CSO.  
In addition, most of the present research that directly or indirectly explores 
corporate orientations is mostly focused on the developed country context. For 
example, Sotorrío and Sánchez (2008) compare the social behavior and 
motivations of firms across the EU and the US; Burton and Goldsby (2009) study 
the social orientations in the US Midwest; Fukukawa and Teramoto (2009) analyze 
the perceptions of Japanese managers, and the various studies on CSO by Ibrahim 
and others explore the US, European and Australian contexts. Interestingly, 
different CSR typologies exist within developed economies for instance the 
prevalence of explicit CSR in the US and UK versus implicit CSR in most of the other 
European countries (Matten & Moon, 2008). Lack of comparative research in this 
field risks putting all the developed countries and their CSOs under one blanket. 
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Therefore, cross-national research is needed to understand CSOs in developing 
and developed country contexts that have arguably adopted different CSR 
typologies (Jamali & Neville, 2011; Williams & Aguilera, 2008).  
3.4 Conceptual development 
For a theoretical advancement of the field, the author suggests a framework to 
untangle the multi-dimensionality of CSO. To do so, the author introduces three 
key constructs: corporate public pretentions, corporate private intentions and de 
facto CSO. The author defines corporate public pretentions as a multi-stakeholder 
image deliberately projected by firms usually through the use of polished words 
and exaggerated assertions. Corporate private intentions, on the other hand, 
reflect the cardinal and fundamental issues of genuine importance to firms and 
are focused only on those stakeholders that firms perceive to be critical and 
relevant. De facto CSO is defined as the factual orientation of firms towards 
internal and external stakeholders. It includes the private intentions towards 
specific stakeholders and excludes the public pretentions towards perceived 
inconsequential stakeholders. The author argues that the decoupling between 
public pretentions and private intentions can uncover firms’ de facto CSOs. 
3.4.1 Signaling, decoupling and de facto corporate social 
orientations 
Hill and Jones (1992) suggest that information asymmetry exists between 
managers and stakeholders. While executives know and co-create their firms’ 
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orientations, stakeholders are often unaware of them. Executives use corporate 
social disclosures (CSDs) to communicate their firms’ orientation to stakeholders 
(internal and external) for reducing the information asymmetry between them. 
Drawing on the signaling theory (Spence, 1973; 2002), the author proposes that 
CSO, among other things, is a signal to the stakeholders about executive behavior 
and behavioral intentions (Elitzur & Gavious, 2003). On the one hand, the CSO 
signals contained in the CSDs may be used by firms for gaining the acceptance, 
approval and support of stakeholders and communities and on the other hand, 
these signals enable stakeholders and communities to make decisions about 
granting or withdrawing firms’ SLO (Boutilier & Thomson, 2011).  
The author argues that the CSO signals include both corporate private intentions 
towards critical and relevant stakeholders as well as corporate public pretentions 
needed to enhance firms’ SLO. This interpretation gives CSO a multi-dimensional 
character making it difficult to understand firms’ factual orientation, de facto CSO. 
Firms that are perceived as conforming with stakeholders’ expectations can secure 
valuable competitive advantages in the form of better investment prospects, 
easier access to capital, stable and committed workforce, and loyal customers 
(Mahoney et al., 2012). However, many of these stakeholder expectations are 
inherently conflicting and require delicate balancing on the part of firms. In 
addition, adopting structures, processes and procedures that substantively fulfill 
these expectations can be risky as well as costly (Perez-Batres, Doh, Miller, & 
Pisani, 2012). With pressure mounting on executives to keep their firms profitable 
for shareholders and investors while adhering to the many stakeholder demands, 
executives may be strongly motivated to cheat either by (a) exercising discretion 
regarding the stakeholders targeted including the nature, amount, extent, and 
frequency of information released; or by (b) shrouding their factual orientations to 
promote a socially legitimate image. This process is akin to ceremonial conformity 
or loose coupling in organizations wherein formal structures and procedures are 
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adopted to conform to external expectations but internal processes are decoupled 
from them to avoid exposure of discrepancies and consequential loss of legitimacy 
(Jamali, 2010; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In the context of CSOs, the author argues 
that executives’ actual intent towards specific stakeholders may be toned down to 
project a balanced stakeholder image for the firm, creating a loose coupling 
between corporate public pretentions and corporate private intentions (Bromley 
& Powell, 2012; Weick, 1976). Therefore, to understand a firm’s de facto CSO it is 
necessary to distinguish between corporate public pretentions and corporate 
private intentions.  
Research suggests that events of a public nature, that constitute a legitimacy 
threat and can endanger the survival of firms, lead to a re-prioritization of 
legitimacy conferring publics (O’Donovan, 2002). With constraints on executive 
time and resources, all stakeholders and issues cannot be attended equally, which 
makes it imperative for executives to deal with stakeholders and issues selectively 
and judiciously (Dutton, 1986; March & Olsen, 1976; Weick, 1976). In addition, 
executives face a legitimization crisis themselves with their effectiveness to lead 
firms during adversity being questioned. Those executives who can successfully 
steer their firms out of such threats are elevated to heroic status while those who 
cannot do so lose their reputation as good leaders (Dutton, 1986). 
Accordingly, in the face of legitimacy threats, executives are highly likely to alter 
their signals to the public in a manner that is no longer concerned with building 
and/or maintaining public pretentions, but rather to alleviate the pressure from 
the threat by focusing on private intentions, i.e., on selected stakeholders 
considered to be critical and relevant for firm survival (Connelly et al., 2011). With 
executive attention prioritized on these critical and relevant stakeholders, signals 
sent prior to the threat primarily for image creation purposes (public pretentions) 
may be substantially reduced or omitted altogether. As a result, there will be a 
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potential disconnect between signals sent prior to and during the threat such that 
the private intention signals will sustain during the threat while the public 
pretention signals will be largely left out (Surroca & Tribo, 2008). Following this 
argumentation, the author proposes that an inter-temporal comparison of CSDs 
around a legitimacy threat, such as the recent global financial crisis, can uncover 
the de facto CSO of firms by distinguishing the public pretentions from the private 
intentions through a process of decoupling (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Connelly et 
al., 2011; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; O’Donovan, 2002; Weick, 1976). 
3.4.2 Firm’s annual letter to shareholders and de facto 
corporate social orientations 
The practice of voluntary CSDs started in the 1970s and has now become a trend 
with about 90% of the Fortune 500 companies reporting their social performance 
(Weber & Marley, 2012). Scholars consider these disclosures as one of the ways to 
capture firms’ social performance (Mitnick, 2000). Accordingly, past studies have 
used top management disclosures such as sustainability and CSR reports, 
environmental reports (Kolk, 1999; 2003), and codes of conduct (Kolk et al., 1999) 
for assessing firms’ social performances, including CSOs. However, most CSDs are 
prepared by consultants based on industry best practices (Hartman, Rubin, & 
Dhanda, 2007) and on specific guidelines (such as the Global Reporting Initiative), 
which can heavily influence firms’ selection of stakeholders (Weber & Marley, 
2012). In addition, it is found that these standalone CSDs are mostly issued by 
firms with a greater social commitment (Mahoney et al., 2012). Together, this is 
likely to the general understanding of CSOs.  
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This study explicitly explores a specific voluntary CSD––the top management’s 
annual letter to the shareholders (hereinafter called the CEO/chairperson letter)––
to capture a firm’s de facto CSO. Research supports that CEO/chairperson letters 
to the shareholders are primarily used to communicate management trends, 
corporate vision, strategies and disclosures on most relevant matters, including on 
corporate responsibilities (Castelló & Lozano, 2011; De Bakker, Groenewegen, & 
Den Hond, 2005). In contrast with most of the other voluntary CSDs, the 
CEO/chairperson letter, although drafted in consultation with communication 
experts, is carefully read, revised and approved by the CEO/chairperson and the 
board of directors themselves (Castelló & Lozano, 2011; Fiol, 1995). For example, 
one of the most expected letters is that of Mr. Warren Buffet, chairman of 
Berkshire Hathaway––a company that is part of the sample used for this research 
(Amernic & Craig, 2007). Such letters are voluntary expressions of executives’ view 
of who and what really counts for their firms and represent the collective belief of 
the entire management team (Cho & Hambrick, 2006). Furthermore, the 
CEO/chairperson letters, although voluntary in nature, are usually a part of firms’ 
statutory annual reports and are issued by most firms, irrespective of their level of 
social commitment. Therefore, the author uses CEO/chairperson letters as the 
data source for examining firms’ de facto CSOs. 
3.5 Empirical setting: Recent global financial crisis and the 
financial sector 
The author contextualizes this research in the recent global financial crisis and 
focus specifically on the financial sector. This is because to capture the decoupling 
between corporate public pretentions and corporate private intentions and to 
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uncover de facto CSOs, it is necessary to explore a context where firms face a 
legitimacy threat, a setting that constitutes a high-risk sector gravely affected by 
this threat, and a situation where there are dilemmas for engagement in CSR 
activities forcing a re-prioritization of firms’ stakeholder orientations.  
Studies based in the context of the financial crisis find some evidence that firms 
may elect not to engage in certain CSR projects or may significantly reduce their 
outlays towards these activities. This is because implementation of CSR may be 
seen as an immediate financial burden (Fernández-Feijóo Souto, 2009). 
Accordingly, the author proposes that the recent global financial crisis represents 
a financially constrained environment that may impact firms’ social performance, 
and create a dilemma situation for firms between focusing on critical and relevant 
stakeholders while maintaining their social license to operate.  
A closer look at the crisis reveals that while it stemmed from the US housing 
market in 2006, it transformed into a credit crisis in the latter half of 2007. This 
was followed by a formidable deterioration in market conditions that spread to 
other advanced economies, such as Germany, and engulfed the rest of the 
manufacturing world, including India (Filardo et al., 2010). Unlike the developed 
economies, where the problems started in the financial sector and spread to the 
real estate sector, in developing countries the problems started in the real estate 
sector and spread to the financial sectori. In sum, the financial sector emerged as a 
high-risk sector during the recent financial meltdown and affected economies 
across the globe including US, Germany and India. Therefore, for the purpose of 
this study, the recent global financial crisis is a fitting context and the financial 
sector is a suitable setting to effectively differentiate between corporate public 
pretentions from corporate private intentions and to unravel the de facto CSOs. 
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3.6. Research design 
The author designs and implements this research in two stages. The first stage is 
conducted as a pilot and serves as a pre-test to reliably ascertain CSOs. It includes 
identifying the pre-crisis and mid-crisis periods across the US, Germany, and India, 
developing and refining the CSO code and establishing and systematizing the 
coding mechanism. Following Boyatzis (1998), the author does not use the actual 
raw data for this purpose to avoid data contamination. Instead, the author 
intensively studies a sample of CEO/chairperson letters of the largest steel firms 
across the US, Germany, and India. The second stage involves coding and analyzing 
the CEO/chairperson letters of financial firms that comprises the actual data of 
this study.  
Steel as a sector, apart from the financial sector, was globally affected by the crisis 
due to a sharp fall in liquidity, shortage of credit fall in demand, and an overall 
drop in production. Since steel was representative of a high-risk sector widely 
affected by the recent financial crisis, it was appropriate both for identifying the 
crisis cut-off years as well as for developing a CSO code that could be reasonably 
generalized across other high-risk sectors including the financial sector.  
At the outset, it was crucial to precisely identify the year that marked the 
beginning of the financial crisis in the US, Germany, and India because there was a 
time lag between when the crisis hit these markets (Filardo et al., 2010). The 
author examined the annual reports of selected steel firms from the period 2005 
until 2009 and identified the pre-crisis and the mid-crisis period for the three 
countries (Refer to Table 3.1). To detect the CSR themes embedded in the 
CEO/chairperson letters addressed to shareholders, the objective was to 
understand the underlying intentions/orientations behind every statement made 
by the executive. 
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Table 3.1: Crisis cut-off period 
Country Pre-Crisis Beginning of Crisis Deepening of Crisis Mid-Crisis 
USA 2006 Second half of 2007 First half of 2008 2008 
Germany 2006 Second half of 2007 First half of 2008 2008 
India 2007 First half of 2008 Second half of 2008 2009 
The nature of this objective was primarily explorative and necessitated an 
interpretative tradition. It involved extracting meanings on corporate orientations 
by interpreting the words used in CEO/chairperson letters. Drawing on recent 
studies (Castelló & Lozano, 2011) that have effectively analyzed CEO statements 
and social disclosures, the author employed thematic analysis in this study. It is a 
qualitative method originally used in psychological research (Braun & Clarke, 
2006) that involves quantifying descriptive texts using explicit themes and their 
recurring patterns (Boyatzis, 1998).  
3.6.1 Developing the corporate social orientation code 
To develop the CSO code, the author defines corporate orientations as the 
managerial intent towards different stakeholder entities and issues that includes 
actual achievements, present policies and concern for future trends, with or 
without cost outlays. By doing so, the author describes the orientations in a broad 
sense and weaves a long-term aspect into it. In this manner, even in the presence 
of a financial crisis (or any other legitimacy threat) firms’ de facto orientations for 
specific stakeholders should remain relatively unchanged.  
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While Carroll’s CSR model was a useful starting point in thinking about potential 
CSO themes, the data analysis was characterized by an iterative and inductive 
process of going from critical reflection to the data and back, with a view to 
developing key CSO themes from the chosen sample of letters. Once the main 
themes were identified, the author applied thematic analysis to systematize them 
into codes. Consequently, a seven-code index of CSO (Refer to Table 3.2) namely–
–shareholder, customer, employee, partner, environmental, community and 
corporate governance––was developed. While each of these codes encompasses 
concern towards a specific stakeholder group, corporate governance is identified 
as a stakeholder issue. The author follows scholars who propose that it is not just 
the shareholders and investors, but also the employees, suppliers, and community 
who could be interested in how a company is governed (Letza, Sun, & Kirkbride, 
2004). Therefore, the author does not identify any specific entity as the 
beneficiary of firms’ corporate governance orientation and codes it as a 
stakeholder issue.  
The shareholder orientation includes concerns for economic goals and 
sustainability, descriptions about economic achievements and financial results, 
and forecasting of economic trends and future strategies with an underlying 
shareholder approach. Customer orientation comprises of concern towards 
present and potential customer needs, reporting of actual and intended policies 
towards customer commitment and service and information on product 
innovations. Employee orientation consists of statements of concern directed 
towards employees and their families, forecasting employee needs and numbers; 
and actual and planned policies related to working conditions and compensation. 
Partner orientation focuses on relationships with suppliers, lenders, banks, 
governments and such other agencies that tie up with firms for various functions, 
and concerns and policies towards sustaining long-term relationships with them. 
Environmental orientation includes actual or intended environment-related 
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policies, systems, and expenditures; and concern for environmental impact of 
products and processes. Community orientation encompasses concern and 
commitment of the firm towards the larger community beyond employees and 
their families. It includes actual and intended effort towards social good, 
disclosures of charitable donations and concern for future generations. Lastly, the 
corporate governance orientation consists of concern for the transparent, lawful 
and ethical operation of the company, management policies and disclosures 
towards the same with a focus on protecting long-term shareholder and multi-
stakeholder interests. Table 3.2 explains in detail each of these orientations 
followed by examples of coding in Table 3.3.  
In order to ensure reliability of coding, the author engaged and trained a second 
coder on the code scheme and the coding mechanisms. The unit of coding was a 
sentence and each sentence was coded for presence of a specific theme. Each 
sentence could be coded for multiple themes provided that themes could be 
distinctly identified without overlap with others. Between the two coders, an 
initial agreement of about 80% on the basis of presence of the themes was 
reached which was as per the minimum acceptable benchmark for inter-coder 
reliability as suggested by Boyatzis (1998). To further improve this reliability, the 
two coders held detailed discussions to foster a better understanding of the code 
before working on the actual data of the study.  
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Table 3.2: Seven-code index of corporate social orientation (CSO) 
Code Theme Description 
Shareholder Orientation 
 
Actual economic achievement described as financial reporting, production numbers, market share and profitability, financial ratios,  
funds for stabilization; steps taken to enhance bottom-line, control costs, 
Forecasting economic trends such as future product demand, increasing costs of operation, rise in salaries of staff, pricing,  
economic crisis, market survival, changes in business models, inorganic growth strategies such as mergers and acquisition, 
Concern for economic goals, economic sustainability, competitive advantage, liquidity issues, risk management, increase in competition. 
* Immediate and long-term time horizon, implied as well as explicit.  
 
Customer Orientation 
 
Actual policies towards customer, commitment and service, introduction of innovative new products, disclosures of product quality,  
consumer relations and service, awards for customer satisfaction or rankings by third parties, 
Forecasting customer needs of specific client such as SMEs, agricultural sector etc., 
Concern for customer related issues of a company as customer satisfaction, sustaining customer relationships and client servicing,  
citizenship with an underlying customer orientation. 
* Immediate and long-term focus, actual as well as intended. 
 
Employee Orientation 
 
Actual policies measures relating to employees working conditions, pension, compensation, allowances, incentives and benefits such  
as ESOPs, disclosures on employment, employee consultation, training and education, employment of minorities or women, and  
trade union information, employee turnover, accidents, awards for best employer award or related rankings by third parties,  
Forecasting employee numbers, turnover, needs such as trainings and development,  
Concern for employees and their dependents such as quality of life, reducing injuries, improving health care, citizenship with an  
underlying employee concern for example “We believe corporate citizenship is demonstrated in who we are as a company, how we  
conduct our business and how we take care of our employees, as well as in how we interact with the world at large.” 
* Statements whether historical, actual, prospective, and planned should have an underlying concern for employees, usually long-term  
in nature, implicit or explicit, and not in context of economic or environmental sustainability. 
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Code Theme Description 
Partner Orientation 
 
Actual policies regarding relationships with suppliers, lenders, banks, governments and such other agencies that are external partners  
for various functions, measures undertaken to support suppliers and increase supplier diversity (including support to women retailers),  
improving joint projects with suppliers, ranking from third party and awards,  
Intent towards sustaining long-term relationship with suppliers such as RBI for banking firms, Government for policy initiatives,  
other lending institutions, compliance with partner norms across supply chain, 
Concern for sustaining long-term supplier relationships. 
* Statements could include actual, planned, issues and concerns towards partners, usually long-term.   
 
Environmental  
Orientation 
 
Actual policies towards environment-related expenditures such as eco-friendly offices, conservation of energy, water, and recycling  
activities, using green technology, alternative production processes, afforestation, maintaining bio-diversity, disclosure of environmental  
policies, environmental management system and environmental awards (including ISO 14001 and Eco Management and Audit Scheme  
– EMAS), environmental benefits of products and processes,  
Forecasting environmental impacts of products and processes,  
Concern for the environment and its protection, conservation and regeneration, climate change, air quality, growing responsibly  
and sustainably with reference to the environment, citizenship with an environmental focus for example, “We pledge to be a  
good corporate citizen in all the places we operate worldwide by dedicated to running safe and environmentally responsible operations.” 
* Actual or intended with a long-term perspective.  
 
Community Orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actual and intended effort towards contributing to social good such as improving education (including youth education, educating  
women and girls, improving education in own/other countries), provision of health services such as AIDS awareness, insurance for  
communities at subsidized rates, inclusive growth including financial inclusion, disclosures relating to sponsorship (e.g. of art exhibits)  
as well as charitable donations and activities, promoting art and culture, educating and protecting human rights,  
Concern and commitment for the larger society and communities and masses, future generations, social transformation, removal of  
poverty, care of human life (including safe driving, reducing traffic accidents), reduction of crime rates, growing responsibly with  
reference to community, citizenship in a community caring sense such as “Our goal is to be a good corporate citizen wherever we  
operate, as a responsible and contributing member of society.” 
* Community concern extends beyond existing employees and their families, is long-term, implicit or explicit.   
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Code Theme Description 
Corporate Governance 
Orientation 
 
Definition: Good corporate governance consists of a system of structuring, operating and controlling a company to foster a culture  
based on ethics, long-term strategic goals of stakeholders (including shareholders) and complying with legal and regulatory requirements.  
Actual management policies concerning transparent, lawful and ethical operation of the company such as compliance to  
standards, control procedures, audits or auditing, whistle blower policy, Sarbanes-Oxley Act; repositioning business, redesigning  
divisions that point at major restructuring, 
Disclosures regarding capital adequacy ratios, BASEL, dividend declarations, values statements, corporate code of conduct, statement  
on managing risk; statement on SAM (sustainability asset management), reduction in executive compensation, leadership and  
responsible management, structure of the board, achievements and awards in CG, 
Concern over corporate governance issues, protection sensitive information, preventing asset laundering, ethical procedures and  
intentions, citizenship with a general stakeholder orientation and even a long-term economic outlook, such as “Our vision is to be  
an innovative and inspirational global citizen in a world where our company participates towards profitable and sustainable growth”. 
* Actual and intended long-term focus of top management on stakeholders’ interests.  
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Table 3.3: Illustrative examples of corporate social orientation (CSO) coding on CEO/chairperson’s letters 
CSO Codes Sample Narrative 
 
 
 
Shareholder Orientation 
 
(i) I have full confidence that we can sustain the drive or recovering market share, strengthening our  
core business, diversifying into other financial services, and improving our profitability. 
(ii) There are two other indicators of overall business growth of the bank – the business per employee and  
the profit per employee levels, both of which have shown considerable improvement.  
 
 
 
 
Customer Orientation 
 
(i) Your bank plans to introduce mobile banking. The aim is that our customers will no longer be just branch  
customers, but bank customers, able to transact business easily anywhere within the country, and for that  
matter, in the world on a real time basis.  
(ii) The bank was able to uphold its position as a dependable and distinguished financing partner for small  
and medium enterprise – even during the crisis. This is evidenced by the strong loyalty and unprecedented  
encouragement that we have experienced on the part of our customers since the outbreak of the crisis. 
    
 
 
 
Employee Orientation 
 
(i) In open houses with employees, I sought feedback from them about the operating environment and  
suggestions to improvement the same. During these meetings, I have shared my concerns and impressed upon  
the need to improve skills to meet new challenges. 
(ii)….when I consented to the US government’s to lead your bank, I found an organization full of proud,  
talented and dedicated people who were stunned and bewildered to see their life’s work––and in many cases  
their life’s savings – in shambles. 
 
 
 
Shareholder Orientation and  
Partner Orientation 
 
(i) As the present branch network and available human resources would simply not be adequate to achieve our  
goal, your bank is leveraging technology and building partnerships with NGOs/MFIs, corporates, and  
government departments, as well as engaging business facilitators and business correspondents.  
(ii) Every group of participants in the economy – lenders, borrowers, regulators, policy makers, appraisers,  
rating agencies, investors, investment bankers – had a motive to push the cycle forward, and most did.   
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CSO Codes Sample Narrative 
 
 
Environmental Orientation 
 
 
 
Environmental Orientation  
and Customer Orientation 
 
(i) Solar power is extensively used in remote branches making technology initiative as Green Projects. The bank  
was conferred with several awards and accolades…..the prestigious CIO 100 Award 2008 for the bank’s green IT  
initiative. 
 
(ii) We see opportunities to improve the environment …by developing products and investing in technologies  
that can mitigate the risk and the effect of climate change.   
 
 
 
Community Orientation 
 
(i) The bank has adopted 101 villages across the country for all round integrated development and cent-percent  
financial inclusion.  
(ii) Given the economic environment and the impact that recession is having on neighborhoods across the  
country, we are working closely more than ever with community leaders in identify the critical needs and  
gaps in local assistance programs and ensure that resources are flowing to individuals and families that are  
especially hard-hit.  
 
 
Corporate Governance  
Orientation 
 
(i) The recent measures mandating all quasi equity and hybrid structures to meet External Commercial Borrowing  
norms is a welcome step and will help in preventing regulatory arbitrage. 
(ii) As promised last year, we have now published code of ethical conduct. This applies to all staff members of the  
bank – from senior management to trainees.  
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3.6.2. Sample and data 
According to a content analysis of voluntary CSR disclosures of 130 large listed 
German firms, the commonly found reasons behind non-uniformity in disclosures 
are firm internationality, profitability, firm size, and industry membership (Chapple 
& Moon, 2005; Gamerschlag, Möller, & Verbeeten, 2011). To reduce, if not rule 
out, the effect of such exogenous variables on patterns of CSO, it was critical to 
select firms that were as close to each other as possible. Accordingly, for the 
second stage of the study, the sample was drawn from a single industry cluster, 
i.e., the financial sector. To minimize the effect of firm size, firm profitability, 
internationalization, and factors associated with them, the study used the Forbes 
Global 2000 list as the universe of largest firms for this study. This list comprises of 
the world’s biggest public firms on the basis of four metrics: sales, profits, assets, 
and market value. Such large firms face similar structural, economic and political 
issues arising from the crisis, are publicly more visible (Adams, Hill, & Roberts, 
1998), are more likely to receive media attention, and therefore would take their 
corporate communications seriously. The author extracted the Forbes Global 2000 
list for the year 2006, as it was a year prior to the beginning of the financial crisis 
across all countries in the sample. The list was segregated on the basis of the 
industry type––financial sector (including banking, insurance and diversified 
financial firms) and then, on the basis of country of origin––the US, Germany, and 
India.  
The objective was to select the 10 largest financial firms from each of the three 
countries to get a total sample of 30. In view of evidence that national cultures 
may influence CSR values of top managers (Waldman et al., 2006), the author 
began selecting these firms such that the CEOs or chairpersons of each of them 
belonged to the same cultural cluster as the country of origin of their respective 
firm. For example, Mr. Vikram Pandit was the CEO of Citigroup between 2007 and 
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2012. Although he gained much of his education in the US and can be considered 
as a global manager, he spent his early life in India and was brought up in a family 
with strong Indian beliefs (Gupte, 2007). As a matter of prudence to avoid the 
potential impact of some of his Indian cultural values on his CSR values while he 
headed an American financial firm, Citigroup was excluded from the sample. In 
addition, firms that had become defunct during the crisis (e.g. Wachovia) were 
also excluded. 
Once the sample was determined, the author used the World Wide Web to extract 
the CEO/chairperson letters from the annual reports of the 30 selected financial 
firms for the pre-crisis and the mid-crisis periods. The annual reports (including 
the CEO/chairperson letters) for the US and German firms were available in online 
archives. The objective was to have a sample of 10 firms for each of the countries. 
However, Indian firms have only recently shifted to the practice of maintaining 
online archives of annual reports and the author faced difficulties in collecting 
hard copies of historical data from various corporate locations in India. Since, a 
balanced sample from each country was important for data analysis, the final 
sample consisted of 27 firms, 9 each from the US, Germany, and India (Refer to 
Table 3.4).  
In all the annual reports in the sample, either the chairperson letter replaced the 
CEO letter or vice-a-versa. Since both these letters serve the same purpose, the 
author followed Tengblad and Ohlsson (2010) and did not treat them differently. 
Finally, 54 CEO/chairperson letters (9 firms x 3 countries x 2 time periods) 
comprised the final raw data hand-coded for this study.  
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Table 3.4: Sample composition 
US Germany India 
Bank of America Corporation Allianz SE State Bank of India Group 
 
AIG, Inc. Deutsche Bank AG 
 
ICICI Bank 
 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
 
Munich Re Group 
 
HDFC Limited 
 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 
 
Commerzbank AG 
 
Punjab National Bank 
 
Wells Fargo & Company 
 
Eurohypo 
 
Bank of Baroda 
 
Morgan Stanley The Hypo Real Estate Holding AG 
 
Bank of India 
 
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 
 
Hannover Re 
 
IDBI Bank Limited 
 
MetLife, Inc. Deutsche Börse AG 
 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 
 
Prudential Financial, Inc. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG 
 
UCO Bank 
3.7 Analyses and findings 
3.7.1 Analyses 
The author begins by analyzing the 54 CEO/chairperson letters using the CSO code 
developed in the pilot stage (Refer to Table 3.2). The author hand-coded the 
letters independently of the second coder to maintain objectiveness of coding. On 
the basis of agreement on presence of themes, a reliability of approximately 89% 
was achieved between the two coders, significantly above the minimum 
acceptable benchmark of 80% (Boyatzis, 1998) and also a marked improvement 
over the pre-testing stage. After further deliberations, the author and the second 
coder reached a complete agreement on the final coding. In effect, the number of 
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times a theme appeared was recorded as the frequency, which reflects the 
intensity of orientation towards a specific stakeholder group and issue. Although 
the CEO letters were of somewhat comparable length within countries, there were 
differences observed in their length across countries. To adjust for the same, the 
author calculated the mean intensity of orientation on each individual theme by 
weighting the final agreed frequencies against the respective number of words in 
each letter.  
Applying the signaling theory and the decoupling argument in the context of the 
financial crisis, the author sustains that CSO signals that continue to be prioritized 
during the mid-crisis period are suggestive of corporate private intentions. 
Conversely, CSO signals that substantially decline during the mid-crisis vis-à-vis the 
pre-crisis period are indicative of corporate public pretentions. The author 
therefore examines (a) the preferential order of various stakeholders and issues 
towards whom the firms are oriented (stakeholder prioritization) during pre-crisis 
and mid-crisis, (b) the degree of firms’ concern towards them (intensity of 
orientation) during pre-crisis and mid-crisis and (c) changes in both the 
stakeholder prioritization and the intensity of orientation in the mid-crisis period.  
Accordingly, the author prepares a stakeholder prioritization table for each 
country on the basis of country means for the pre-crisis and mid-crisis periods (see 
Table 3.5).  
Descriptive statistics of study variables, as shown in Table 3.6, indicate the mean 
intensity of each orientation for the pre-crisis and mid-crisis periods for all the 
three countries along with the percentage change in them during mid-crisis.  
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Table 3.5: Stakeholder prioritization 
US Germany India 
Pre-Crisis  Mid-Crisis Pre-Crisis  Mid-Crisis Pre-Crisis  Mid-Crisis 
Shareholder Shareholder Shareholder Shareholder Shareholder Shareholder 
Customer Corporate Gov. Corporate Gov. Corporate Gov. Customer Customer 
Corporate Gov. Customer Customer Customer Corporate Gov. Corporate Gov. 
Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee Partner 
Community Partner Partner Partner Community 
 
Community 
Partner Community 
  
Community 
  
Community 
  
Partner Employee 
Environment Environment Environment Environment Environment Environment 
Table 3.6: Descriptive statistics 
Orientations US Pre  
Mean 
US Mid  
Mean 
% Change Ger Pre  
Mean 
Ger Mid 
Mean 
% Change Ind Pre  
Mean  
Ind Mid  
Mean 
% Change 
 
Shareholder 
 
Customer 
 
Employee 
 
Partner 
 
Environment 
 
Community 
 
Corp. Gov. 
 
251 
 
86 
 
39 
 
16 
 
09 
 
18 
 
71 
 
260 
 
56 
 
31 
 
19 
 
01 
 
15 
 
90 
 
+03.79% 
 
-34.58% 
 
-21.81% 
 
+21.94% 
 
-86.64% 
 
-16.85% 
               
 +26.96% 
 
334 
 
37 
 
24 
 
19 
 
02 
 
12 
 
76 
 
 
280 
 
45 
 
17 
 
13 
 
00 
 
00 
 
76 
  
-16.11% 
 
+21.39% 
 
-30.27% 
 
-30.73% 
 
-100.0% 
 
-100.0% 
 
+01.00% 
 
270 
 
59 
 
20 
 
12 
 
00 
 
18 
 
52 
 
 
234 
 
74 
 
12 
 
21 
 
02 
 
15 
 
57 
 
-13.39% 
 
+24.62% 
 
-39.41% 
 
+71.48% 
 
- 
 
-17.12% 
 
+09.16% 
 
 
Notes: The mean values represent the average intensity of CSOs.  
Pre: Pre-Crisis, Mid: Mid-Crisis, Ger: Germany; Ind: India 
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Furthermore, the author tests whether there are significant differences in the 
mean intensity of CSOs across countries for pre-crisis and mid-crisis using one-way 
ANOVA. The test is replicated across countries on each individual orientation for 
both the time periods. Multiple ANOVA test is used to look for the interaction 
effect of country of origin and crisis. Table 3.7 shows the results of one-way and 
multiple ANOVA tests. Since, the results are based on a small sample, the author 
also calculates the effect size using eta squared (2). Eta squared is an appropriate 
measure of effect size for this study because it is an estimate of the magnitude of 
effect that is relatively independent of sample size and is highly used in case of 
human communication research where sample sizes tend to be smaller (Levine & 
Hullett, 2002). 
Table 3.7: ANOVA results for corporate social orientations across countries for 
pre-crisis and mid-crisis period 
Dependent Variable ANOVA Period 
 
F Value Sig. Eta  
Squared 2 
Combined Effect  
Across Countries 
Pre-Crisis 3.879 0.035*  
 Mid-Crisis 6.635 0.005* 
 
 
 
Shareholder Orientation 
 
Across Countries 
Pre-Crisis 5.228 0.013* 0.303 
  Mid-Crisis 1.495 0.244 0.111 
 Year*Country  1.470 0.240 
 
 
Customer Orientation  
Across Countries 
Pre-Crisis 3.018 0.068+ 0.201 
  Mid-Crisis 1.685 0.207 0.123 
 Year*Country  1.758 0.183 
 
 
Employee Orientation  
Across Countries 
Pre-Crisis 1.819 0.184 0.132 
  Mid-Crisis 5.150 0.014* 0.300 
 Year*Country  0.004 0.996 
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Table 3.7: ANOVA results for corporate social orientations across countries for 
pre-crisis and mid-crisis period (contd.) 
Dependent Variable ANOVA Period 
 
F Value Sig. Eta  
Squared 2 
Partner Orientation  
Across Countries 
Pre-Crisis 0.583 0.566 0.046 
  Mid-Crisis 0.408 0.607 0.033 
 Year*Country  0.898 0.414 
 
 
Environmental  
Orientation 
 
Across Countries 
Pre-Crisis 4.527 0.021* 0.274 
  Mid-Crisis 0.764 0.477 0.060 
 Year*Country  3.824 0.029* 
 
 
Community Orientation  
Across Countries 
Pre-Crisis 0.166 0.848 0.014 
  Mid-Crisis 3.557 0.044* 0.229 
 Year*Country  0.286 0.752 
 
 
Corp. Gov. Orientation  
Across Countries 
Pre-Crisis 0.748 0.484 0.059 
  Mid-Crisis 0.908 0.417 0.070 
 Year*Country  0.182 0.835 
 
 
 
Notes: Designed as a two-tailed test.  
One-way ANOVA used for testing across countries. 
Multiple ANOVA used for testing the interaction between year and country  
* Significant at p<0.05 + Significant at p<0.10 
2: 0.02 < Small: < 0.13, 0.13 < Medium: < 0.26, Large: > 0.26 
Lastly, the Fisher’s LSD post-hoc analysis is used in order to identify how the US, 
Germany, and India relate to one another on each of the seven CSOs. Given the 
small sample size and the need to perform pair-wise comparisons across 
countries, Fisher’s LSD at an alpha level of 0.05 is considered appropriate (Field, 
2009). These results are shown in Table 3.8. 
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 Table 3.8: Fisher’s LSD post-hoc analysis across countries  
 for pre-crisis and mid-crisis period 
DV Country Country 
Pre-Crisis        Mid-Crisis 
Sig. Sig. 
Shareholder 
India 
Germany 0.025* 0.098+ 
USA 0.492 0.330 
Germany 
India 0.025* 0.098+ 
USA 0.005* 0.474 
USA 
India 0.492 0.330 
Germany 0.005* 0.474 
Customer 
India 
Germany 0.281 0.081
+ 
USA 0.190 0.284 
Germany 
India 0.281 0.081+ 
USA 0.022* 0.474 
USA 
India 0.190 0.284 
Germany 0.022* 0.474 
Employee 
India 
Germany 0.683 0.421 
USA 0.081+ 0.005* 
Germany 
India 0.683 0.421 
USA 0.173 0.032* 
USA 
India 0.081+ 0.005* 
Germany 0.173 0.032* 
Partner 
India 
Germany 0.291 0.397 
USA 0.582 0.845 
Germany 
India 0.291 0.397 
USA 0.607 0.513 
USA 
India 0.582 0.845 
Germany 0.607 0.513 
 India Germany 0.611 0.240 
  USA 0.009* 0.717 
 Germany India 0.611 0.240 
Environmental  USA 0.030* 0.41 
 USA India 0.009* 0.717 
  Germany 0.030* 0.410 
* Significant at p<0.05 + Significant at p<0.10 
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Table 3.8: Fisher’s LSD post-hoc analysis across countries for pre-crisis  and 
mid-crisis period (contd.) 
DV Country Country 
Pre-Crisis        Mid-Crisis 
Sig. Sig. 
 India Germany 0.645 0.033* 
  USA 0.952 0.920 
Community Germany India 0.645 0.033* 
  USA 0.603 0.027* 
 USA India 0.952 0.920 
  Germany 0.603 0.027* 
 India Germany 0.259 0.438 
  USA 0.364 0.193 
Corporate Germany India 0.259 0.438 
Governance  USA 0.819 0.586 
 USA India 0.364 0.193 
  Germany 0.819 0.586 
* Significant at p<0.05 + Significant at p<0.10 
3.7.2 Findings 
Table 3.5 reveals that the US and India have the same stakeholder prioritization in 
the pre-crisis period with shareholder, customer and corporate governance being 
the first three priorities in that order; community, partner and environment being 
the last three; and employees nested in the middle. Germany, on the other hand, 
has a different preference order in most respects. For example, German firms give 
preference to corporate governance over customers, and to partners over 
community. The mid-crisis period exposes some interesting changes in this pattern 
with the US and German firms having the same stakeholder priorities, and Indian 
firms emerging as the variant type. What is notable is that the stakeholder re-
prioritization happens in the US and to some degree in India, while Germany 
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maintains its pre-crisis preferences. On the whole it appears that in the context of 
the crisis, the US and German firms converge not only on their overall stakeholder 
prioritization, but also in their preferential concern for shareholders, governance, 
customers, and employees respectively. On the other hand, Indian firms’ concern 
is prioritized towards shareholders, customers, governance, and partners in that 
order.  
Table 3.6 shows that between the pre-crisis and the mid-crisis periods, there is an 
increase in the firms’ mean intensity of orientation towards shareholders (4%), 
partners (22%), and corporate governance (27%) in the US. This implies that the 
US firms have a greater degree of concern for shareholder, partner, and corporate 
governance issues during the crisis than prior to it. In contrast, during the same 
period German firms pay greater attention to the subject of customers (21%), 
while Indian firms demonstrate a heightened orientation for customers (25%), 
partners (71%), and corporate governance to some degree (9%). While there is a 
general fall in the environmental orientation across the US (87%) and Germany 
(100%), there is a marginal improvement in this orientation in India. Interestingly 
this shift in case of India is due to the activity of two firms only and may be treated 
as an outlier activity. Overall there is an increase in the corporate governance 
orientation and a decline in employee, community, and environmental 
orientations across the sample.  
The one-way ANOVA results in Table 3.7 highlight that CSOs differ significantly 
across countries both for the pre-crisis and the mid-crisis periods with F (2, 24) = 
3.879, p = 0.035 and F (2, 24) = 6.635, p = 0.005, respectively. On each individual 
orientation, in the pre-crisis period, differences across the countries were 
significant for shareholder orientation, F(2, 24)= 5.228, p=0.013, 2= 0.30, for 
environmental orientation, F(2, 24)= 4.527, p=0.021, 2= 0.27, and marginally 
significant for customer orientation, F(2,24)=3.018, p=0.068, 2=0.20. For the mid-
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crisis period, results point at a significant difference across countries on employee 
orientation, F(2,24)=5.150, p=0.014, 2= 0.30, and on community orientation, 
F(2,24)=3.557, p=0.044, 2= 0.23 but not for shareholder, customer, and 
environmental orientations as observed in pre-crisis. These findings highlight that 
the mean intensity of CSOs changes significantly between the pre-crisis and mid-
crisis. The multiple ANOVA test shows a significant difference in environmental 
orientation, F(2,48)=3.824, p=0.029, implying a moderating effect of time. It is 
important to note that eta squared (2) ranges from moderate (>0.06) to high 
(>0.26) in all cases (Refer to Table 3.7), indicating a reasonably strong effect size in 
the model independent of the sample size (Cohen, 1988).  
To identify which of the countries in the sample differ on specific CSOs, the author 
conducts a post-hoc analysis (Table 3.8). The findings of the post-hoc analysis are 
consistent with the descriptive (Table 3.6) and ANOVA results (Table 3.7) reported 
earlier and help clarify them further. The results show that, in the pre-crisis period, 
Germany has a significantly different intensity of shareholder orientation from 
both the US and India (p<0.05). On the other hand, the US has a significantly 
different intensity of environmental orientation from both India and Germany 
(p<0.05). The marginal difference in the intensity of customer orientation before 
the crisis (Table 3.7) is explained by the significant differences between the US and 
Germany (p<0.05). For the mid-crisis period, no differences emerge on the 
intensity of shareholder orientation, but the US differs significantly from both 
Germany and India on employee orientation (p<0.05). Seen collectively with the 
descriptive statistics, this indicates that while globally the concern for employees 
have decreased pursuant to the crisis, the US still appears to have the highest 
concern among the three countries towards this stakeholder group. On 
community orientation, Germany differs significantly from both the US and India 
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(p<0.05) with no concern expressed on such matters in the sample of 
CEO/chairperson letters of this study.  
3.8 Discussion 
This study attempts to progress the understanding of cross-national CSOs through 
an inter-temporal examination of CSDs, in particular CEO/chairperson letters, in 
the context of a legitimacy threat. The results, as shown in Tables 3.5 to 3.8, 
suggest that despite the crisis, shareholders, governance concerns and customers 
continue to remain the top three priorities for financial firms across the US, 
Germany, and India. While the intensity of shareholder and customer orientations 
vary significantly in the pre-crisis period, these differences are no longer 
significant in the mid-crisis. There appears to be a convergence on both the 
prioritization as well as the intensity of orientation towards shareholders, 
governance issues, and customers, which comprise firms’ primary concerns 
(Clarkson, 1995). In addition, the deepening of the financial crisis is associated not 
only with an overall decline in firms’ prioritization of employees, community, and 
the environment, but also with a weaker intensity of orientation towards them.  
One may argue that the most important objective during a financial crisis is 
survival of the firm. Under such circumstances, reduction in CSR expenditures may 
be viewed as an immediate cost cutting exercise (Fernández-Feijóo, 2009) rather 
than a lack of orientation towards specific stakeholders. To counter this argument, 
the author defined the orientations in a broad sense and weaved a long-term 
aspect into it by looking for firms’ concern for stakeholders and issues, with or 
without actual cost outlays. In this manner, the presence of a financial crisis (or 
any other liquidity threat) should not have significantly altered firms’ genuine 
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concerns for specific stakeholders both in terms of prioritization as well in terms of 
intensity of orientation. Accordingly, based on the signaling and the decoupling 
argument, the continuance of high priority for and the increase in intensity of 
shareholder, corporate governance, and customer orientations during the crisis 
highlight firms’ private intentions. The decline in firms’ prioritization and as well as 
intensity of employee, community, and environmental orientations during the 
mid-crisis vis-à-vis the pre-crisis is indicative of a decoupling between the public 
pretentions of a heightened concerns for them in good times and the private 
intentions of a reduced concern for them in challenging times. In turn, the 
disconnect in signaling over the two time periods exposes firms’ de facto CSO 
towards shareholders, customers, and corporate governance issues across the US, 
Germany, and India.  
Focusing on the developed countries, it appears that the stakeholder prioritization 
shifts in the mid-crisis are more prominently visible in the US than in Germany. 
This suggests a greater degree of decoupling and therefore a higher prevalence of 
green-washing in the former than in the latter. As a result of this shift, the US now 
converges with Germany not only on overall stakeholder prioritization but also in 
their preferential concern for primary stakeholders namely, shareholders, 
customers, and employees over concern for partners, community, and the 
environment. Thus, in the context of CSOs there might be a potential weakening 
of rigidities between typologies of developed countries as noted by Heyes et al. 
(2012). The fall in firms’ orientations towards community and environment are in 
line with suggestions of Waldman et al. (2006) and McWilliams and Siegel (2001) 
who argue that perhaps executives in developed countries are less likely to be 
oriented towards the welfare of larger community and society. 
Interestingly, Germany seems to show a lower concern for the community and the 
environment in comparison to the US. As per Hall and Soskice (2001), Germany is 
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an ideal form of a coordinated market economy (CME) and the US is an ideal form 
of a liberal market economy (LME). Accordingly, a lower orientation of CMEs 
towards community and environment than LMEs mirrors the results of Jackson 
and Apostolakou (2010) lending support to the view that voluntary CSR practices 
in LME countries (e.g. the US) may be a substitute of institutionalized form of CSR 
in CME countries (e.g. Germany). This is why firms in the US have a higher 
voluntary expression of CSR than their counterparts in Germany, who view it as 
compliance with laws that does not need to be explicitly communicated to 
stakeholders (Matten & Moon, 2008).  
In the context of developing countries, Indian firms’ stakeholder prioritization 
resembles the US firms during the pre-crisis period. This may be reflective of a 
strong strategic planning for CSR in large Indian multinationals, similar to the US 
firms (Fisher, Shirole, & Bhupatkar, 2001; Hartman et al., 2007). However, a 
deflection from this position is clearly visible during mid-crisis (Table 3.5) when 
there is a re-prioritization of stakeholders as Indian firms demonstrate a 
heightened orientation for customers (25%), partners (71%), and corporate 
governance (9%) and a fall in the concern for employees (39%) and community 
(17%). Overall the major shift in stakeholder prioritization between the pre-crisis 
and mid-crisis period (Table 3.5) captures the de facto orientations of Indian 
financial firms towards primary stakeholders during the crisis, supporting Mitra’s 
(2012, pp. 132) contention that “the mainstream (CSR) discourse frames a façade 
of nation-building (in India)”. The sudden increase in the relevance of partners 
occurs perhaps because a significant number of banks in the sample have a 
majority government stake. It appears that the crisis may have driven these firms 
to align their orientations with government/investor partners. While India’s trend 
is directionally similar to the US, it surpasses the latter on the intensity of this 
orientation.  
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The increase in corporate governance orientation in the mid-crisis period could be 
associated with the earnings scandal of Satyam Computers that rocked the Indian 
markets in 2009 (mid-crisis period) followed by rising calls for financial 
transparency. On the whole, it appears that India exhibits a unique variety of CSO 
distinct from both the US and Germany (Witt & Redding, 2013). That said this 
study considers only two time periods––pre-crisis (2007) and mid-crisis (2009). For 
greater clarification on the Indian typology, further research to examine CSO is 
needed over a larger sample and across longer time duration. 
Lastly, cross-national research provides evidence that differences in CSR behaviors 
are in part driven by diverse institutional environments (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, 
& Ganapathi, 2007; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Jamali & Neville, 2011; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). However, recent research also suggests that the 
institutional typologies within the developed world may no longer be as rigidly 
distinguishable as before, along with newer typologies emerging in the developing 
world (Heyes et al., 2012; Macartney, 2011; Witt & Redding, 2013). The case of 
employee orientation in the study is a good example of this trend. Specifically, the 
findings unveil a substantial decline in the concern for employees across all the 
three countries in the mid-crisis period (Table 3.6). While this trend is expected 
during the crisis in the US that is typified by flexible labor markets, minimum 
welfare state and individualized labor contracts, surprisingly it is also visible in 
Germany that is characterized by highly institutionalized labor regulations, 
favorable employment conditions and benefits (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Matten & 
Moon, 2008). These results are consistent with the fact that during the present 
financial crisis the German government has reduced labor leave benefits and 
pensions contributions and removed unemployment supplements, pointing at 
changes in institutional environments through a general marginalization of labor, 
erosion of employment and of social protections across the developed economies 
(Heyes et al., 2012). On the one hand, this trend indicates institutional 
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convergence among developed countries and on the other hand, it suggests that 
institutional factors not only have an impact on actual CSR practices and behaviors 
(Matten & Moon, 2008), but also on firms’ orientations and their communications, 
that represent a more internalized and embedded aspect of CSR. These are 
intriguing questions for future research. 
Though the research design of this study was carefully considered, at this juncture 
there are some limitations that should be acknowledged. First, this study is 
exploratory in nature and capitalizes on the context of the recent financial crisis to 
study patterns of CSOs. The purpose of this study is not to draw conclusions that 
can be generalized to all the US, German, and Indian firms, but to gain preliminary 
empirical insights on the signaling and decoupling phenomena in the field of CSO. 
Although as an exploratory research, a sample of 54 letters is sufficient to address 
the key objectives of this study and the sample size is in line with other studies 
based on qualitative analysis of executive communications (Pless, Maak, & 
Waldman, 2012), the findings have limited external validity. That said, the 
moderate to strong effect size (2) indicates that the results are robust despite the 
small sample size and are worthy of further exploration on a larger scale. Second, 
the author was unable to control for firm-specific contingencies and within-
country differences. Although the sample was carefully selected such as that all 
firms were large in size belonging to the same industrial cluster facing similar 
structural, economic and political issues, and the national culture of the 
CEO/chairperson were matched with the country of origin of their respective firms 
(Waldman et al., 2006), it is plausible that firms within the same industry and the 
same country have different CSOs. However, the objective of this research is to 
study cross-national differences in CSOs. For this, it is important to first assess the 
CSOs of firms within a specific country, which is an average of the CSOs of all the 
firms in the sample, irrespective of their individual differences. Accordingly, 
within-country convergence may not be relevant at this stage, although it is 
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worthwhile to undertake country specific research to understand within-country 
differences in CSOs. Third, as a conclusive test of decoupling in CSO signals, it is 
necessary to have a control sample over a non-crisis time period. If the decoupling 
between corporate public pretentions and corporate private intentions is captured 
only in the context of the crisis and not otherwise––it could help to test the 
construct validity as well as lend further support to the application of signaling 
theory and the process of decoupling to the field of managerial intent. Finally, 
while well-written CEO/chairperson letters are a candid expression of executive 
aspirations for the firms they represent and large firms are known to pay more 
importance to such communications (Weber & Marley, 2012), it is plausible that 
some executives do not discuss CSR related issues in their annual letters to 
shareholders. In this light, future research could replicate the research design to 
multiple types of voluntary corporate disclosures to explore a more exhaustive set 
of corporate communications and to comprehensively examine changes in cross-
national CSOs over time.  
3.9 Conclusion 
The CSO concept has failed to keep up with the expansions in the multi-
dimensional understanding of the CSR construct. Two concerns emerge at this 
stage: First, the CSO construct, which is originally based on Carroll’s model of CSR 
(1979), does not consider the specific stakeholder entities towards whom firms 
may be oriented and has limited application due to cross-national differences in 
CSR typologies (Wood, 2010). Second, amidst the increasing use of corporate 
disclosures as green-washing and impression building tools, systematic 
mechanisms to uncover firms’ de facto CSOs are yet to be discovered. In this 
article, using signaling theory (Spence, 1973) and the process of decoupling 
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(Meyer and Rowan, 1977), the author untangles the multi-dimensional facets of 
CSO and demonstrates that in the presence of a legitimacy threat, a substantial 
shift in CSOs can capture the decoupling between corporate public pretentions 
and corporate private intentions and in turn uncover firms’ de facto CSOs towards 
specific stakeholders.  
Towards this end, the study employs thematic analysis in two stages––first, on a 
sample of steel firms and second, on a sample of financial firms. Apart from 
identifying orientation towards specific stakeholders, the author also calculates 
the intensity of orientation towards them. In this manner, this study progresses 
the theoretical understanding of CSO by illustrating stakeholder salience (Mitchell 
et al., 1997). The author develops a seven-code CSO index that encompasses 
orientations towards specific stakeholder groups and issues, in terms of concerns, 
intended plans as well as actual actions undertaken. Through an inter-temporal 
examination of CSOs over two time periods in the context of the recent financial 
crisis, the author captures a pre-dominant primary stakeholder orientation across 
financial firms in all the three countries in the sample. It appears that firms signal a 
multi-stakeholder image directed towards employees, communities and 
environment during good times to enhance their social license to operate and yet 
such signals are not carried through during the crisis. The author interprets this 
disconnect in signaling, in the wake of a legitimacy threat, as a decoupling 
between corporate public pretentions and corporate private intentions. This 
multi-dimensionality in CSO signaling is indicative of green-washing in voluntary 
corporate disclosures. It appears that US and Indian firms are more prone to 
green-wash their image in comparison to their German counterparts. It also 
appears that in the context of the crisis, the strict typologies of developed 
countries, particularly regarding CSOs, may be diluted and that developing 
countries may have a unique set of CSOs. All of these observations represent areas 
worthy of additional research.  
166 | Page 
 
References for Chapter 3 
1. Adams, C., Hill, W., & Roberts, C. (1998). Corporate social reporting 
practices in western Europe: Legitimating corporate behaviour. 
British Accounting Review, 30(1), 1-21. 
2. Aguilera, R., Rupp, D., Williams, C., & Ganapathi, J. (2007). Putting 
the S back in corporate social responsibility: A multilevel theory of 
social change in organizations. Academy of Management Review, 
32(3), 836-863. 
3. Albinger, H. S., & Freeman, S. J. (2000). Corporate social 
performance and attractiveness as an employer to different job 
seeking populations. Journal of Business Ethics, 28(3), 243-253. 
4. Amernic, J., & Craig, R. (2007). Guidelines for CEO-speak: Editing the 
language of corporate leadership. Strategy and Leadership, 35(3), 
25-31. 
5. Angelidis, J. P., & Ibrahim, N. A. (2004). An exploratory study of the 
impact of degree of religiousness upon an individual's corporate 
social responsiveness orientation. Journal of Business Ethics, 51, 
119-128. 
6. Aupperle, K. E. (1984). An empirical measure of corporate social 
orientation. Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, 6, 
27-54. 
7. Berman, S. L., Wicks, A. C., Kotha, S., & Jones, T. M. (1999). Does 
stakeholder orientation matter? The relationship between 
stakeholder management models and firm financial performance. 
Academy of Management Journal, 42(5), 488-506. 
8. Boutilier, R., & Thomson, I. (2011). Modelling and measuring the 
social license to operate: Fruits of a dialogue between theory and 
practice. Socialicense.com, 1-10. Available online: 
  167 | Page 
 
http://socialicense.com/publications/Modelling%20and%20Measur
ing%20the%20SLO.pdf. 
9. Boyatzis, R. (1998). Transforming qualitative information: Thematic 
analysis and code development. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
10. Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. 
Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77-101. 
11. Bromley, P., & Powell, W. W. (2012). From smoke and mirrors to 
walking the talk: Decoupling in the contemporary world. Academy 
of Management Annals, 6(1), 483-530. 
12. Burton, B. K., & Goldsby, M. (2009). Corporate social responsibility 
orientation, goals, and behavior: A study of small business owners. 
Business & Society, 48(1), 88-104. 
13. Burton, B. K., Farh, J-L., & Hegarty, W. H. (2000). A cross-cultural 
comparison of corporate social responsibility orientation: Hong 
Kong vs. United States students. Teaching Business Ethics, 4(2), 151-
167. 
14. Carroll, A. B. (1979). A three-dimensional conceptual model of 
corporate performance. Academy of Management Review, 4(4), 
497-505. 
15. Carroll, A. B. (1991). The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: 
Toward the moral management of organizational stakeholders. 
Business Horizons, 34(4), 39-48.  
16. Castelló, I., & Lozano, J. M. (2011). Searching for new forms of 
legitimacy through corporate responsibility rhetoric. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 100(1), 11-29. 
17. Chapple, W., & Moon, J. (2005). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
in Asia: A seven-country study of CSR web site reporting. Business & 
Society, 44(4), 415-441. 
18. Cho, T. S., & Hambrick, D. C. (2006). Attention as the mediator 
between top management team characteristics and strategic 
change: The case of airline deregulation. Organization Science, 
17(4), 453-469. 
168 | Page 
 
19. Clarkson, M. B. E. (1995). A stakeholder framework for analyzing 
and evaluating corporate social performance. Academy of 
Management Review, 20(1), 92-117. 
20. Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral 
sciences (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
21. Connelly, B., Certo, S., Ireland, R., & Reutzel, C. (2011). Signaling 
theory: A review and assessment. Journal of Management, 37(1), 
39-67. 
22. Crane, A., & Matten, D. (2007). Business ethics: Managing 
corporate citizenship and sustainability in the age of globalization. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
23. Dahlsrud, A. (2008). How corporate social responsibility is defined: 
An analysis of 37 definitions. Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management, 15(1), 1-15. 
24. De Bakker, F. G. A., Groenewegen, P., & Den Hond, F. (2005). A 
bibliometric analysis of 30 years of research and theory on 
corporate social responsibility and corporate social performance. 
Business & Society, 44(3), 283-317. 
25. Dutton, J. E. (1986). The processing of crisis and non-crisis strategic 
issues. Journal of Management Studies, 23(5), 501-517. 
26. Elitzur, R., & Gavious, A. (2003). Contracting, signaling, and moral 
hazard: A model of entrepreneurs, “angels,” and venture capitalists. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 18, 709-725. 
27. Fernández-Feijóo Souto, B. (2009). Crisis and corporate social 
responsibility: Threat or opportunity? International Journal of 
Economic Sciences and Applied Research, 36-50. 
28. Field, A. (2009). Discovering statistics using SPSS. London: Sage 
Publications Ltd. 
29. Filardo, A., George, J., Loretan, M., Ma, G., Munro, A., Shim, I., et al. 
(2010). The international financial crisis: Timeline, impact and policy 
responses in Asia and the Pacific. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from 
www.bis.org: http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap52c.pdf  
  169 | Page 
 
30. Fiol, C. M. (1995). Corporate communications: Comparing 
executives' private and public statements. Academy of 
Management Journal, 38(2), 522-536. 
31. Fisher, C., Shirole, R., & Bhupatkar, A. (2001). Ethical stances in 
Indian management culture. Personal Review, 30(6), 694-710. 
32. Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder 
approach (Vol. 1). Boston: Pitman. 
33. Friedman, M. (2009). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
34. Fukukawa, K., & Teramoto, Y. (2009). Understanding Japanese CSR: 
The reflections of managers in the field of global operations. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 85(1), 133-146. 
35. Gamerschlag, R., Möller, K., & Verbeeten, F. (2011). Determinants 
of voluntary CSR disclosure: Empirical evidence from Germany. 
Review of Managerial Science, 5(2-3), 233-262. 
36. Gratton, L. (2013). Restoring faith in leadership. - 3 May. Retrieved 
May 15, 2013, from http://gls.london.edu: 
http://gls.london.edu/news-and-articles/117/95/Restoring-faith-in-
leadership---3-May.html. 
37. Gray, R., & Milne, M. (2002). Sustainability reporting: Who's kidding 
whom? Chartered Accountants Journal of New Zealand, 81(6), 66-
70. 
38. Gupte, P. (2007, December 11). The New Prince of Citi. Upstart 
Business Journal. http://upstart.bizjournals.com/news-
markets/top-5/2007/12/11/Citigroups-New-Chief.html?page=all. 
December 11. http://www.bizjournals.com/ (accessed September 
14, 2015). 
39. Hahn, R. (2012). Standardizing social responsibility? New 
perspectives on guidance documents and management system 
standards for sustainable development. IEEE - Transactions on 
Engineering Management, 59(4), 717-727. 
170 | Page 
 
40. Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of capitalism: The 
institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
41. Hartman, L. P., Rubin, R. S., & Dhanda, K. K. (2007). The 
communication of corporate social responsibility: United States and 
European Union multinational corporations. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 74(4), 373-389. 
42. Heyes, J., Lewis, P., & Clark, I. (2012). Varieties of capitalism in crisis? 
The consequences of the ‘great recession’ for employment and 
social protections and comparative institutional analysis. Beyond 
borders: Governance of work in a global economy. Birmingham, UK: 
Proceedings of the 16th ILERA World Congress. 
43. Hill, C. W., & Jones, T. M. (1992). Stakeholder‐agency theory. 
Journal of Management Studies, 29(2), 131-154. 
44. Hillman, A. J., & Keim, G. D. (2001). Shareholder value, stakeholder 
management, and social issues: What's the bottom line? Strategic 
Management Journal, 22(2), 125-139. 
45. Ibrahim, N. A., & Angelidis, J. P. (1991). Effects of board members' 
gender on level of involvement in strategic management and 
corporate social responsiveness orientation. Proceedings of the 
Northeast Decision Sciences Institute (pp. 208-210). Sage 
Publications. 
46. Ibrahim, N. A., & Angelidis, J. P. (1995). The corporate social 
responsiveness orientation of board members: Are there 
differences between inside and outside directors? Journal of 
Business Ethics, 14, 405-410. 
47. Jackson, G., & Apostolakou, A. (2010). Corporate social 
responsibility in Western Europe: An institutional mirror or 
substitute? Journal of Business Ethics, 94(3), 371-394. 
48. Jamali, D. (2008). A stakeholder approach to corporate social 
responsibility: A fresh perspective into theory and practice. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 82(1), 213-231. 
  171 | Page 
 
49. Jamali, D. (2010). MNCs and international accountability standards 
through an institutional lens: Evidence of symbolic conformity or 
decoupling. Journal of Business Ethics, 95(4), 617-640. 
50. Jamali, D., & Neville, B. (2011). Convergence versus divergence of 
CSR in developing countries: An embedded multi-layered 
institutional lens. Journal of Business Ethics, 102(4), 599-621. 
51. Kolk, A. (1999). Evaluating corporate environmental reporting. 
Business Strategy and the Environment, 8(4), 225-237. 
52. Kolk, A. (2003). Trends in sustainability reporting by the Fortune 
Global 250. Business Strategy and the Environment, 12(5), 279-291. 
53. Kolk, A., van Tulder, R., & Welters, C. (1999). International codes of 
conduct and corporate social responsibility: Can transnational 
corporations regulate themselves? Transnational Corporations, 8(1), 
143-180. 
54. Laplume, A. O., Sonpar, K., & Litz, R. A. (2008). Stakeholder theory: 
Reviewing a theory that moves us. Journal of Management, 34(6), 
1152-1189. 
55. Laufer, W. (2003). Social accountability and corporate 
greenwashing. Journal of Business Ethics, 43(3), 253-261. 
56. Letza, S., Sun, X., & Kirkbride, J. (2004). Shareholding versus 
stakeholding: A critical review of corporate governance. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 12(3), 242-262. 
57. Levine, T. R., & Hullett, C. R. (2002). Eta squared, partial eta squared, 
and misreporting of effect size in communication research. Human 
Communication Research, 28(4), 612-625. 
58. Macartney, H. (2011). Variegated neoliberalism: EU varieties of 
capitalism and international political economy. London, UK: 
Routledge Chapman & Hall. 
59. Mahoney, L. S., Thorne, L., Cecil, L., & LaGore, W. (2012). A research 
note on standalone corporate social responsibility reports: Signaling 
or greenwashing? Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 24(4), 350-
359. 
172 | Page 
 
60. March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1976). Ambiguity and choice in 
organizations. Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget. 
61. Matten, D., & Moon, J. (2008). "Implicit" and "explicit" CSR: A 
conceptual framework for a comparative understanding of 
corporate social responsibility. Academy of Management Review, 
33(2), 404-424. 
62. McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate social responsibility: 
A theory of the firm perspective. Academy of Management Review, 
26(1), 117-127. 
63. Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: 
Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American journal of 
sociology, 340-363. 
64. Mitchell, R., Agle, B., & Wood, D. (1997). Toward a theory of 
stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of 
who and what really counts. Academy of Management Review, 22, 
853-886. 
65. Mitnick, B. (2000). Commitment, revelation, and the testaments of 
belief: The metrics of measurement of corporate social 
performance. Business & Society, 39, 419-465. 
66. Mitra, R. (2012). "My country's future": A culture-centered 
interrogation of corporate social responsibility in India. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 106(2), 131-147. 
67. O'Donovan, G. (2002). Environmental disclosures in the annual 
report. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 15(3), 344-
371. 
68. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Development Centre. (2010). Perspectives on global development 
2013: Industrial policies in a changing world. Paris: OECD. 
69. Perez-Batres, L. A., Doh, J. P., Miller, V. V., & Pisani, M. J. (2012). 
Stakeholder pressures as determinants of CSR strategic choice: Why 
do firms choose symbolic versus substantive self-regulatory codes 
of conduct? Journal of Business Ethics, 110(2), 157-172. 
  173 | Page 
 
70. Pless, N. M., Maak, T., & Waldman, D. A. (2012). Different 
approaches toward doing the right thing: Mapping the 
responsibility orientations of leaders. Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 26(4), 51-65. 
71. Porter, M., & Kramer, M. (2002). The competitive advantage of 
corporate philanthropy. Harvard Business Review, 80(12), 56-68. 
72. Schiebel, W., & Pöchtrager, S. (2003). Corporate ethics as a factor 
for success. The measurement instrument of the University of 
Agricultural Sciences. Supply Chain Management - An International 
Journal, 8(2), 116-121. 
73. Sotorrío, L., & Sánchez, J. (2008). Corporate social responsibility of 
the highly reputed European and North American firms. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 82, 379-390. 
74. Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 87, 355-374. 
75. Spence, M. (2002). Signaling in retrospect and the informational 
structure of markets. American Economic Review, 92, 434-459. 
76. Surroca, J., & Tribo, J. A. (2008). Managerial entrenchment and 
corporate social performance. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 35(5 & 6), 748-789. 
77. Tang, Z., & Tang, J. (2012). Stakeholder–firm power difference, 
stakeholders' CSR orientation, and SMEs' environmental 
performance in China. Journal of Business Venturing, 27(4), 436-455. 
78. Tengblad, S., & Ohlsson, C. (2010). The framing of corporate social 
responsibility and the globalization of national business systems: A 
longitudinal case study. Journal of Business Ethics, 93(4), 653-669. 
79. Visser, W. (2008). Corporate social responsibility in developing 
countries. In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon, & D. 
Siegel, The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (pp. 
473-479). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
80. Waddock, S. A., & Graves, S. B. (1997). The corporate social 
performance-financial performance link. Strategic Management 
Journal, 18(4), 303-319. 
174 | Page 
 
81. Waldman, D., de Luque, M., Washburn, N., House, R., Adetoun, B., 
Barrasa, A., et al. (2006). Cultural and leadership predictors of 
corporate social responsibility values of top management: A GLOBE 
study of 15 countries. Journal of International Business Studies, 37, 
823-837. 
82. Weber, J., & Marley, K. (2012). In search of stakeholder salience: 
Exploring corporate social and sustainability reports. Business & 
Society, 51(4), 626-649. 
83. Weick, K. E. (1976). Educational organizations as loosely coupled 
systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1-19. 
84. Williams, C., & Aguilera, R. (2008). Corporate social responsibility in 
a comparative perspective. In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. 
Moon, & D. Siegel, The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (pp. 452-472). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
85. Witt, M., & Redding, G. (2013). Asian business systems: Institutional 
comparison, clusters and implications for varieties of capitalism and 
business systems theory. Socio-Economic Review, 11(2), 265-300. 
86. Wood, D. (2010). Measuring corporate social performance: a review. 
International Journal of Management Reviews, 12(1), 50-84. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  175 | Page 
 
Chapter 4: Corporate stakeholder orientation in an 
emerging country context: A longitudinal 
cross-industry analysis  
4.1 Abstract  
This study examines corporate stakeholder orientation (CSO) across industries and 
over time prior to the introduction of mandatory CSR. We argue that CSO is a 
legitimacy signal consciously employed by firms to demonstrate their shareholder 
and specific non-shareholder orientations in the midst of institutional pressures 
emerging from country and industry contexts. Using a seven-code index of CSO on 
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CEO-shareholder communications from India, we find that in general large firms in 
India exhibit a predominant, significant and rising trend of pro-shareholder 
orientation in the six-year period immediately preceding the CSR law. Yet, we 
uncover significant industry differences in CSO potentially driven by four key 
factors: the degree of competitive dynamics, nature of products and services, 
extent of negative externalities and social activism, and exposure to international 
markets. Our findings support the view that while some minimum threshold of 
regulatory intervention is required to balance the interests of business with 
society, legislation raises questions in relation to the usefulness of a uniform one-
size-fits-all CSR across all industries. 
4.2 Introduction 
During the last decade, the new trend of mandating certain minimum standards of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) is gaining traction in the developing world––
i.e., after Mauritius and Indonesia, India has recently passed a law, directing 
specified large companies across all industries to devote, at the least, 2% of their 
net profits in (non-profit making) CSR activities1. We can draw two main 
observations from this initiative. First, mandatory regulation on CSR reflects 
concerns about the absence or lack of firms’ orientation towards social 
stakeholders (Mitra, 2011). In this manner, it invokes the controversial yet 
important debate regarding the purpose of the business corporation i.e., whether 
firms should adopt a shareholder orientation to maximize shareholder value or 
whether they should pursue wider socio-economic objectives by espousing a 
broader stakeholder orientation (Economist, 2015; Stout, 2012). Second, a 
minimum universal one-size-fits-all threshold has the unintended consequence of 
bundling all firms across industries in the same basket, overlooking industry-
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specific concerns, responsibilities and their respective dynamics (Beschorner, 
2013). Probing further into these two evident observations is timely and 
important, which we set out to do in this paper. 
A firm’s orientation towards its stakeholders has been assessed by examining the 
managerial perspective of a firm’s responsibilities towards its internal and external 
stakeholders (Aupperle, 1984). There is a general agreement that corporate 
responsibility is a culture-laden construct and national cultural differences can 
influence managerial stakeholder perspectives (Burton, Farh, & Hegarty, 2000). 
Yet, some studies based in emerging countries find that exposure to institutional 
pressures from international markets, inter-governmental organizations and 
parent companies are important drivers of managerial motivations behind 
corporate responsibility (Jamali, Lund-Thomsen, & Jeppesen, 2015; Tsamenyi & 
Uddin, 2009).  
For example in the Indian context, benevolence in business was a well-established 
practice based on normative pressures primarily driven by cultural and religious 
beliefs (Kanagasabapathi, 2007). Given the prevalence of family and state owned 
firms with a strong “community ethos” (Balasubramanian, Kimber, & Siemensma, 
2005), Indian business practices historically reflected a wide stakeholder 
orientation. However, skeptics construe that progressive globalization, increased 
competition for attracting investments among firms and also among governments, 
along with a simultaneous influx of western business philosophies may have 
weakened this ethos and altered perceptions towards an instrumental view of 
corporate responsibility as propagated by Friedman’s model of shareholder 
orientation (Chakraborty, 1997; Sundar, 2000).  
At an industry level, scholars suggest that while homogeneity in CSR practices is 
generally found within industries, differences in CSR practices are apparent across 
industries (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). The similarity of institutional conditions 
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within an industry in the form of the degree of competition and collaboration 
among firms and presence of industry specific self-regulations that are 
encouraged in a comply/explain basis (soft laws) may result in homogeneity of CSR 
behaviors within industries. On the other hand, power differences in monitoring 
across critical stakeholders and influence of the state across industries also 
account for divergence in CSR behaviors across industries (Campbell, 2007). Thus, 
industry specific complexities may drive firms to adopt a similar view of 
responsibility towards stakeholders, and at the same time industry specificities 
may lead to emergence of different groupings on stakeholder orientations 
(O’Connor & Shumate, 2010). Current research on corporate orientations, 
although substantial, has not yet considered both emerging country as well as 
industry specific dynamics (Burton & Goldsby, 2009).  
The purpose of this study is to longitudinally assess stakeholder orientations of 
large firms across industries in an emerging country prior to the introduction of a 
hard law on mandatory CSR expenditures. It is our understanding that exploring 
voluntary corporate stakeholder orientations (CSO) prior to institutionalized social 
responsibilities captures the disparities between firms’ existing orientations and 
what such regulatory practices seek to establish. It also sheds light on the purpose 
of the business as viewed through a corporate lens relative to how it is perceived 
by the regulatory state. Together, they can help to identify the nature and extent 
of changes expected in future CSR behaviors. 
We draw on the construct of corporate social orientation (Aupperle, 1984) to 
define corporate stakeholder orientation (CSO) as a legitimacy signal (Jain, 
Forthcoming) that reflects managerial perception of legitimate stakeholders for 
their firms in the midst of various kinds of environmental pressures. Adopting an 
institutional perspective in an industry context, we contend that firms face 
coercive, mimetic and normative pressures while framing their stakeholder 
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orientations, contingent upon economic and environmental constraints, and socio-
cultural and ethical norms (Campbell, 2007; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001; 
2008). Furthermore, the degree to which these institutional pressures will impact 
the construction of CSO will be tempered by the industry in which firms are 
embedded. We argue that it is within these industry level institutional dynamics 
that management constructs their CSOs and communicates them to stakeholders 
through their voluntary corporate disclosures. Firms are likely to send stronger 
signals to those stakeholders that (managers perceive) hold the key to their social 
legitimacy (Boutlier & Thomson, 2011; O’Donovan, 2002). 
We contextualize our study in India, which presents an opportune experimental 
setting due to the recently mandated CSR law. To assess CSO, we adapt and apply 
a validated CSO index (Jain, Forthcoming) on a large sample of CEO/chairpersons’ 
annual statements between 2007 and 2012, immediately preceding the CSR law in 
India. Using thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998) on these communications, we 
inductively identify the specific stakeholders towards whom firms are oriented. 
We analyze the shareholder and non-shareholder orientations through careful 
longitudinal and across industries comparisons to synthesize a better 
understanding of firms’ stakeholder preferences in light of the specific institutional 
pressures at play. We believe CSR legislation must take cognizance of institutional 
differences across industries and corresponding industry CSOs to facilitate the 
acceptance and effective implementation of such laws.  
Through this paper, we offer the following contributions to the CSR field. We 
clarify the corporate social orientation (Aupperle, 1984) construct by refining it as 
corporate stakeholder orientation. This is not a matter of semantics, but we 
believe that the corporate stakeholder orientation construct offers a better 
mechanism for identifying corporate purpose––both economic and social. In line 
with the focus of this special issue, examining industry-specific CSO fills an 
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important gap in the comparative inter-sectorial CSR literature. Drawing on 
institutional theory at the industry level, we theorize and illustrate the 
complexities behind CSOs. By longitudinally analyzing CSOs, we add a dynamic 
dimension to CSO, which has been explored as a static construct in the literature. 
Finally, although in general we capture a widening gap between shareholder 
versus non-shareholder orientations of firms in India, we also identify significant 
industry differences highlighting the relevance of industry level institutional 
dynamics in constructing CSO.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin by introducing our 
corporate stakeholder orientation construct followed by a review of literature in 
this field. Next, drawing on relevant literature pertaining to institutional theory 
and the industry context, we present our theoretical framework where we 
conceptualize CSO as a legitimacy signal. Thereafter, we describe our research 
design and methodology before presenting our findings and analyses. We 
conclude this paper by offering a set of relevant, timely and testable propositions 
on industry specific CSO. 
4.3 From corporate social orientation to corporate 
stakeholder orientation 
Among the different definitions for CSR (Dahlsrud, 2008), one of the most widely 
used was suggested by Carroll (1979). He proposed that the entire spectrum of 
corporate responsibilities could be conceptualized into economic, legal, ethical 
and philanthropic responsibilities (Carroll, 1991). Economic responsibility is 
primarily concerned with creating value for shareholders; legal responsibility 
implies legal and regulatory compliance; ethical responsibility involves following 
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normative codes prevalent in society; and philanthropic responsibility includes 
corporate giving for non-profit endeavors (Carroll, 1979; 1991). Using this 
definition, Aupperle (1984) introduced the corporate social orientation construct 
to assess the managerial view of a firm’s responsibilities towards internal and 
external stakeholders. Aupperle (1984) scored firms’ orientations through a forced 
choice survey instrument. Respondents were asked to rate statements that 
represented economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary dimensions of CSR. The 
mean score on each of these four dimensions was then collated to measure CSOs. 
Aupperle’s instrument has since been used to study orientations of diverse groups 
such as CEOs and board members (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1991; 1995), small 
businesses (Burton & Goldsby, 2009) as well as students (Angelidis & Ibrahim, 
2004) 
Although the corporate social orientation construct has expanded research on 
CSR, it provides a limited view of CSR. Carroll’s CSR definition is an all inclusive 
classification of responsibilities that includes economic and non-economic 
obligations towards shareholders and non-shareholder stakeholders.  Although 
the corporate “social” orientation construct is based on this definition of CSR, the 
economic dimension is later separated from the non-economic dimension. 
Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield (1985) propose that the latter corroborates better 
with the social orientation of organizations. Despite this segregation, the literature 
continues to club the orientation towards all stakeholders (including shareholders) 
as corporate social orientation. This adds to the confusion of corporate social 
orientation implying orientations of a social nature alone, when in fact they 
include orientations of economic responsibility towards stakeholders. In addition, 
though corporate social orientation explains the entire spectrum of manager’s 
responsibilities towards stakeholders, it does not clearly capture the stakeholders 
associated with each level of responsibility. 
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In order to bring greater clarity to this construct that embodies the managerial 
perception of firms’ internal and external stakeholder responsibilities, we re-frame 
it as corporate stakeholder orientations, henceforth (CSO). CSO includes 
identifying the requisite stakeholder groups towards whom firms are oriented and 
it does not club all the non-shareholder stakeholders into a single category. We 
contend that this is important because the nature and extent of responsibility 
towards these multiple stakeholder entities may differ. Furthermore, the 
stakeholder orientation construct is independent of culture or country specific 
nuances often associated with CSR (Burton et al., 2000), thereby more 
appropriately embodying and/or reflecting who and what counts for top 
management and for the firms they represent in any national context (Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984).  
4.3.1 Literature review 
In this section, we discuss how the literature on corporate orientations has 
developed over time. Notably, most of the present research has focused on 
studying CSO in the developed country context. The most commonly studied 
contexts include countries in the EU, USA, Japan, and Australia (Angelidis & 
Ibrahim, 2004; Burton & Goldsby, 2009; Fukukawa & Teramoto, 2009; Ibrahim & 
Angelidis, 1991; 1995; Sotorrío & Sánchez, 2008). Since our study is based in an 
emerging country context, it is important to highlight that differences in 
institutional pressures and cultural norms often inform how firms in different 
countries understand and interpret their stakeholder responsibilities and 
subsequently construct their stakeholder orientations (Jamali & Neville, 2011; 
Visser, 2008; Williams & Aguilera, 2008). Accordingly, CSO in developed contexts 
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are likely to significantly differ from CSO in emerging market contexts, such as 
India (Jain, Forthcoming).   
Specifically in the Indian context, the CSO literature can be divided into two 
different time periods. The first corresponds to the period when India was a closed 
economy with restrictive foreign trade policy and second, relates to the period 
after India adopted economic liberalization and became part of the global markets 
(Nayar, 1998). Prior to India’s exposure to globalization, there are two main 
studies on corporate orientations that are worth highlighting––the study of 
managerial perceptions by Khan and Atkinson (1987) and a comprehensive study 
of management attitudes by Krishna (1992). Both studies find that a large 
proportion of Indian managers believed that a business has responsibility not just 
to its shareholders, but also to its employees, customers, suppliers, the state, and 
the society within which it operates. They uncover an agreement on the corporate 
pursuit of economic and social goals among managers, particularly in larger sized 
firms. Most scholars relate this to the culture and value system prevalent in India 
at the time, which implicitly institutionalized social and ethical responsibilities 
among firms (Matten & Moon, 2008; Patel & Schaefer, 2009).  
Studies evaluating corporate orientation in the post liberalization era report that 
the Indian economy lags behind the west in terms of social, environmental and 
ethical performances (KPMG, 2005; Mishra & Suar, 2010; Mitra, 2011). Part of this 
massive shift in orientation, from a broader social character to a largely profit 
oriented one, could be explained by the institutional changes that accompanied 
globalization. To begin with, there were several corporate governance reforms 
that took place in the developing world (Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2008). Many of 
these reforms were largely based on the corporate governance practices of the 
US, that follow the agency model of shareholder value maximization (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2008). At the 
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same time, the new millennium witnessed a growing importance and 
institutionalization of soft laws in the forms of principles, standards and ethical 
codes of conduct such as those propagated by UN Global Compact, Global 
Reporting Initiative and UNDP. The influx of these somewhat contradicting yet 
powerful global institutional practices led to an interesting interplay between the 
pressure to conform to shareholder value logic by mimicking the legitimized 
governance practices and the pressure to conform to ethical norms propagated by 
soft laws and the prevalent socio-cultural systems. In this paper, we track the 
trend of corporate stakeholder orientations across industries in India prior to the 
introduction of institutionalized CSR. We argue that institutional pressures to 
conform to stakeholder expectations will vary contingent on industry specificities.  
4.3.2 Corporate stakeholder orientation as a legitimacy 
signal  
A stakeholder is broadly understood as any individual or group who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of an organization's objectives (Freeman, 1984). 
However, managerial perception of who these stakeholders are and how far 
managerial responsibility extends still remain intriguing questions, particularly 
with differences in managerial mindsets across nations (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995; Jamali, Sidani, & El-Asmar, 2009; Kapelus, 2002; O’Riordan & Fairbrass, 
2008; Waldman, de Luque, Washburn, & House et al., 2006). We define corporate 
stakeholder orientation (CSO) as the top management’s viewpoint of their firm’s 
legitimate stakeholders. We contend that managers co-create their firms’ CSO on 
the basis of who they consider to be their legitimate stakeholders and accordingly 
communicate this intent and orientation through corporate disclosures. 
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We conceptualize CSO as a legitimacy signal that carries crucial information about 
organizations’ stakeholder intent. Management is likely to accord greater 
attention, in other words, send more signals to those entities who are perceived 
as more important for their firms’ survival and whose claims are considered 
legitimate. In addition, there are complex environmental pressures facing firms 
(Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007) during this process that will 
influence the construction of CSOs.  
As per institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), firms encounter different 
institutional pressures ranging from coercive, normative to mimetic (Scott, 2008). 
Conformation to these pressures enables firms to gain both resources and 
legitimacy that are vital to unlock success in hugely competitive environments 
such as those persisting in emerging countries (ibid). It also helps to avoid social 
and legal sanctions that may accrue due to non-compliance (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). When viewed from the stakeholder lens, institutional pressures can be seen 
as embodying diverse stakeholder expectations from firms. At the same time, 
institutional configurations can influence the degree to which stakeholders can 
influence managers (Campbell, 2007) and, in this manner, impact managerial 
stakeholder orientations.  
Drawing on literature linking institutional theory to the industry context, we posit 
that firms belonging to a particular industry group have to establish a good 
corporate image among their peers to get access to human and material 
resources, and to maintain customer loyalty. Yet, they must secure investment 
opportunities (Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil, & LaGore, 2012) and gain competitive 
advantages over other firms in the same industry (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). 
Given the nature of products and services, structure of the industry, 
manufacturing processes, risks involved, extent of societal visibility, and the 
nature and level of interaction with the state, every industry faces a set of unique 
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opportunities and constraints different from other industries (ibid). Therefore, 
firms within an industry are presented with a complex but similar amalgam of local 
and global institutional pressures that arise from a juxtaposition of multiple 
coercive, mimetic and normative forces specific to that particular industry 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). We argue that under such circumstances, each 
industry is sensitized differently to its stakeholders, and such distinctions lead to 
the creation of industry specific stakeholder orientations. 
4.3.3 Institutional pressures in the industry context 
In this section, we discuss how the institutional dynamics at the industry level lead 
to firms’ adopting specific stakeholder orientations, resulting in potential 
isomorphism among them. The central idea is based on the argument that firms 
thrive on legitimacy, and in their quest for legitimacy they surrender and succumb 
to industry specific institutional pressures (O’Donovan, 2002; Washington & 
Patterson, 2011). We argue that this process would typically result in similarity of 
stakeholder orientations across firms functioning in the same industry 
(Washington & Patterson, 2011). Below we discuss the three kinds of institutional 
isomorphism at the industry level in emerging country contexts, such as India.  
Coercive isomorphism is a consequence of firms experiencing institutional 
pressures (formal or informal) from organizations on which they are dependent 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), embodying an element of power relations. These 
pressures could arise from multiple entities such as from the state through 
regulations; customers, suppliers and parent companies due to resource 
dependence; watchdogs such as media, national and international NGOs and 
social movements; and socio-cultural norms prevalent in society (Scott, 2008). 
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Interestingly, these different pressure points tend to embody mechanisms that 
may push for both shareholder and non-shareholder orientations. For example, 
for foreign multinational subsidiaries in emerging countries, corporate governance 
practices prevalent in home countries may require firms to align their orientation 
with shareholder value maximization (La Porta et al., 1998) that may contradict 
with the cultural norms supporting social stakeholders in the host country (Patel & 
Schaefer, 2009).  
At the industry level, industries with exorbitant profit margins may attract state 
and third sector attention due to ethical concerns in emerging countries. For 
example, the metals and mining industry in India, has a somewhat oligopolistic 
structure, giving firms in this sector enormous power. Such powerful firms are not 
affected by their dwindling social reputations and their economic priorities tend to 
over-ride the need for certain forms of institutional compliance. At the same time, 
some industries (due to their societal visibility and the magnitude of externalities 
they create) are more prone to attract activism from NGOs and social movements. 
We sustain that the different kinds of coercive institutional pressures interact 
among themselves and with specific industry variables such as market structure 
and power dynamics (Perez-Batres, Doh, Miller, & Pisani, 2012). This process is 
expected to trigger managers into complying with those institutional demands 
that are more salient, magnified and intense within their industries. In this 
manner, coercive institutional pressures together with the industry dynamics can 
affect corporate stakeholder orientations.  
Normative isomorphism tends to emerge when professionals in a field claim 
superiority and set up norms that are adopted across firms (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Such pressures for adoption are most commonly seen in the form of soft 
laws. Some of these soft laws such as the UN Global Compact are targeted at all 
firms across industries, others are more specific industry codes of conduct (Dacin, 
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1997; Scott, 2001) and standards propagated through universities, professional 
training institutions, and trade magazines (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989). 
Firms that defect from such norms are likely to be viewed with suspicion from 
media and social stakeholders, yet it is noteworthy that these norms are in the 
form of comply or explain and do not come with legal sanctions.  
We contend that across industry codes pressure firms to adopt some common 
orientations depending on pressing global concerns. A good example of such a 
code is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) that seeks to promote sustainability 
and integrated reporting across industries in view of the globally significant 
climate change phenomena and businesses’ ecological footprint. However, firms 
may opt to follow industry specific codes depending on the relevance of the issue 
represented by the code along with industry specific externalities and pressures 
(Logsdon & Wood, 2005). For example, due to heavy outsourcing of manufacturing 
facilities to emerging countries and institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) in 
labor laws, the apparel industry is blamed for encouraging inhumane labor 
conditions. On the other hand, the extractive industries are infamous for extensive 
mining of minerals in an environmentally irresponsible way (Frynas, 2005). To tide 
with these different sets of externalities (that increase industry susceptibility to 
social activism), there are different codes that guide action such as the Ethical 
Trading Initiative (ETI) that seeks to improve working conditions in the apparel 
industry, and the Sustainable Mining Initiative that addresses social and 
environmental issues related to extractive industries. Firms adopting such industry 
codes are likely to gain more legitimacy among their peers and supply chain 
partners (Prakash, 2000). We contend that normative institutional pressures, 
together with sector specific externalities, visibility of the industry and pressures 
of conformation within the industry are likely to inform stakeholder orientations 
at the industry level.   
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Mimetic isomorphism displays the tendency of firms to model or imitate the 
behavior of successful and legitimate firms in an environment of uncertainty 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Mimicking behavior is a safer and easier way to gain 
legitimacy in an environment when the best course of action cannot be 
ascertained (Suchman, 1995). In emerging countries, globalization was 
accompanied by a strong wave of structural reforms that encompassed industrial 
deregulation, trade liberalization, and relaxation of state regulations (Nayar, 
1998). These weakened the protectionist regimes, at least in some countries, such 
as India, and exposed the local firms to fierce international competition. To cope 
with this uncertain environment and appear legitimate in this highly competitive 
international business environment, the emerging country firms started mimicking 
western business models through a process of mimetic isomorphism (ibid).  
However, at the industry level, the scope and scale of liberalization differed. While 
some industries such as information technology saw a greater interaction with the 
global markets (Arora & Gambardella, 2004), others such as mining and finance 
still remained partially dominated by state owned corporations and derived a large 
proportion of their revenues from domestic businesses (Goldberg, 2009). Higher 
state regulations placed restrictions on the extent to which foreign firms could 
enter specific industries. In line with this argumentation, we contend that 
although the impact of mimetic isomorphism will be visible within and across 
industries, firms will mimic those behaviors and practices that are followed by 
leading and successful firms in their specific industries. Firms facing greater 
international competition are likely to mimic successful international firms and 
firms operating largely in the domestic market will tend to mimic domestic firms. 
We sustain that mimetic isomorphism is likely to influence stakeholder 
orientations contingent on industry specifics such as the degree to which an 
industry has exposure to the international market environment.  
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Overall, we argue that firms face diverse institutional pressures from multiple 
stakeholders. The intensity of such pressures and the legitimacy of these 
stakeholders are contingent upon the industry within which firms are embedded. 
It is within this complex interaction of multiple pressures (Aguilera et al., 2007), 
that firms identify their legitimate and critical stakeholders and construct their 
corporate stakeholder orientations.  
4.4 Research design 
The purpose of this study is to longitudinally assess voluntary corporate 
stakeholder orientations across industries. To do so, we contextualize this study in 
India, and focus on the period prior to the CSR legislation that was enacted in 
2013. We believe this constitutes a unique experimental setting to evaluate 
voluntary CSO across industries prior to state institutionalization of firms’ 
responsibilities that is likely to significantly impact existing CSOs and usher a new 
era of CSR.  
Existing studies have used three different methodologies to analyze CSO. The first 
approach uses a self-reported survey instrument pioneered by Aupperle et al. 
(1985), the second approach examines CSOs through reputational ratings such as 
the KLD (e.g., Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Tang & Tang, 2012) and the 
third approach is based on the content analysis of corporate social disclosures 
(CSDs) (e.g., Adams et al., 1998). While all these approaches have proliferated, 
they are not without limitations. Aupperle’s (1984) survey instrument has limited 
application for our study because it does not explicitly identify the stakeholders 
towards whom firms have economic and non-economic responsibilities (Aupperle 
et al., 1985). The main contention of reputational ratings is that they are more a 
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measure of outcomes rather than of orientations and adopt specified categories 
that end up being restrictive in identifying orientations (Wood, 2010).  
On the other hand, CSDs can be useful tools for examining CSO, yet scholars are 
often critical about their strategic use for green-washing and publicity (Hoffman, 
2006). In this study, we capitalize on the potential of corporate disclosures to 
capture CSO for two reasons. One, in line with our definition of CSO, we want to 
identify a corporate disclosure that is voluntary and reflects the managerial 
viewpoint of legitimate stakeholders. Two, it is critical that this disclosure should 
be able to filter out, if not all, at least a significant part of corporate posturing. We 
argue that the CEOs/chairpersons’ annual letters to the shareholders meet both of 
these conditions as the relevant voluntary disclosure for longitudinally examining 
CSO (Jain, Forthcoming). 
We contend that to examine CSO, it is prudent to focus on corporate disclosures 
that are voluntary, not impacted by particular guidelines such as GRI and that 
reflect top management’s view of their company’s position with respect to 
corporate responsibilities (Castelló & Lozano, 2011). CEOs/chairpersons’ letters to 
stockholders are generally employed by top management to communicate firm’s 
vision and mission, business trends, corporate policies, and strategies on aspects 
that are perceived to be highly relevant to stakeholders. These statements often 
candidly express management opinions and beliefs, including on trends such as 
CSR (Raman, 2006). For instance, N. R. Narayana Murthy, the chairman of Infosys 
Technologies Ltd., is known to write his own letters to the shareholders. Such 
letters may reveal top management’s willingness to align their firms’ behaviors 
with norms defined by their multiple stakeholders.  
Secondly, CEOs/chairpersons’ annual letters to the shareholders are specifically 
addressed to stockholders. Therefore, these letters can be a conservative test of a 
firm’s stakeholder orientation i.e., if a firm perceives its purpose as shareholder 
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value maximization, we expect to find a stockholder letter heavily focused on 
shareholders. On the other hand, if a firm believes in creating long-term 
shareholder value through satisfying a broader set of stakeholders, it will 
communicate this to its shareholders by highlighting the value of sound 
stakeholder relationships. Furthermore, shareholders themselves do not 
constitute a homogeneous group and different types of shareholders have 
different expectations from firms (Neubaum & Zahra, 2006; Stout, 2012; Walls, 
Berrone, & Phan, 2012). For instance, some shareholders have a short-term 
investment horizon and expect firms to focus on maximizing shareholder value 
and disregard expenditures for other stakeholders unless such investments are 
instrumental for increasing profits. Other shareholders invest in firms for the long 
haul and consider CSR activities relevant for strategic competitive advantages 
(Walls et al., 2012). Top management is likely to consider these varied shareholder 
expectations while framing their stakeholder orientations. Accordingly, 
CEOs/chairpersons’ letters are likely to be a strong reflection of who managers 
perceive to be their key stakeholders, what firms perceive as their stakeholders’ 
expectations and consequently how firms frame their stakeholder responsibilities 
and orientations (Castelló & Lozano, 2011; Jain, Forthcoming; Raman, 2006).  
For the purpose of assessing the CSO from CEO/Chairperson’s letters (hereinafter 
called the CEO statement), we used thematic analysis which is a technique 
commonly employed in psychological studies (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It is a 
qualitative method that involves quantifying qualitative texts using recurring 
patterns of explicit themes and analyzing them statistically (Boyatzis, 1998). Our 
goal was to carefully examine what is being communicated and then inductively 
identify the underlying stakeholder towards whom it was intended (Stebbins, 
2001). We employ a previously developed and validated CSO code (Jain, 
Forthcoming). This study devised the code through a two-stage process. During 
the first stage, CEO statements of the largest steel firms in the world were utilized. 
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Focusing on the intentional level of analysis, every sentence in the CEO statement 
was coded to identify the managerial intentions behind it. In this manner, specific 
stakeholders towards whom top management attention was directed were 
inductively identified. The following orientations were most commonly prevalent 
across the data set––shareholder, customer, employee, partner, environment, 
community and corporate governance. In the second stage, this code was applied 
on 54 CEO statements of banking firms across multiple countries, including India. 
We adapted the CSO code from this study and modified it to the Indian context as 
shown in Table 4.1.  
Shareholder orientation includes a concern for economic sustainability, economic 
achievements and future financial strategies with an underlying emphasis on 
creating shareholder value. Customer orientation encompasses concern for 
present as well as potential customers such as designing product and customer 
satisfaction policies. Employee orientation comprises concern towards employees’ 
working conditions, compensation and training, and welfare of their families. 
Partner orientation focuses on sustaining long-term relationships with third 
parties such as suppliers, creditors and lending institutions, and governmental 
agencies. Environment orientation includes actual and intended environment-
related policies and structures, and concern for ecological footprint. Community 
orientation comprises of firms’ concern towards the larger society and future 
generations beyond employees and their families. Lastly, corporate governance 
orientation focuses on adopting ethical, lawful and transparent structures and 
practices.
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Table 4.1: Seven-code CSO index 
 
Code Theme Description 
 
 
Shareholder Orientation 
 
Actual economic achievement described as financial reporting, production numbers, market share and  
profitability, financial ratios, steps taken to enhance bottom-line, control costs, 
Forecasting economic trends such as future product demand, increasing costs of operation, rise in salaries, 
pricing, economic crisis, market survival, inorganic growth strategies, 
Concern for economic goals, economic sustainability, competitive advantage, liquidity issues, increase in  
competition. 
 
* Immediate and long-term time horizon, implied as well as explicit.  
 
 
Customer Orientation 
 
Actual policies towards customer, commitment and service, introduction of innovative new products,  
disclosures of product quality, consumer relations and service, awards for customer satisfaction, consumer  
protection laws, 
Forecasting customer needs, 
Concern for customer related issues of a company as customer satisfaction, sustaining customer relationships  
and client servicing, citizenship with an underlying customer orientation. 
 
* Immediate and long-term focus, actual as well as intended. 
 
 
Employee Orientation 
 
Actual policy measures relating to employees working conditions, pension, compensation, employee consultation, 
training and education, employment of minorities or women, and trade union information, employee turnover,  
accidents, awards for best employer award, labor laws, 
Forecasting employee numbers, turnover, needs such as trainings and development,  
Concern for employees and their dependents such as quality of life, reducing injuries, improving health care,  
citizenship with an underlying employee concern.  
 
* Statements should have an underlying concern for employees, usually long-term in nature, implicit or explicit,  
and not in context of economic or environmental sustainability. 
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Code Theme Description 
 
 
Partner Orientation 
 
 
Actual policies regarding relationships with suppliers, lenders, banks, governments and such other agencies  
that are external partners for various functions, measures undertaken to support suppliers and increase supplier  
diversity, improving joint projects with suppliers,  
Intent towards sustaining long-term relationship with suppliers, government for policy initiatives,  
other lending institutions, compliance with partner norms across supply chain, 
Concern for sustaining long-term supplier relationships. 
 
* Statements could include actual, planned, issues and concerns towards partners, usually long-term.   
 
 
Environment Orientation 
 
Actual policies towards environment-related expenditures such as eco-friendly offices, conservation of energy,  
water, and recycling activities, using green technology, alternative production processes, maintaining  
bio-diversity, disclosure of environmental policies and regulations, and environmental awards (including ISO 14001 
and Eco Management and Audit Scheme – EMAS),  
Forecasting environmental impacts of products and processes,  
Concern for the environment and its protection, conservation and regeneration, climate change, air quality,  
growing responsibly and sustainably with reference to the environment, citizenship with an environmental focus. 
 
* Actual or intended with a long-term perspective.  
 
 
Community Orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actual and intended effort towards contributing to social good such as improving education, provision of  
health services such as AIDS awareness, inclusive growth, disclosures relating to sponsorship (e.g. of art exhibits)  
as well as charitable donations and activities, promoting art and culture, educating and protecting human rights,  
Concern and commitment for the larger society and communities and masses, future generations, social  
transformation, removal of poverty, care of human life (including safe driving, reducing traffic accidents),  
reduction of crime rates, growing responsibly with reference to community, citizenship in a community sense, 
 
* Community concern extends beyond existing employees and their families, is long-term, implicit or explicit.   
  
196 | Page 
 
Code Theme Description 
 
 
Corporate Governance  
Orientation 
 
Actual management policies concerning transparent, lawful and ethical operation of the company such as  
compliance to standards, control procedures, audits, whistle blower policy, Clause 49 of the listing  
agreement, repositioning business, major restructuring, 
Disclosures on capital adequacy ratios, BASEL, dividend declarations, values statements, codes of conduct,  
statement on managing risk; executive compensation, leadership, responsible management, BOD structure,  
achievements in CG, 
Concern over corporate governance issues, protection sensitive information, preventing asset laundering, 
 ethical procedures and intentions, citizenship with a general stakeholder orientation and even a long-term  
economic outlook, 
 
* Actual and intended long-term focus of top management on stakeholders’ interests.  
  
 
(Adapted from Jain, Forthcoming) 
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4.4.1 Sample and data 
 
We examine CSO of large firms in India across industries between 2007 and 2012. 
We focus on the BSE S&P 100 index, which is a broad-based index composed of 
100 large, liquid and well-established companies across all sectors in India, 
covering nearly 70% market capitalization of the listed universe. Firms that are 
part of this index are representative of various industrial sectors of the Indian 
economy and results based on their analysis can give us a good indication of CSO 
of large firms across industries.  
We obtained the BSE S&P 100 list of firms as of April 1st, 2007 from BSE India. 
Table 4.2 lists the sector-wise distribution of these firms. We focused on the “the 
letter to the shareholder” section of the annual reports or “CEO/chairperson 
message” of these firms from 2007 to 2012. The annual reports were accessed 
from individual company websites. Several Indian companies have only recently 
started maintaining online archives of annual reports. Therefore, in those cases 
where annual reports were not available on the websites, we contacted the 
registered offices of the companies. In some cases, the chairperson’s letter 
replaced the CEO’s letter or vice-a-versa. Since both these letters serve the same 
purpose, we followed Tengblad and Ohlsson (2010) and did not treat them 
differently. Some firms did not issue either of the two statements, which were 
subsequently labeled as missing.  
From the total desired sample of 600 CEO statements (BSE S&P 100 firms over 6 
years), 359 CEO statements across 18 industries were available. 251 statements 
were missing that comprised about 41.8% of the planned data set. We analyzed 
the missing data and found a systematic pattern in it. The primary reason behind 
the pattern was that some firms did not issue a CEO statement at all. We found 
that 24 firms (across 15 industries) out of the 100 targeted did not issue a CEO 
statement for the block years 2007-2012. However, the non-issuing of a CEO 
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statement does not imply that firms do not have an orientation towards their 
stakeholders: it simply indicates that we do not know what their orientation is. We 
proceeded with the hand-coding of 359 CEO statements inductively (Stebbins, 
2001) after eliminating all the missing data. 
Table 4.2: Sector-wise distribution of BSE S&P 100 
S.No.  Industry Name Number of Firms  % Index Weight 
 
1 Auto  7 5.07 
2 Capital Goods 8 8.21 
3 Cement 5 2.93 
4 Chemicals 3 1.15 
5 Diversified 5 2.70 
6 Electronics 1 0.27 
7 Finance 18 20.48 
8 FMCG 8 6.99 
9 Pharma 7 4.12 
10 Hospitality 1 0.56 
11 IT 7 15.52 
12 Mass Media 1 0.57 
13 Metal & Mining 8 4.71 
14 Oil & Gas 9 14.47 
15 Power 4 3.45 
16 Real Estate 2 0.92 
17 Sugar 2 0.26 
18 Telecom 
Total 
4 
100 
7.63 
100% 
To maintain reliability of codes, a second coder was engaged aside from the first 
author of the paper (who was the main coder of the text). The unit of coding was a 
sentence and each sentence was coded for the presence of orientations as per the 
CSO index in Table 4.1. The number of times an orientation appeared was 
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recorded as the frequency, which reflected the intensity of a specific orientation. 
The CSO codes were applied to the sample of 359 CEO statements independently 
by the two coders to maintain objectiveness of coding. Between the two coders, 
an initial agreement of about 84% on the basis of presence of themes was reached 
which was as per the minimum acceptable benchmark for inter-coder reliability 
suggested by Boyatzis (1998). After further discussions, we reached a complete 
agreement on the final coding. 
4.5 Research analyses and findings 
We begin the analysis by checking for normality of our final data set.  Although the 
sample was fairly large to assume normality of the distribution, we apply several 
normality tests namely Shapiro-Wilk, Jarque-Bera and Anderson-Darling (Field, 
2009). We find that normality was not obtained for any of the orientation 
distributions except for the shareholder orientation (results available upon 
request). Accordingly, we proceed with the analysis using non-parametric tests. 
We analyze the seven-orientations (as coded) for the BSE S&P 100 firms as a 
whole and across industries. 
Our first two objectives are to assess the corporate stakeholder orientations 
among large firms in India over the 2007-2012 period, and then to scrutinize the 
CSO across industries. For this, it is important to analyze both the firms’ 
preferential order of various stakeholders (stakeholder prioritization) and the 
extent of firms’ relative concern towards each of them (relative intensity of 
stakeholder orientation). To do so, we begin by calculating the mean orientations 
for the Index and for specific industries presented in Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.3: Mean intensity of shareholder and stakeholder orientations for BSE S&P index and across industries 
 BSE 
 
 
Cap. 
Goods 
Cement Auto Finance Power Oil Telecom Pharma FMCG IT Mining 
Shareholder 38.44 38.42 37.04 41.82 36.20 31.49 43.94 31.08 39.91 38.24 34.21 40.89 
Customer  11.18 9.59 2.84 12.60 13.03 6.24 7.76 15.43 18.78 16.69 20.92 5.41 
Employee 5.74 6.10 17.03 4.25 2.58 4.40 3.65 2.68 4.11 6.37 9.78 9.18 
Partner  5.32 5.13 5.63 5.41 6.27 6.00 5.46 3.12 3.61 5.18 3.53 3.53 
Environment 2.14 3.05 2.83 1.20 0.69 5.65 4.64 0.91 0.15 3.91 3.01 2.45 
Community  3.14 2.28 2.85 1.37 3.49 7.32 3.32 6.35 3.40 3.12 2.54 3.39 
Corp.Gov.  6.33 5.84 4.08 4.74 7.79 8.20 5.08 6.67 8.74 5.25 8.54 5.85 
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Table 4.3 shows that in general the preference for shareholder orientation is 
clearly evident across all firms and industries. In terms of prioritization for the 
index, on an average shareholder (M=38.44), customer (M=11.18) and corporate 
governance (M=6.33) orientations are the top three priorities; partner (M=5.32), 
community (M=3.14) and environment orientations (M=2.14) are the bottom 
three; and employee orientation (M=5.74) is nested in the middle. However, an 
important observation is that even though these letters are addressed to 
shareholders, they portray firms’ orientation towards non-shareholders 
stakeholders as well. On one hand, this observation supports our argument that 
shareholder letters could be viewed as an interesting site for capturing non-
shareholder orientations on a conservative basis and on the other hand, it 
highlights that although large firms demonstrate a pre-dominant shareholder 
orientation, they also reflect a broader stakeholder orientation in their 
shareholder letters.  
Next step is to investigate the prevalence of shareholder and non-shareholder 
orientations at an industry level. Towards this end, we start by using the mean 
orientations in Table 4.3 to prepare stakeholder prioritization graphs for BSE S&P 
100 index (Figure 4.1) and for specific industries (Figure 4.2). This enables us to 
visualize the relative importance of each stakeholder for large firms on an average 
and also for each industry in our sample. Some interesting observations stand out. 
We find that oil and gas (M=43.94) and metals and mining (M=40.89) industries 
have the highest shareholder orientations and also the widest gap between their 
shareholder and non-shareholder orientations. On the other hand, information 
technology (IT), and telecom industries not only have lower than average 
shareholder orientation but also have the lowest gap between their shareholder 
and non-shareholder orientations indicating industry differences.  
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Figure 4.1: Stakeholder prioritization for BSE S&P 100 firms over 2007-2012 
 
Figure 4.2: Industry-wise shareholder and stakeholder orientations in India over 
2007-2012 
 
To shed more light on whether the mean differences in orientations across 
industries are significant, we employ Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 4.4) as a baseline 
Shareholder Customer Employee Partner Environmental Community Corp.Gov.  
Orientations 38.44 11.18 5.74 5.32 2.14 3.14 6.33 
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(Field, 2009). We find that for all orientations namely shareholder (K=44.5, 
p<0.001), customer (K=118.2, p<0.001), employee (K=83.72, p<0.001), partner 
(K=25.20, p<0.05), environment (K=105.99, p<0.001), community (K=39.28, 
p<0.001) and corporate governance (K=49.41, p<0.001) the differences across 
industries are significant, indicating that industries prioritize their stakeholder 
orientations differently. This provides preliminary support to our argument that 
industries have their own unique institutional dynamics that are likely to inform 
their view of stakeholder legitimacy.  
Our next objective is to delve deeper into the industry dynamics. In particular, we 
seek to explore to what extent similar institutional forces can lead specific 
industries to exhibit analogous intensity of orientations. To do so, we conduct 
pairwise analysis of industries using Dunn’s procedure (p<0.05) (presented in 
Table 4.5) and establish industry clusters for each orientation (Field, 2009). The 
industry clusters that emerge from this analysis are not significantly different 
within themselves, but significantly different between themselves i.e., industries 
that fall within a cluster do not significantly differ from each other on a specific 
orientation, while two separate industry clusters significantly differ from each 
other on that orientation. This helps us analyze the nature of similarities between 
industries and qualitatively identify the institutional forces behind these 
commonalities.  
Some observations from the pair-wise comparisons in Table 4.5 are as follows. We 
find that oil and gas (M=43.94) and metal and mining (M=40.89) are not 
statistically different on their shareholder orientations and cluster together. The 
results are in line with our earlier observation that these two industries also have 
the strongest mean shareholder orientation, significantly different from the 
cluster of finance (M=36.20), power (M=31.49), telecom (M=31.08) and IT 
(M=34.21) industries, which also have the lowest mean shareholder orientation. 
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Table 4.4: Kruskal-Wallis test for differences on each orientation across industries 
 Shareholder Customer Employee Partner Environment Community Corp. Gov. 
K 44.45*** 118.72*** 83.72*** 25.20** 105.99*** 39.28*** 49.41*** 
Two-Tailed Test: **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.001  
Table 4.5: An example of industry cluster 
Shareholder Customer Employee Environment Community CG 
Telecom 
Power 
IT 
Finance 
Mining 
Oil & Gas 
Cement 
Mining 
Auto 
Telecom 
Pharma 
FMCG 
IT 
Finance Cap.Goods 
Mining 
IT 
Cement 
Pharma 
Finance 
 
Mining 
Cap.Goods 
IT 
Oil & Gas 
Power 
Auto 
Cap.Goods 
Telecom 
Power 
Auto Finance 
Power 
All groupings are significant at p <0.05 
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On customer orientation, durable goods, fast moving and service-based industries 
have higher than average customer orientation significantly different from the 
cluster of heavy industries, which have lower than average customer orientation. 
For example, one of the emerging clusters with a higher than average customer 
orientation is that of IT (M=20.92), pharmaceutical (M=18.78), FMCG (M=16.69), 
telecom (M=15.43), and automobile (M=12.60) industries. In contrast, heavy 
industries such as cement (M=2.84) and mining (M=5.41) cluster together at the 
lower end.  
On employee orientation, industries that tend to follow poor labor policies such as 
employing a high proportion of contract labor, and this includes majority of the 
industrial sector such as cement (M=17.03), metal and mining (M=9.78) and 
capital good (M=6.10) (Ananthanarayanan, 2014) cluster together and exhibit high 
employee orientations (Table 4.5). On environment orientation, broadly all 
industries portray a low level of orientation in their shareholder letters. However, 
industries that inherently create more risk for the environment by virtue of their 
manufacturing or extraction processes such as power (M=5.65), oil and gas 
(M=4.64), capital goods (M=3.05), IT (M=3.01), and mining (M=2.45) cluster 
together with higher than average mean environment orientation. Interestingly, 
automobile firms that heavily rely on contract labor reflect a low employee 
orientation (M=4.25) and pharmaceutical firms (M=0.15) despite being risky in 
terms of their environmental footprint exhibit low environment orientation.  
Our next step is to explore whether there are likely to be differences between CSO 
prior to and after a CSR law. In India, the CSR law intends to improve firms’ 
orientations towards community and environment (Companies Act, 2013). 
Therefore, we ascertain how firms are orientated towards community and 
environment versus other stakeholders prior to the law. If the existing orientations 
towards these two stakeholders are low, we can expect CSR law to substantially 
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change CSO in the future. Accordingly, we create a composite index of 
environment and community––CEC, and club the rest of the stakeholders into a 
separate category. Using the Kruskal-Wallis technique (Field, 2009), we test 
whether there are significant differences between firms’ orientations towards CEC 
vis-à-vis other orientations (Table 4.6). We also conduct pairwise comparison 
between CEC and other stakeholder orientations using Dunn’s procedure (Field, 
2009) to identify the extent and direction of differences between them (Table 4.7). 
Finally, we plot these differences to visualize the orientation gap between CEC and 
other stakeholders (Figure 4.3). 
Table 4.6: Kruskal-Wallis test for differences between CEC and other orientations 
Years 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
K 107.47*** 101.62*** 107.75*** 117.93*** 121.65*** 141.30*** 
Two-Tailed Test: ***p < 0.0001 
Table 4.7: Pair-wise comparisons using Dunn’s procedure between CEC and other 
orientations 
 Shareholder Customer Employee Partner Corp.Gov. 
2007 -132.59*** -63.59*** -25.01 -15.29 -40.56 
2008 -136.40*** -55.23*** -31.37 -30.57 -50.97*** 
2009 -134.94*** -65.17*** -18.73 -31.73 -38.97 
2010 -143.16*** -81.76*** -27.09 -46.37*** -45.17** 
2011 -142.36*** -83.24*** -22.70 -43.70** -40.57 
2012 -165.27*** -101.53*** -54.24*** -73.90*** -76.06*** 
Two-Tailed Test: **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.0001 
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As expected, firms’ community and environment orientations are significantly and 
positively correlated (rs = +0.34, p<0.001). The Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 4.6) 
shows that the differences between CEC and all other orientations as a group are 
significant for all years 2007-2012.  Upon further investigation through pair-wise 
comparisons (Table 4.7) between CEC and each specific orientation namely, 
shareholder, customer, employee, partner and corporate governance, we find that 
not only is the difference between them significant individually, but also negative 
for most of the years in the block period of 2007-2012. This specifies that CEC 
orientations are significantly low versus the rest of the orientations. What is 
critical is that the primary stakeholder orientations (Clarkson, 1985) i.e. 
shareholder and customer centric orientations of management, are consistently in 
conflict with community and environment. When we plot their mean of rank 
values in a graph (Figure 4.3), we find that the difference between the CEC and 
other orientations is positive, significant and rising over the years 2007-2012. 
These results reflect a potential discord between CEC and rest of the orientations. 
To add further clarity to these results, we run correlation tests to ascertain 
whether the relationship between shareholder and non-shareholder orientations 
is contradictory or harmonious. We employ the Spearman correlation (rs ) test for 
this purpose given the non-parametric nature of our data (Field, 2009). The results 
indicate that the shareholder orientation for BSE S&P firms negatively and 
significantly correlates with employee (rs = -0.13, p <0.001), community (rs = -0.29, 
p<0.0001) and corporate governance (rs = -0.33, p<0.0001) orientations. At an 
industry level (Table 4.8) also, a clear pattern emerges revealing a strong negative 
correlation between shareholder orientation at one end and employee, 
community, environment and corporate governance orientations at the other. 
This finding implies that managers of large firms in India often perceive 
shareholder interests as opposed to non-shareholder interests, and that 
prioritizing the former implies ignoring the latter. 
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Figure 4.3: Orientation gap between CEC and other orientations from 2007-2012 
 
It highlights the classic shareholder versus non-shareholder dilemma among 
managers (Adams et al., 1998) particularly in relation to community and 
environment stakeholders, the prime beneficiaries of a pro-CSR legislation. Our 
finding implies that if the CSR law is implemented as purported, it should lead to 
significant changes in existing stakeholder orientations of large firms in India over 
time in favor of non-shareholder shareholders (particularly community and 
environment as intended by the law).  
The negative correlation between shareholder and corporate governance 
orientation is intriguing primarily because good corporate governance is generally 
understood as the structuring, operating and controlling of a company to foster 
ways in which widely dispersed shareholders can ensure a return on their 
investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Consequently, one would expect corporate 
governance orientation to be positively related with shareholder orientation (La 
Porta et al., 1998).   
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Table 4.8: Correlation matrix between shareholder orientation and stakeholder orientations across industries 
Shareholder Orientation 
 
 Cap.Goods Cement Auto  Finance  Power Oil & Gas Telecom  Pharma  FMCG  IT  Mining  
Customer  -0.30* 0.51* -0.26 -0.09 0.35 0.16 0.54* 0.10 0.21 0.07 0.57** 
Employee -0.62*** -0.44 -0.01 -0.07 0.19 0.17 -0.60** -0.46* -0.42* 0.08 -0.41** 
Partner  -0.05 0.25 0.49** 0.25** 0.38 0.44** -0.36 0.01 -0.01 -0.17 0.14 
Environment -0.30* -0.01 -0.53** 0.01 -0.339 -0.08 -0.06 -0.17 0.12 -0.09 -0.17 
Community  -0.55*** -0.11 -0.47** -0.11 -0.12 -0.42** -0.62** -0.40* -0.15 -0.40* -0.16 
Corp.Gov.  -0.27* -0.35 -0.78*** -0.11 -0.38 -0.13 -0.42 -0.61** -0.39 0.19 -0.29 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.001 ***p < 0.0001 
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We focus our analysis on three industries, i.e. capital goods, automobile and 
pharmaceutical, that display a significant negative correlation between the two 
orientations (Table 4.8). In all three sectors in our sample, family promoters 
(individuals who set up the firm) and/or institutional investors tend to be the 
largest shareholders. As per the corporate governance literature, in cases where 
promoters or institutions are the majority shareholders, they can directly monitor 
management, and this reduces the need for disclosing information through 
corporate disclosures, which is reflective of their peculiar corporate governance 
practices (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). In addition, in an emerging country context, 
agency conflicts arise not between managers and widely dispersed shareholders, 
but rather between promoters (having dual class shares) and other shareholders 
(Pande & Kaushik, 2012; Stout, 2012). In such cases, promoters have greater 
power over resource allocation decisions as well as over board of directors and 
management, and they purposely intend to keep transparency low (Shah, 2009), 
supporting the significant negative correlation between corporate governance and 
shareholder orientations. 
4.5.1 Robustness check 
Prior research suggests that voluntary CSR practices, and hence orientations, may 
also be affected by firm size, financial performance and maturity of the firm 
(Gamerschlag, Möller, & Verbeeten, 2011; Sharma, 2002). To ensure robustness of 
our results and avoid the impact of exogenous variables on our model, we check 
for correlations between the seven orientations and firm size measured by sales, 
financial performance measured by slack and age of the firm measured by the 
number of years since incorporation. We find only two significant correlations 
between employee orientation and age (+0.13, p<0.05) and environment 
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orientation and firm size (+0.24, p<0.05). Subsequently, we run regression models 
on these variables to estimate their impact on changes in orientations. The 
regression model was found to be weak and not significant (results available upon 
request). Therefore, we can conclude that our results are robust and do not 
appear to be affected by differences in firm size, performance or age. 
4.6 Discussion of findings and theoretical propositions 
In this section, we critically discuss our findings on CSO to uncover insights 
anchored in institutional theory applied at the industry level and draw relevant 
theoretical implications. Although there are multiple interesting results, we focus 
on four key factors namely, the degree of competitive dynamics, nature of 
products and services, extent of negative externalities and social activism, and 
exposure to international markets that can together shed more light on industry 
specific CSR.  
At the outset, our assessment of CSO in India during the six years prior to the CSR 
law suggests a pre-dominance of shareholder centric orientations across 
industries, yet we find the prevalence of non-shareholder orientations in varying 
proportions. Oil and gas, and metal and mining industries in India tend to exhibit 
the highest shareholder orientation in our sample. Interestingly, both of these 
industries are oligopolies (Livemint, 2009). In situations where competition is low 
and firms have enormous power, the tendency to extract profits is higher and 
firms can withstand coercive institutional pressures that are not strong enough to 
influence firms’ profitability and survival (Campbell, 2007). In addition, these 
industries present their own specific set of operational conditions and constraints 
that may increase shareholder pressure on profitability. For instance, the oil and 
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gas sector faces financial constraints due to shortage of fuel and state enforced 
price caps (Lee, 2013). The metal and mining sector, on the other hand, depends 
heavily on the state for securing mine allocations and their respective pricing. 
Often, this dependency together with institutional voids prevalent in emerging 
contexts promotes illicit political donations pressuring firms to recover these extra 
costs (Frynas, 2005). That said, although the oil and gas industry falls in the same 
cluster as metal and mining on its environment orientations with no significant 
differences, yet the mean orientations on CEC are higher for the oil and gas sector 
in comparison to the metal and mining sector. Notably, oil and gas sector in our 
sample has a larger proportion of state owned firms, while majority of the mining 
firms in our sample belong to the private sector. The power industry also 
demonstrates similar dynamics such that along with an oligopolistic structure, the 
power industry in our sample is dominated by state owned firms. While firms in 
this industry exhibit one of the lowest shareholder orientations, they also display a 
higher environment and community orientation. 
Corroborating the two observations, private sector ownerships in oligopolistic 
market dynamics seem to exert greater pressure on firms to adopt a shareholder 
orientation leading to a wider gap between shareholder and non-shareholder 
orientations. At the same time, such market conditions can weaken the coercive 
institutional pressures on firms towards adopting a wider stakeholder orientation. 
Therefore, oligopolistic industries are more likely to adopt a stronger shareholder 
orientation. However, state participation increases coercive pressures to conform 
to social expectations and consequently pushes firms towards a more responsible 
orientation towards social stakeholders. This is evident in the oil and gas industry 
that adopts a stronger CEC orientation, similar to the state dominated power 
industry, unlike the private sector dominated metal and mining industry. This 
brings us to our first proposition: 
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Proposition 1: In the presence of oligopolistic dynamics at the industry level, a 
higher proportion of private ownership is likely to reduce the effect of coercive 
institutional pressures to adopt a pro-community and pro-environment orientation. 
On the other hand, a higher proportion of state ownership is likely to increase the 
effect of coercive institutional pressures to adopt a pro-community and pro-
environment orientation.  
 
At the other spectrum, some industries tend to be highly competitive. In our 
sample, the industries that are representative of such a market structure are 
telecom, IT, pharmaceuticals, automobile, and FMCG (Battelle, 2014). These 
industries cluster together and display the highest customer orientation in our 
sample (Table 4.5). Primarily belonging to the business-to-consumer segment, this 
cluster is highly visible in the communities. Some of these products directly impact 
consumer health and wellbeing such as pharmaceuticals, and others such as IT and 
telecom are often blamed for creating a “digital divide” in emerging and 
developing countries (Hoekstra, 2003; Verboven, 2011). Accordingly, institutional 
pressures for legitimization in these industries are very strong. As per the 2014 
R&D funding forecast (Battelle, 2014), driven by intense competition and 
consumer demands, the share of emerging countries in global R&D spending is 
rising rapidly, specifically in consumer centric industries, faster than the share of 
the developed economies. High competition from international and domestic 
players intensify mimetic pressures to innovate and spend on research, at the 
same time growth of the consumer movement enforces coercive pressures to 
follow quality standards such as ISO 9000. It is clear that business-to-consumer 
industries producing socially visible products in highly competitive environmental 
contexts are pressured into adopting customer-focused orientations.  
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On the other hand, the business-to-business segment such as metal and mining 
and cement display the lowest customer orientations (Table 4.5). These industries 
are not highly competitive to begin with (Livemint, 2009). The market for industrial 
goods is typically dominated by a few large players with high barriers to entry. The 
products manufactured or extracted are primarily undifferentiated across firms, 
their per capita consumption is low and the value created is usually hidden and 
indirect. Consequently, the coercive pressures from customers as a stakeholder 
group are lower and that brings us to the second proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: In the presence of highly competitive market dynamics at the 
industry level, consumer centric industries are more likely to face mimetic and 
coercive institutional pressures to adopt a higher customer orientation.  
 
Our third observation relates to industry specific externalities in emerging country 
contexts. Industries generate many different types of negative externalities. For 
example, due to outsourcing of manufacturing processes and inherent cost-
competitiveness, the industrial sector in emerging countries is responsible for 
creating a low skill-bad job trap for workers (Booth & Snower, 1996). Often, 
unemployed workers are willing to accept low wages during training periods with 
a view to earn more after the skill training. However, the combination of lower 
demand for high skills, and a higher demand for low skills leads to skill and training 
externalities in industrial firms (ibid). These practices may also have the effect of 
lowering societal expectations of acceptable working conditions besides 
promoting the culture of low wages for manual work. Similarly, the extractive 
industries are infamous for extensive unsustainable mining of minerals by way of 
exploiting industry-government relations (Human Rights Watch, 2012). These 
practices result in deplorable living conditions and a high incidence of diseases in 
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communities around mining sites creating severe health externalities (Pless-
Mulloli, Howel, & Prince, 2001).  
Specifically in India, the industrial sector uses significant amount of contract labor. 
Industries such as cement, capital goods, mining and automobile manufacturers 
meet upto 45% of labor requirements through temporary contract labor 
(Ananthanarayanan, 2014). These laborers are poorly trained with low skills, low 
wages and no union representation that results in skill externalities. Similarly, 
certain types of industries such as power, oil and gas, capital goods, and mining 
inherently create health externalities due to irresponsible environmental 
practices. To discourage such activities, there are different types of legislations in 
the form of hard law such as labor laws prescribing minimum wages, and quotas 
restricting the extent of mining to limit ecological damage (Kolk, Tulder, & Welters, 
1999). However, the coercive and restrictive nature of legislations induces 
industries to find ways and means for circumventing laws particularly because of 
the prevalence of institutional voids in emerging countries (Khanna & Palepu, 
1997; Luo & Tung, 2007). In such circumstances, the third sector plays a watchdog 
role and exerts coercive pressures on industries to comply with societal norms and 
expectations (Frynas, 2005).  
Interestingly, some industries attract third sector attention more than others. For 
example, in the Indian context, industries such as capital goods, metal and mining, 
and cement tend to feel the pressure from NGOs more and consequently adopt a 
higher orientation towards employees (Table 4.5) (Ananthanarayanan, 2014). 
Similarly, metal and mining, capital goods, oil and gas, and power adopt a higher 
orientation than others towards the environment because of the pressure of 
environmental advocacy groups. However, the automobile industry is known for 
employing the most amount of contract labor. Yet, their employee orientations 
tend to be weak. This is because it was only recently in 2012 that the automobile 
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industry in India came under the scanner of social activists (Ananthanarayanan, 
2014). Similarly, pharmaceuticals have a significantly high environmental footprint 
and yet their environment orientations are low because their activities have still 
not attracted adequate social activism (Mathew & Unnikrishnan, 2012). 
From this analysis, we conclude that not all industries attract social activism 
despite the externalities they create because of the differentiated nature of 
institutional pressures at play in each industry. Those that do come under activists’ 
scrutiny, tend to adopt a stronger orientation towards those stakeholders that are 
adversely affected by their functioning because of a potential damage to their 
reputations. Therefore, coercive institutional pressures on firms’ CSO are 
contingent on the nature of externality created by the industry. At the same time, 
these pressures tend to get magnified when the degree of activism surrounding 
the issue is high. We suggest our third proposition as follows: 
 
Proposition 3: Coercive institutional pressure of social activism on specific 
stakeholder orientations is likely to magnify the effect of negative externalities on 
corresponding stakeholder orientations at the industry level.   
 
Our fourth observation pertains to variations in industry exposure to international 
markets and its effect on firm’s CSO. In the Indian context, within the service 
industry, IT firms derive a large part of their business from international markets 
(Forbes, 2007). To gain legitimacy in international markets and meet competition, 
IT firms have to comply with coercive global institutional pressures and at the 
same time mimic the behavior of responsible firms in the global IT industry. This 
generally translates to more responsible HR practices and higher environmental 
standards (Som, 2006), regardless of whether the industry generates negative 
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externalities.  Therefore industries exposed to international markets and 
competition face mimetic pressures to adopt higher standards on both employee 
and environment. 
Conversely, banking industry in India is mainly concentrated in the domestic 
market. Accordingly, it derives legitimacy from standards prevalent in domestic 
markets. Employee and environmental regulations in the domestic market are not 
as stringent for service firms as they are for industrial firms (Ananthanarayanan, 
2014). This helps to explain that the finance industry has a lower orientation 
towards both employee and environmental stakeholders due to lack of coercive 
institutional pressures in the domestic market. This leads to our fourth 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: Greater exposure to international markets is more likely to trigger 
mimetic institutional pressures towards adopting higher non-shareholder 
orientations, irrespective of industry specific negative externalities.  
 
Though the research design of this study was carefully deliberated, and our results 
are supported by the institutional theory framework at the industry level, this 
study remains limited in ways that merit further research. First, while we analyzed 
the largest 100 firms in India, that represented 18 different industries, our sample 
size was effectively reduced and can be considered relatively small for a cross-
industry analysis. To deal with this limitation, for industry level analysis we 
examine only 11 industries where the sample was large enough to robustly 
conduct the required statistical tests. Consequently, some sectors with a smaller 
sample size such as electronics, chemical, sugar, hospitality, real estate and mass 
media were omitted from our industry analysis. There is clearly a room for 
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confirming our findings by focusing on individual sectorial indices. Second, 
although CEO statements are relevant for assessing managerial intentions and 
hence firms’ CSO (Weber & Marley, 2012), it is plausible that some managers may 
not express specific stakeholder orientations through their CEO statements. To 
substantiate our findings, it would be worthwhile to look at other voluntary 
disclosures in conjunction with CEO statements.   
4.7 Conclusion 
Our study seeks to understand corporate stakeholder orientations across 
industries in an emerging country context. Contextualizing this research in India, 
we longitudinally examine the CSO of large firms across multiple industries. We 
maintain that CSO is a legitimacy signal consciously used by firms to demonstrate 
their shareholder and specific stakeholder orientations in the midst of multiple 
coercive, normative and mimetic pressures that differ across industries. Our 
results show that during the six-years preceding the CSR law, firms in India 
demonstrate a pre-dominant pro-shareholder orientation consistent across 
industries. The orientation gap between community and environment (potential 
beneficiaries of the pro-CSR legislation) and other stakeholders is positive, 
significant and growing.  
Yet, there are significant industry differences in non-shareholder orientations. 
Industry specificities such as the degree of competitive dynamics, nature of 
products and services, extent of negative externalities and social activism, and 
exposure to international markets creates differences in institutional pressures at 
the industry level that in turn differentiates across industry stakeholder 
orientations. Regulations promoting CSR and defining CSR (such as in India) that 
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work like a blanket regulation tend to overlook these industry dynamics that 
influence the construction of stakeholder orientations. 
While it appears that some degree of regulatory CSR interventions might be in 
order in emerging countries where firms have a tendency to neglect communities 
and environment, there are two key takeaways that must be emphasized. The first 
one is that setting the same benchmark across industries both in terms of 
minimum investment requirement and stakeholders to be targeted (community 
and environment), despite apparent differences in the nature of the industries, 
existing orientations and the nature and extent of negative externalities, may fail 
to sufficiently encourage deficient stakeholder orientations (Beschorner, 2013; 
Rupp & Williams, 2011). States should possibly try to learn from industry specific 
soft laws that take industry dynamics into consideration for encouraging 
responsible and desirable behaviors.  Second, given institutional voids in emerging 
countries (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) due to corruption, weak governance and faulty 
implementation of laws (Visser, 2008), threats of litigation and punishments for 
non-compliance with hard laws could undermine the development of 
psychologically induced motivations to meet the spirit, and not just the letter, of 
law (Kagan, Gunningham, & Thornton, 2003). The jury, in this case, is still out. 
Note 
1 Under this law, all companies in India, public and private, domestic as well as 
foreign, having a net worth of at least US $83 million or a turnover of US $160 
million or a net profit of US $830,000 will have to contribute 2% of their net profits 
to CSR in India for activities such as promoting poverty reduction, education, 
gender equality, health, vocational skills development and environmental 
sustainability. As per a PWC report (2014), this law is likely to impact about 16,000 
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companies across all industries operating in India. It is expected that this law could 
change the course of CSR approaches of large firms. Our study is based on a six-
year period preceding this legislation.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and future research 
Environmental and social issues represent some of the greatest challenges of our 
times. Finding solutions to such issues, on the one hand, comprise firms’ 
responsibilities as members of society and, on the other hand, enable firms to win 
the trust and support of their stakeholders; thus maintaining their social 
legitimacy while, at the same time, creating significant business opportunities 
through shared value models (Porter & Kramer, 2011). Yet, resolving the many 
internal and external stakeholder issues (Clarkson, 1995) involves investments in 
human and material resources, which could be viewed as a diversion from a firm’s 
core business, presenting its management with dilemmas in the formulation of 
stakeholder orientations. This thesis aims at bringing greater clarity to the debate 
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on the purpose of a business by focusing on corporate stakeholder orientation 
(CSO) and introspecting into its antecedents and assessment. Accordingly, essay I 
of this thesis discusses corporate governance (CG) as an antecedent of stakeholder 
orientations; and essay II and III focus on the aspects related to the assessment of 
stakeholder orientations. 
In this section, I synthesize my findings and observations gleaned from the three 
essays undertaken as part of this PhD thesis. I discuss the contributions that it 
could potentially make toward opening new frontiers in academic research. 
Beyond theoretical implications, I also aspire to provide guidance to business 
organizations, rating agencies and policymakers towards the development and 
sustainment of a responsible society. 
5.1 Corporate governance as an antecedent of corporate 
stakeholder orientations  
Several international organizations, such as the UN World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD), have sought to galvanize the global business 
community into adopting good corporate governance practices for a responsible 
and sustainable development (Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013). However, wider 
stakeholder issues, such as human rights protection throughout global value 
chains, control of bribery and corruption, and the responsible management of 
natural resources, are rarely taken up in corporate boardrooms (Elkington, 2006). 
Despite the proliferation of literature on the need for integration of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) at the boardroom level (Elkington, 2006; Jamali, 
Safieddine, & Rabbath, 2008; Kimball, Palmer, & Marquis, 2012), recent surveys 
have found that CSR issues are being consistently ranked at the lower end of 
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boardroom priorities (Paine, 2014). Weaving the requirements of the sustainability 
agenda into a firm’s very fabric is recommended as the best way to break down 
any resistance and to ensure that responsible and sustainable development 
practices are adopted in earnest (Bansal & DesJardine, 2014; Sneirson, 2009). 
Therefore, the resonant question involves determining which CG indicators and 
variables enable or constrain the adoption of an inclusive approach to creating 
social value.  
Formulating CG to be an antecedent of CSR, my findings highlight that there are 
multiple dimensions of CG namely, institutional, firm, group, and individual levels. 
Examining how these multi-level CG dimensions, their indicators and variables, 
work, not just independently but also from a “holistic” perspective, reveals that 
they are interdependent and interact with each other as they influence the 
formulation of a firm’s stakeholder orientations. This observation holds several 
theoretical and practical implications that could progress future research.  
Theoretically, the over-reliance of CG research on the agency paradigm is called 
into question due to its overly simplistic assumptions regarding human behavior 
(Judge, 2008). Thus, one way to forge ahead in research is to go beyond the 
agency theory. Typically, agency theory conceptualizes managers as being 
shareholder agents and assumes that shareholders act in the interest of society 
(Ward & Filatotchev, 2010). However, it is important to recognize that, while 
shareholders represent themselves and their firms, they are also representative of 
the society at large and, in this respect, become agents of that society. Given the 
strength and power wielded by investors, both inside and outside a firm, double 
agency theory proposes that it is plausible for shareholders––particularly insider 
ones––to also act in ways that may go against the interest of their firms and of 
society (Raelin & Bondy, 2013; Ward & Filatotchev, 2010). Research in the field of 
CG should explore the possibility of double agency conflicts and the need to 
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morally compel shareholders to fulfill their duty towards the society, the interests 
of which they also represent (Quinn & Jones, 1995). Yet another future direction 
involves utilizing the wisdom of theories from the fields of sociology and socio-
psychology, particularly as emerging research has revealed that CEO-boardroom 
interactions and boardroom processes, rather than boardroom structures, seem 
to hold the answer to what makes firms more responsible. Here, role theory 
(Solomon, Surprenant, Czepiel, & Gutman, 1985) could help theorize the 
expansion of the role played by the board of directors beyond that of merely 
monitoring managers, as proposed by agency theory, to that of advising and 
counseling them toward making well-balanced decisions aimed at stakeholder, 
and not just shareholder, satisfaction.  
A second way in which theoretical advancement could be achieved lies in 
recognizing that the underlying complexities that exist between the various CG 
variables and the effects they have on CSR cannot be fully comprehended by 
viewing them through a single theoretical lens (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). A 
more nuanced understanding of CG can make headway through the adoption of 
multiple theoretical lenses at various levels of analysis and by equally emphasizing 
both the financial and social performances of firms (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & 
Ganapathi, 2007). In this domain, one of the main contributions made by my 
thesis lies in recognizing the importance of nested CG structures. Future research 
can delve deeper into the analysis of the different configurations of these nested 
structures with a view to understanding their effects on CSR behaviors. For 
example, at the institutional and firm levels, research is needed to understand 
firm investor behaviors within concentrated ownerships, and their tendency to 
encourage or discourage CSR not just in relation to their individual investment 
horizons and motivations, but, at the same time, as a consequence of the 
institutional environments in which they are embedded (Rees & Rodionova, 2015).  
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Figure 5.1: Nested corporate governance levels 
 
Similarly, further research should be carried out on those aspects of managerial 
entrenchment that tend to impact managerial discretion at both the institutional 
and individual levels. At the institutional level, regulations aimed at curbing 
managerial discretion are enacted and imposed across multiple countries; this is 
primarily done to protect shareholder interests by minimizing agency conflicts. At 
the same time and unless supported by formal and informal institutions, 
managerial discretion is a necessary condition for the adoption of stakeholder 
orientations. Therefore, the curbing of managerial discretion to protect 
shareholder value is, by default, likely to negatively affect wider stakeholder 
engagements. Again, further research is needed here to evaluate the 
institutionalization of restricting managerial entrenchment across multiple 
countries, the informal institutional structures prevalent in these contexts (such as 
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the culture and values influencing individual managers’ socio-psychological 
attitudes toward supporting a wider stakeholder orientation), and any possible 
imbalance and mismatch between the two factors that could create dilemmas and 
obstacles against addressing the sustainability agenda. 
From a practical perspective, the observations I make in this thesis raise a number 
of concerns for policymakers, especially those in developing countries, most of 
which are inspired by their developed counterparts, particularly with regard to 
their corporate governance reforms. For example, in a recent move, the Securities 
and Exchange Board of India made it mandatory for publicly listed firms to appoint 
at least one woman on their boards of directors, in compliance with the 2013 
Companies Act. This reform was brought on by the need to institute a higher 
degree of gender equality and more diversity for decision-making at the board 
level in accordance with the trends, found in several developed countries, of 
introducing quotas or soft laws aimed at the increased promotion of women to 
the boardrooms (Orsagh, 2014). By virtue of their greater diversity in skills and 
expertise, and access to networks and knowledge, gender-diversified boards are 
known to make more socially balanced and responsible decisions. Interestingly, in 
complying with this regulation, one in every six Indian companies appointed 
female relatives of promoters as directors, raising questions regarding their value 
as resources for facilitating decision-making, while also calling into question their 
independence from management (Srivastava & Singh, 2015). This exemplifies how, 
in countries in which the gender gap is substantial and the informal institutions 
are male dominated, firm and group level structural changes towards promoting 
inclusivity in boardrooms are likely to be implemented more symbolically than 
substantially. Thus, to ensure the success of any firm level structural reforms 
aimed at encouraging socially responsible behaviors, it is appropriate for them to 
be complemented by deeper and more ingrained changes in the institutional 
makeup of the contexts in which the firms operate (Brown, Helland, & Smith, 
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2006; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002).  
5.2 Assessing de facto corporate stakeholder orientations  
My thesis also touches upon the assessment of CSOs in multiple contexts. Using a 
multi-theoretical lens, I draw on signaling theory, institutional theory and the 
decoupling logic to conceptualize the CSO construct that, to maintain a balanced 
social legitimacy image, include privately held corporate intentions towards those 
stakeholders that are seen as critical and relevant (i.e., corporate private 
intentions), and publicly proclaimed corporate gestures towards those perceived 
as being inconsequential (i.e., corporate public pretentions). This thesis 
demonstrates how de facto CSO can be uncovered by filtering out corporate public 
pretentions from stakeholder signaling. Alternatively, assessing corporate 
stakeholder signaling over time identifies the management’s long-term 
commitment towards specific stakeholders, which is indicative of its de facto 
orientations. Furthermore, it also captures the differences in degrees of corporate 
posturing as well as differences in stakeholder orientations across different 
countries and industries.  
Theoretically, one of the main contributions herein lies in unveiling the underlying 
multi-dimensionality in corporate orientations. While theories on decoupling are 
currently focused on either policy-practice or means-end decoupling (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012), the multi-dimensionality in orientation is indicative of decoupling at 
the intent level itself. Recent research on intent and action suggests that all moral 
judgments (CSR being one) can be explained as “dyadic interactions” between a 
moral agent and a moral patient (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). Moral agents (such 
as managers) have intentions and the capacity to translate them into behaviors; 
moral patients (such as stakeholders) are essentially recipients who experience 
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the impact of the above-mentioned intentions and behaviors (ibid). Because intent 
and impact are vested in two different entities, many studies tend to evaluate the 
impacts of managerial behaviors independently of their original intents. The 
growing exclusively impact-based focus of corporate social performance literature 
(Wood, 2010) is a case in point. However, psychological research suggests that any 
perception of impact is itself swayed by its related presumed intentions (Ames & 
Fiske, 2013; Gray & Wegner, 2008). Even in legal literature differential treatments 
are meted out to entities that, although they may have caused the same degree of 
harm, did so as the outcome of differing intentions (Cushman, 2008; Darley & 
Pittman, 2003). Therefore, the evaluation of an activity as being responsible or 
irresponsible is a product of the evaluation of both its intent, as vested in the 
managers, and its impact, as experienced by the stakeholders. Management 
research on CSR is increasingly treating stakeholder intents and impacts as being 
orthogonal, when they are actually cognitively not separate from each other.  
At the same time, while intent manifests itself in behavior, behavior may not 
always be reflective of intent (Pattanaik, 2013); this is true of the business case for 
CSR (Margolis & Walsh 2001, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003), in which 
organizations may engage in CSR not out of considerations of responsibility, but 
rather of opportunity. Those that do adopt an ideological stance towards 
responsible stakeholder behaviors (such as WholeFoods and Patagonia) develop 
and follow-through long-term visions towards it. By contrast, those that view CSR 
as more of a business opportunity may modulate their stakeholder investments 
accordingly; curtailing them when CSR ceases to be an opportunity, or when 
presented with more appealing ones (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Fernandez-
Feijoo, Romero, & Ruiz, 2014). Therefore, amidst the prevalent information 
asymmetry, evaluating corporate intent over time may shed more light on a firm’s 
long-term vision. Understanding the stakeholder engagement horizon of a firm 
will be particularly relevant for specific stakeholders and their respective 
  239 | Page 
 
investments, and also for rating agencies that, often, get it totally wrong in 
designating firms as thought leaders when the latter are merely very good at 
pretending to be so. Beyond establishing the relationship between corporate 
intent and its actual impact on stakeholders and society, mapping intentions and 
matching them with historical corporate social performance would shed more 
light on any potential firm decoupling behaviors. Thus, future research must pay 
greater attention to the intents behind CSR behaviors. 
While I propose the importance of intent, I do not imply that intentional 
irresponsible behaviors are more destructive than unintentional ones. However, 
focusing on intent could have important practical implications. For instance, jointly 
evaluating intent and impact over time could increase the possibility of unveiling 
recurring irresponsible behaviors among firms. This would be valuable to those 
stakeholders that were heavily invested in firms and could end up losing 
substantially due to the latter’s well-conceived public posturing. It would enable 
stakeholders to make more informed decisions about their investments, while also 
encouraging stakeholder activism to pressure firms into adopting more 
responsible intents towards specific behaviors. At the same time, it would be of 
interest to policymakers, who could formulate CG structures designed to curb and 
discourage intentional irresponsible behaviors, thus enabling rating agencies to 
evaluate firms more accurately.  
5.3 Limitations and future research  
This thesis suffers from some limitations that merit further research. Primarily my 
understanding of corporate governance as an antecedent of corporate 
responsibility dwelled upon those aspects that are discussed most explicitly in the 
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CG-CSR literature. Beyond the aspects recognized in this thesis, there are other CG 
variables that, although studied in depth in relation to shareholder outcomes, are 
not examined expansively in relation to non-financial outcomes and were not 
considered in this thesis for reasons of parsimony. One such area of research is 
related to the diversity of boards that goes beyond gender diversity and extends 
to racial, national and generational diversity among boards (Cox, Lobel, & 
McLeod, 1991; Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014; Kets de Vries & Miller, 1984). While 
a few studies assess the effect of these variables on social outcomes (Galbreath, 
2011; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013; Ben Barka & Dardour, 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013), more research should be conducted in a cross-national setup to capture 
their effect on CSR conclusively. This becomes particularly relevant as board of 
directors become more multi-national due to increasing globalization of firms.  In 
a similar stance, the effect of foreign investors on CSR is presently explored in a 
limited fashion. Yet, with their power and voice, foreign investors (holding large 
stakes) can effectively monitor managers and play an important role in creating 
international pressure towards corporate responsibility (Choi, Lee, & Park, 2013; 
Oh, Chang, & Martynov, 2011; Rahim & Alam, 2014). This phenomenon needs to 
be studied in multiple contexts, particularly across developing countries, where 
governments could potentially encourage foreign investments with a view to 
increase investments in development-oriented CSR (Jain & Jamali, 2015). 
In relation to the assessment of stakeholder orientations, I develop and validate a 
new methodological approach that involves hand-coding of voluntary corporate 
communications to impute corporate orientation/intent. This approach limits the 
extent of data mined in this thesis. Therefore, substantial opportunities exist to 
computerize the coding process through the use of machine learning that could 
enable the mining of enormous amounts of different kinds of corporate 
communications, presenting exciting opportunities to analyze corporate intent 
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longitudinally, and across multiple countries and contexts, which could open 
several new avenues of research. At the micro level, one could track and study the 
evolution of corporate intent in specific top management teams. This could 
highlight how different TMT compositions enable the construction of firms’ social 
images. Research could also explore how corporate orientations change over time 
with the life cycles of firms (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2011), which could improve 
our understanding of the evolution of CSOs. At the macro level, computerized 
thematic coding could enable us to assess the differences in corporate orientation 
across multiple institutional contexts on a much larger scale, making it possible for 
researchers to test the extent of convergence in terms of stakeholder salience 
across nations (Heyes, Lewis, & Clark, 2012; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Witt & 
Redding, 2013), given the rising support for stakeholder thinking.  
Furthermore, I extrapolate corporate intent based on the qualitative analysis of a 
specific type of executive communication. Although, the findings of this thesis 
provide preliminary empirical insights on the existence of signaling and decoupling 
phenomena while uncovering the multi-dimensionality of CSO; the results 
reported are indicative at best. While replication research is typically not favored 
in management research, I argue that the CSO code developed in this thesis 
should be applied over a more exhaustive set of corporate communications and a 
larger sample of firms over a longer-time horizon to validate the multi-
dimensionality of CSO as proposed in this thesis. Extending this to a cross-cultural 
setting, a new avenue of inquiry could be to assess whether some national 
cultures are more susceptible to decoupling than others.  
In addition, the impact of firm-specific contingencies on CSO cannot be ruled out. 
At the firm level, researchers could examine the evolution of corporate intent 
embedded in corporate communications over-time to test for the intent 
continuity since inception and the effect of specific firm characteristics on the 
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development of CSOs. In parallel, as a conclusive test of decoupling in CSO signals, 
it is necessary to have a control sample over a non-crisis time period. If the 
decoupling between corporate public pretentions and corporate private intentions 
is captured only in the context of the crisis and not otherwise – it could help to 
test the construct validity as well as lend further support to the application of 
signaling theory and the process of decoupling to the field of managerial intent. To 
add to our knowledge on CSO at a sectorial level, future studies are warranted to 
test the propositions and to confirm the exploratory findings of this thesis, 
especially given the important practical implications of this topic.  
Finally, this thesis is limited in its scope and focuses on the conceptualization and 
assessment of the CSO construct and its antecedents. It does not evaluate the 
implications of an alignment between CG systems and a stakeholder orientation, 
which could have important consequences both for economic, social and 
environmental performances and for how these outcomes are achieved. There are 
three prominent ways in which future research could progress in this direction.  
First, stakeholder orientation has the potential of altering the relationships that 
firms have with their internal and external stakeholders in a manner that can 
produce “particular sets of social value both outside and inside the organization” 
(Brickson, 2007: 866). CG systems that integrate stakeholder orientation can 
change how firms are valued; going beyond economic value to include social value 
creation. Second, the alignment of CG systems and stakeholder orientation would 
provide multiple stakeholders with voices. As of now, the voices of outside-
directors representing different stakeholders are overshadowed by the voices of 
directors representing the powerful financial investor lobby (de Villiers et al., 
2011; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013). Once CG structures facilitate and support multi-
stakeholder representatives in a more integrated manner, it could be expected 
that there would be a genuine and sincere exchange of knowledge towards the 
adoption of a long-term vision for a firm that does not pit the interests of one 
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stakeholder group against another, but rather helps integrate them towards 
maximizing value for society. Third, this could have significant effects on the 
power dynamics between boards and management. The agency logic would get 
weaker as managers would no longer opportunistically be able to play social- 
against economic-stakeholders. Eventually, shareholders might come to not view 
their stakes in firms as positions of priority over those of other stakeholders, 
changing the equation from doing-good-by-doing-well to doing-well-by-doing-
good. This would likely spur social and environmental innovations that would 
enable stakeholder-oriented firms to become more sustainable.  
In closing, I would like to argue that, as long as socially responsible behavior is 
viewed as a business opportunity rather than an inherent responsibility, the 
debate on the purpose of a business will continue to linger. For our future 
generations to survive and flourish, responsibility and opportunity need to be 
rendered compatible in the sense that, while responsibility should not be viewed 
through an opportunistic lens, opportunity should be exploited more responsibly. 
This would help us establish a culture of responsible corporate governance while 
continuing to grow and develop our businesses towards a more just and 
sustainable world.  
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